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ABSTRACT
LATIN AMERICAN-UNITED STATES SECURITY RELATIONS AND 
THE POWER ASYMMETRY DIVIDE
Matthew R. Slater 
Old Dominion University, 2002 
Director: Dr. Francis Adams
Security relations between Latin American and the United States are generally 
well explained by hegemonic stability theory. Succinctly stated, hegemonic stability 
theory explains that in systems with a hegemonic power there is a greater likelihood of 
security cooperation. This is because a hegemon provides public goods, such as a stable 
currency or security from outside interference, and in turn, the less powerful states 
acknowledge the leadership of the dominant state. When compared to other regions it is 
readily apparent that the U.S. and Latin America do not have major security issues on the 
level of East Asia, the Middle East, Africa, or even Europe.
However, a review of the literature indicates a persistent gap between U.S. and 
Latin American responses to security related issues such as state sovereignty, arms trade, 
humanitarian intervention, the illegal narcotics trade, and technology transfer.
Hegemonic stability explains the relatively peaceful relations between the U.S. and Latin 
America; however, it fails to explain the undercurrent of distrust.
This study focuses on the degree of power asymmetry between the hegemon and 
weaker states in the system to explain why the same hegemonic system may create greater 
levels of cooperation during different periods. A hegemonic system by definition 
contains a certain level of power asymmetry, however this study asks the question: When
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power asymmetry becomes more extreme does it erode security cooperation between the 
U.S. and Latin America?
To explore this issue empirical evidence is gathered from the last century of Latin 
American-U.S. security relations. The ebb and flow of security cooperation is analyzed 
and reveals that broad patterns in the system emerge over time demonstrating that as the 
power of the U.S. increases, the likelihood of U.S. leaders to commit to unilateral actions 
in Latin America increases. During the same time, the likelihood of Latin American 
leaders to be more sensitive to U.S. policies and search for alternatives to U.S. dominance 
also increases. Although U.S. hegemony contributes to greater security cooperation as 
hegemonic stability theory predicts, when U.S. power reaches higher levels compared to 
Latin American, the gains of hegemonic stability deteriorate and security cooperation 
becomes more difficult.
The dissertation contributes to international relations scholarship in two important 
ways. First, it demands that when hegemonic stability theory is applied it cannot be 
assumed that all levels of power asymmetry create security cooperation equally. Second, 
it applies formal international relations theory to Latin American-U.S. relations, a 
geographical area in which comparative political theory is more commonly utilized.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
This work is dedicated to my wife, Denise U. Slater, my daughter, 
Monica R. Slater and my parents, Juanita R. Slater and 
Robert W. Slater. I thank them all for helping me keep faith, and 
my wife and daughter for allowing me the time 
away from them to complete the project.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
VACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I thank all of my committee members. Dr. Regina Karp and Dr. Donald Zeigler. 
particularly Dr. Francis Adams who continually provided constructive and timely 
feedback throughout the dissertation process. I also thank everyone in the Graduate 
Program in International Studies department who aided my efforts to complete my 
dissertation. To Ms. Elizabeth Thornton and Dr. Pat Rollins: although I can not share a 
handshake or a smile with you on graduation day, and thank-you personally for your 
efforts, I know you will both be there to witness the moment in some fashion.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter Page
L THE BURDEN OF POWER ASYMMETRY............................................... 1
II. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY, POWER
ASYMMETRY AND SECURITY COOPERATION................................ 19
m. THE FORGING OF U.S. HEGEMONY ( 1823-
1944)............................................................................................................. 64
IV. THE RISE OF STRONG HEGEMONY (1945-1969)............................... 95
V. CONTINUED DETERIORATION (1970-1979)...................................... 126
VL THE MARGINALIZATION OF SECURITY
COOPERATION (1980-1989)............................................................ -...159
VH. AN ERA OF NEW OPPORTUNITIES (1990-2001)................................ 192
VIII. FINAL ANALYSIS: COOPERATION UNDER ASYMMERTY 226
BIBLIOGRAPHY.............................................................................................................. 246
VITA..................................................................................................................................... 267




L. Pan American Conferences Before World War II.................................................... 82
2. Regional Dominance in Terms of GNP, 1963-1969.................................................97
3. Annual Military Expenditure. 1963-1970.................................................................98
4. U.S. Lend Lease Aid to Latin America....................................................................100
5. Latin American Aid Sources. 1961-1970................................................................ 120
6. Regional Dominance in Terms GNP. 1970-1979................................................... 129
7. Annual Military Expenditure. 1970-1979................................................................130
8. Increasing Oil Prices. 1970-1980............................................................................. 134
9. Regional Dominance in Terms of GNP. 1980-1989............................................... 162
10. Imports/Exports to U.S. (As a Percentage of Total World
Trade.........................................................................................................................163
11. Annual Military Expenditure, 1980-1989................................................................ 163
12. Brazilian Arms Exports and Imports. 1985-1993................................................... 181
13. Regional Dominance in Terms of GNP, 1990-1999............................................... 193
14. Import/Exports to U.S. (As a Percentage of Total World
Trade).................................................................................................................... _.194
15. Annual Military Expenditure. 1990-1997............................................................. -195
16. Brazilian Trade Trends (Exports as Percentage of Total World
Trade).....................................................................................................................-204
17. Regional Issues Demonstrating Security Cooperation. 1990-2001.........................221





Relationship Between Hegemonic Power and Security
Cooperation................................................................................................................33
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
LIST OF ACRONYMS
AFP: Alliance for Progress
ANCOM: Andean Common Market
CARICOM: Caribbean Community and Common Market
CECLA: Special Commission for Coordination o f Latin American
CIA: Central Intelligence Agency
COAS: Council o f the Organization o f American States
EC: European Community
EU: European Union
FARC: Revolutionary Armed Forces o f Colombia
FTAA: Free Trade Area o f the Americas
GDP: Gross Domestic Product
GNP: Gross National Product
IADB: Inter-American Defense Board
IMF: International Monetary Fund
LAFTA: Latin American Free Trade Area
MNC: Multi-National Corporation
MERCOSUR: Southern Common Market
MTCR: Missile Technology Control Regime
NAFTA: North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OAS: Organization o f American States
OECS: Organization o f Eastern Caribbean States
SELA: Latin American Economic System




USSR: Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1CHAPTER I 
THE BURDEN OF POWER ASYMMETRY
The end of the Cold War ushered in an era of improved inter-American security 
cooperation. The Cold War had seemed to inhibit the ability of regional states to work 
together for the benefit of regional stability and prosperity. Many analysts noted the 
importance of the Cold War on regional relations: “In response to Soviet challenges the 
United States (U.S.) sought to extend and consolidate its political supremacy throughout 
the hemisphere." resulting in a U.S. “anti-communist crusade."1 Regional experts noted 
that due to its anti-communist perceptions the U.S. proceeded to intervene in Brazil. 
Chile. Cuba. Dominican Republic. Grenada. Guatemala, and Nicaragua during the Cold 
War. and indirectly to influence the internal affairs of regional states in other cases. 
These actions had the effect of polarizing regional relations and undermining efforts at 
regional security cooperation.
Even with the end of the Cold War an invisible force still seemed to be curbing 
cooperative efforts. Alongside the successes of the post-CoId War era. such as the 
negotiations and implementation of the peace plan to end the Peru-Ecuador border 
conflict in 1997, there were also surprising failures. The Organization of American 
States (OAS) did not fulfill its collective responsibilities to defend democracy in Haiti to
This dissertation uses the following document for its formatting standard: Kate L. 
Turabian. A Manual fo r  Writers o f Term Papers. Theses, and Dissertations. 6th ed. 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).
lPeter H. Smith. Talons o f the Eagle: Dynamics o f U.S.-Latin American Relations 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 117.
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the United Nations (UN-).2 As David Forsythe noted, there is an abstract commitment to 
human rights and democracy in Latin America, but an unwillingness to politically 
support them / Despite the fact that the drug trade severely damages the social and 
economic institutions in Latin America, cooperation with the U.S. on the drug war has 
not been especially forthcoming by Latin American states. The problem of instability in 
Colombia, which is at least partially due to the narcotic trafficking, is almost ignored by 
neighboring states. Leaders of these countries fear U.S. involvement may lead to an 
escalation and a U.S. occupation, despite assurances from U.S. officials that this is not 
the intent. Although the benefits of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) continue to fuel Mexican economic growth, some Latin American states are 
reluctant to enter into a broader hemispheric accord. In an almost reflexive response, 
regional states doubled their efforts to create and support a regional trade agreement that 
purposely excludes the U.S. Latin American disagreement over the government of Cuba 
has declined in the post-Cold War era but still remains a thorny issue between the U.S. 
and Latin America.
Although some reviews of Latin American-U.S. security cooperation focus on the 
detrimental impact of the Cold War. patterns that persist today began well before the 
forty-year confrontation between the U.S. and Soviet Union. Mexico and Argentina were 
both suspicious of U.S. intentions during the first Pan American meeting in 1889. U.S.
2Anthony Maingot, “Haiti: Sovereign Consent versus State-Centric Sovereignty.” 
in Beyond Sovereignty. Collectively Defending Democracy in the Americas, ed. Tom 
Farer (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1996), p. 190.
^David P. Forsythe, “Human Rights, the United States, and the Organization of 
American States,” Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. I (February, 1991): 66.
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3interventions were not unique to the Cold War, and occurred with frequency during the 
first twenty years of the twentieth century. The effect of U.S. interventions was similar to 
what was experienced during the Cold War: Latin American states actively sought to 
balance U.S. military and economic power because it was viewed as a threat to state 
sovereignty.
There were also eras of greater stability in regional security relations. After the 
Civil War in the U.S.. and its subsequent rise to world power. Latin America reaction to 
U.S. power was more subdued. The U.S. assumed the role as the primary enforcer of the 
Monroe Doctrine, a position that was traditionally filled by Great Britain. Through U.S. 
military action and diplomacy several European forays into the region were reversed, and 
U.S. power was considered beneficial by many states in the Americas. The era before the 
Great Depression also resulted in better inter-American security relations. President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt extended his Good Neighbor Policy to Latin America with positive 
results. Relations improved in time to enable a unified effort against the Axis powers 
during World War II. This period of goodwill culminated in the signing of the Rio Treaty 
in 1947 and the creation of the OAS the following year. After the Cold War security 
cooperation once again seemed to improve to some degree.
Several theories exist to explain the lack of security cooperation in the region. As 
mentioned above, the overlay of the Cold War has been debated as a major impediment 
to regional security cooperation. However, problems began before the Cold War, and 
persisted to some degree in the post-CoId War era. although it is clear the Cold War 
played a role in amplifying security problems.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4Many theses concentrate on the deleterious impact of U.S. intervention on 
regional states. David Dent's meticulously records U.S. interventions in Latin America 
in his volume: The Legacy o f the Monroe Doctrine. Dent blames the Monroe Doctrine 
for U.S. interventionist policy, and this policy for helping to destabilize Latin America.4 
Although this approach to understanding regional security dynamics is logical, it does not 
comprehensively explain the security dynamics of regional security relations. For 
example, holding U.S. interventionist policy accountable for regional security dynamics 
does not sufficiently explain the rise and fall of security cooperation over time since U.S. 
policy is assumed to be consistently interventionist beginning with the introduction of the 
Monroe Doctrine in 1823. If intervention were the primary problem one would expect a 
consistent Latin American reaction, building in intensity for the last hundred years, and 
culminating in a Latin American collective security agreement directed against the U.S.
An alternative explanation for problems in regional security relations holds the 
lack of institutionalization accountable. Richard J. Bloomfield offers collective security 
as an alternative to intervention.5 However, collective security has been an ongoing 
effort in the Americas since the creation of Pan Americanism in 1889. reiterated by the 
creation of the OAS in 1948. Despite the best of intentions and efforts by many Latin 
American and U.S. leaders these institutions failed to create a reliable alternative for 
regional security relations.
■^ David W. Dent, The Legacy o f the Monroe Doctrine: A Reference Guide to U.S. 
Involvement in Latin America and the Caribbean (Westport: Greenwood Press. 1999), 
14-16.
5Richard J. Bloomfield, “Suppressing the Interventionist Impulse: Toward a New 
Collective Security System in the Americas,” in Alternative to Intervention: A New U.S.- 
Latin American Security Relationship, eds. Richard J. Bloomfield and Gregory F. 
Treverton (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1990), 115.
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Some scholars focus on one constant dynamic through the history of U.S.-Latin
American security relations, the persistence of U.S. hegemony. Bloomfield summarized
the asymmetry of power in the region as follows:
“Their [Latin Americans] enduring problem has been how to cope with the greater 
power of the United States: how to benefit from it and avoid being dominated by 
it. For North Americans, the problem has been how to prevent their enemies from 
using the weakness of Latin American politics from threatening U.S. national 
interests.*'6
Cole Blaiser writes that U.S. behavior “reflects the huge power gap between the United 
States and the smaller powers in its sphere of influence in the Americas.” He continues 
the observation. “The reason is not primarily one of leaders or policies per se. It is the 
result of power disparities.”7 Blaiser acknowledges that all the good policies in the world 
cannot change the structural reality of the U.S.-Latin American relationship. Peter H. 
Smith finds that this disparity in power, at least in terms of GDP. is growing. In 1950 per 
capita gross domestic product (GDP) of the U.S. was seven times that of all Latin 
American states combined, and by 1990 this increased to ten times larger.8
The relationship between the U.S. and Latin America is one of hegemony. Blaiser 
writes of hegemony in terms of dominance. Hegemonic stability theory views hegemony 
in a more complex manner. Hegemonic stability is **the view that stability in
6Ibid.
Cole Blaiser, The Hovering Giant: U.S. Responses to Revolutionary Changes in 
Latin America 1910-1985 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. 1985), 298.
8Peter H. Smith. “Strategic Options for Latin America.” in Latin America in the 
New International System, eds. Joseph S. Tulchin and Ralph H. Espach (Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner, 2001), 38.
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international relations stems from the presence of hegemony.”9 This stability is the 
product of a symbiotic relationship in which the hegemon provides public goods in 
exchange for acknowledgement of its leadership and the benefits that go with it. Two 
examples of public goods are security from outside intervention, or providing a market 
for the goods of weaker states in the hegemonic relationship. Unipolarity is a 
relationship stemming from dominance: meaning that there is an understanding among 
states that the relationship is solely based on power. One is more likely to find 
institutions in hegemonic stability than in a situation of strict unipolarity.
A fundamental characteristic of the U.S. hegemonic system in the Americas is 
that it seems to fluctuate between strong and weaker hegemony. The fluctuation seems to 
play a role in the kinds of public goods the hegemon is willing to provide. As James R. 
Kurth points out, "The inter-American collective security system has never been based 
upon an identity of interests between the United States and Latin America.”10 The reality 
is that regional cooperation has been based on a bargain in which neither side clearly 
understood the expectations of the other. Latin America expected economic aid in the 
form of debt relief. U.S. investments, opening of the U.S. market, and direct aid for 
infrastructure projects. The U.S. expected acknowledgement of its leadership in turn for 
protection from potential interlocutors. Latin America sought stability from internal 
social and economic threats, whereas the U.S. focused on providing stability against
Vaui R. Vioti and Mark V. Kaupi. International Relations Theory: Realism. 
Pluralism, Globalism (New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1987), 592.
l0James R. Kurth, “The Rise and Decline of the Inter-American System: A U.S. 
View,” in Alternative to Intervention: A New U.S.-Latin American Security Relationship, 
eds. Richard J. Bloomfield and Gregory F. Treverton (Boulder. Lynne Rienner, 1990),
24.
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7European monarchy. Soviet communism, and now, against terrorism. In short, there is a 
discrepancy in the kinds of public goods offered by the hegemon and the kinds of public 
goods sought by the weaker states.
RESEARCH QUESTION AND ASSUMPTIONS
To study power asymmetry in the context of U.S.-Latin American security 
relations, the following research question is proposed: How does power asymmetry 
impact security cooperation between the U.S. and Latin America? This dissertation 
examines a relationship exists between power asymmetry under U.S. hegemony, and the 
degree of security cooperation that takes place in the region. The U.S. and Latin 
America compose the region under study. When the term Latin America is used it is 
intended to encompass all states in Central America. South America, and the Caribbean. 
The next section will discuss the study’s basic assumptions. The last section of chapter 
one outlines the overall organization and methodology of the project.
The concept of power asymmetry is tied to hegemonic stability theory. The 
presence of a hegemon raises the potential for system stability. However, this stability is 
not perfect. Just as hegemony provides a basic stability, it also represents a large degree 
of power asymmetry in the system. This dissertation contends that excessive power 
asymmetry in the relationship can provoke a reaction in the system that undermines 
security cooperation. For example, when one state becomes exceedingly powerful it is 
frequently tempted to use the unilateral option without deliberations with weaker states in 
the system. The lack of consultation gives the appearance of undermining the 
sovereignty of the weaker states. In such a system any action by the hegemon has the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
8potential to affect the sovereignty of the weaker state. Therefore, power asymmetry can 
be thought of as a condition among given states in which one state's dominance is so 
overwhelming that it undermines the gains from hegemonic stability.
The history of security cooperation between the U.S. and Latin America supports 
the idea that power structure is a determining factor in regional affairs, but also 
challenges hegemonic stability theory. Hegemonic stability predicts that institutions 
should exist in the Americas to address regional security concerns. Inter-American 
institutions exist, but play a limited role in security affairs. Strong power asymmetry may 
explain the duality of persistent security institutions that endure despite their diminished 
capacity to influence U.S.-Latin American security relations.
Hegemonic stability asserts that the presence of the hegemon improves the 
chances of security cooperation because the hegemon makes concessions to weaker states 
to encourage them to acknowledge the hegemonic state's leadership.11 The power 
asymmetry argument adds that in cases where the accepted hegemon is excessively 
powerful the stability endowed by the hegemon can be eroded.
A condition of strong power asymmetry in a given system suppresses security 
cooperation by making bilateral or multilateral initiatives appear to be coercive from the 
perspective of the weaker states. Weaker states find the difference between cooperation 
and coercion hard to distinguish. Whether a dominant state imparts public goods to 
weaker states or not, the public goods will be perceived as another indicator of the 
restraints of the weaker state. Military assistance becomes a scheme to sink less powerful
llRobert W. Cox. “Social Forces, States, and World Order,” in Neorealism and its 
Critics, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 219.
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9states into further debt, and if offered for free, it is an attempt to create a dependent 
relationship. Free trade agreements may be perceived as a tool of the dominant state to 
keep weaker states in a subservient position. Under the condition of strong power 
asymmetry all intervention, for humanitarian reasons or otherwise, can be interpreted as 
an egregious breach of state sovereignty rather than as an attempt to restore stability and 
alleviate human suffering. Even non-intervention has the potential to be viewed in a 
negative light, as a sign of neglect and arrogance by the hegemon. As Donald Marquand 
Dozer states in his critique of U.S.-Latin American relations. “Gift-giving is intolerable 
except among equals.” 12 At a certain point power asymmetry becomes too strong in a 
given system, after that line is crossed security cooperation is less likely to occur.
Two basic assumptions deemed important to the study are reviewed below. The 
first argues that a region should be considered an important and useful level of analysis. 
The second supports the notion that security cooperation entails more than military 
related issues.
To justify the regional focus of this study there is an assumption that the regional 
level of analysis, specifically the America's region, can be thought of as a cohesive unit. 
The regional level of analysis is not a well-developed concept, despite its frequent use in 
international relations literature. Many scholars have definition problems with the term 
‘region', which is no surprise since very few authors have written on the topic, and many 
that do, focus on region structures do not recognize the analytical division within their
12 Donald Marquand Dozer. Are We Good Neighbors? Three Decades o f Inter- 
American Relations, 1930-1960 (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1959), 52.
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own work.lj Some authors claim to be studying a region, yet are really only referring to 
it in a geographical sense, with their true discussion directed towards a systemic or 
comparative analysis.
Barry Buzan and William R. Thompson composed similar definitions of the term 
region. Buzan posits the need for a regional level of analysis because of the inherent 
complexity in trying to explain all state actions from a purely systemic level: “If the 
security of each is related to the security of all. then nothing can be fully understood 
without understanding everything. Such a tall order threatens to make the study of 
security unrealistic.”14 This study agrees, asserting that a greater degree of detail is 
obtained from observing state behavior from the perspective of the region.
Other scholars have provided a body of literature that fleshes out the regional 
level of analysis. Thompson has provided a four-point definition for a region, or 
subsystem, that roughly correlates with Buzan. First, the actors' pattern of relations or 
interactions must exhibit a particular degree of regularity and intensity to the extent that a 
change at one point in the subsystem affects other points. Second, The actors must be 
generally proximate.15 Third, internal and external observers and actors recognize the
13For more on this point see the introductory section of David A. Lake and Patrick 
M. Morgan. Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World (University Park, PA: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997).
l4Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda For International Security 
Studies in the Post-Cold War Era (Boulder, CO.: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 1990), 187.
t5The U.S. is a unique exception to this case as it is a major actor in every region 
in the world. The same may be said of the former Soviet Union.
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subsystem as a distinctive area or "theater of operation”. And the last point is that the 
subsystem must logically consist of at least two and quite probably more actors.16
The literature supports the concept of a regional level of analysis and validates the 
idea that the Americas form a region. Some analysts argue that the U.S. and Latin 
America form distinct regions, based in Northern European roots of the U.S. and Canada, 
and the Iberian heritage of the states south of the Rio Grande. Robert Keohane disagrees: 
“Empirical evidence does not support this hypothesis." Based on
“...communication routes, airline routes, and trade relationships across the globe.
without sticking on national or regional labels, you would not be able to pick out a
coherent geographical entity to be called Latin America. In fact, judging airline
connections alone, the entire region would appear tied to North America.”1'
The final assumption addresses the question: What issues are viable security 
topics? During much of the Cold War security issues were considered high politics, and 
economic and social phenomena were thought of as low politics. This is because the 
threat of military force was considered the most effective means of expressing power: 
therefore it deserved the majority of attention.18 Arnold Wolfers describes high politics 
in terms of the goals of self-extension, or self-preservation.19 Edward Morse contradicted
16WilIiam R. Thompson, “The Regional Subsystem: A Conceptual Explication 
and Propositional Inventory." International Studies Quarterlv, Vol. 17, No. I (March 
1973): 101.
w Robert O. Keohane, “Between Vision and Reality: Variables in Latin American 
Foreign Policy,” In Latin American in the New International System, eds. Joseph S. 
Tulchin and Ralph H. Espach (Boulder: Lynne Rienner. 2000), 207-208.
18Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World 
Politics in Transition (U .S.: Harper-CoIIins, 1989), 3-5.
19AmoId Wolfers. Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics 
(Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1962), 91-102.
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traditional thought, stating, "The classical goals of power and security have been 
expanded to, or superseded by, goals of wealth and welfare.”20 After the end of the Cold 
War the clear delineation between high and low politics began to dissolve. Other 
variables, such as culture and economy rose to the forefront of security analysis.21
For this study high and low politics are considered relevant to security issues of 
the Americas region. Security issues will encompass border disputes, national 
insurrection, state sovereignty, but also include the drug trade, and economic issues. 
Many of the security topics in the Americas are instigated by state instability, in turn 
fomented by economic and social problems. To focus on "high” politics as the only 
legitimate topics for research would severely weaken this study.
ORGANIZATION AND METHODOLOGY
This study is structured around a research question that provides a framework to 
explore the effect asymmetric power structures on interstate security cooperation. The 
research question is: How does power asymmetry impact security cooperation between 
the U.S. and Latin America? Historical review is utilized to explore the causal 
relationship proposed in the hypothesis, supported by empirical evidence. Different eras 
of U.S.-Latin American relations are broken down into five case study chapters to better
20Edward L. Morse, "The Transformation of Foreign Policies: Modernization, 
Interdependence, and Extemalization,” World Politics, Vol. 22, No. 3 (April 1970): 316.
2lPerhaps the most influential book in the post Cold War order to date is Samuel 
P. Huntington's, The Clash o f Civilizations the Remaking o f World Order (New York: 
Simon and Schuster. 1996). Another influential author that focuses on the relevance of 
culture to security issues, among many others, is Robert Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy: 
Shattering the Dreams of the Post Cold War Order (New York: Random House, 2000). 
Francis Fukuyama tends to take a sociological/economic view of security.
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understand how U.S. regional dominance contributes to regional security cooperation. 
This method was selected since it could demonstrate whether security cooperation 
improved during times when U.S. dominance marginally decreased, such as during the 
Great Depression, and the recessions of the 1970s, or decreased during periods of U.S. 
power growth, such as the later years of the nineteenth century after the civil war. after 
World War L after World War II and the end of the Cold War.
There are several potential ways regional security relations could be examined. 
One method is to explore bilateral relations between the U.S. and individual Latin 
American states in consecutive chapters. The second method is to organize the case study 
chapters by chronological order, dividing the chapters by time periods. This work 
utilizes the latter format. Studying time periods preserves the regional integrity of the 
study since it considers the impact of historical events on all states at once. This format 
will make the task of describing system-wide trends far easier. For example, the policy 
of the U.S. to evaluate states regarding their level of democracy in the late 1970s drew’ 
criticism from many Latin American leaders. If these reactions were noted in chapters 
that consider individual states, the ability to note the reaction as a regional trend becomes 
more difficult.
This study places an emphasis on security cooperation between the U.S. and key 
states in the Americas. Certain states are emphasized because of their importance to 
regional politics and history of interaction with the U.S. These characteristics make their 
policies, and reactions to U.S. policies, pertinent to understanding Latin America as a 
whole. Some of the states regularly referred to in this dissertation are reviewed below.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Argentina, like Brazil, maintained its independence and a strong military, making 
its role as a regional player more important. Further, it has developed into a very 
important security player in the region. One example of Argentina’s growing regional 
prestige can be found in its request for North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
membership. Although Argentina was not granted its request for NATO membership, the 
U.S. accorded Argentina with a security partner status that it previously only reserved for 
Israel.
Brazil is considered the primary power in South America, as Mexico is the 
primary power in Central America. Brazil has the largest economy and population in 
Latin America, its population of 160 million being greater than the rest of South America 
combined. It maintains a border with every state in South America except for Chile and 
Ecuador.
Mexico is the second most populous state in Latin America, with just over 100 
million inhabitants. Until the end of the 1980s Mexico was prominent in leading Latin 
American efforts to lessen the impact of U.S. dominance. Mexico is particularly 
important to U.S. policy makers for several reasons. Because of its lengthy border with 
the U.S.. migration and the illegal drug-trade are important issues in bilateral relations. 
Interdependence between Mexico and the U.S. increased dramatically with the advent of 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). For example, in 1993 Mexico 
exported nearly $52 million of goods and services. This figure increased to $117 million 
by 1998.“
~Jorge I. Dominguez and Rafael Fernandez de Castro, The United States and 
Mexico: Between Partnership and Conflict (New York: Routledge, 2001), 119.
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Venezuela’s regional importance is due to its large petroleum production, its 
proximity to the fighting in Colombia, and its notable policies aimed at asserting its 
independence from the U.S. It is the world's fourth largest oil producing state, and the 
third largest supplier to the U.S. Because of the policies of its current leader. President 
Hugo Chavez, it has become the manifestation of problems in the U.S.-Latin American 
dialog. Colombia also is a major oil producer, although not to the same degree as 
Venezuela. Its instability due to a continuing civil war that has recently intensified 
makes Colombia the focus of much of the regional security dialog. Chapter seven will 
discuss the Venezuelan and Colombian cases in more detail.
This paper contends that the defining factor that shapes security cooperation in the 
region is the hegemonic power structure. However, it argues that hegemonic stability 
does not alone adequately describe regional security dynamics. The power fluctuation of 
the hegemon may have an impact on the level of security cooperation in the system, 
chapter two will explore this notion further, laying the theoretical foundation for the rest 
of the project. Chapter two reviews the relevance of international relations theory 
literature associated with this study and explores alternative explanations for variation in 
the dependent variable, security cooperation. By reviewing international relations 
literature on security cooperation and power asymmetry a clearer definition of how the 
terms will be used in this study will emerge.
Chapter three reviews the general themes of U.S.-Latin America relations and 
how these themes relate to security issues. This is accomplished by providing a broad 
overview of regional relations dating from the early nineteenth century, when the first 
proposals for inter-hemispheric security cooperation were instituted, to the beginning of
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World War n. Patterns in security relations emerged during this time period that held 
sway throughout the remainder of the twentieth century, making this time period 
important to understanding the broader regional security dynamics.
Chapter three explores bilateral relations between states on both sides of the 
regional asymmetric power division. In the nascent stage of the America's regional 
development the power structure that would eventually emerge was far from certain.
States in South America, such as Argentina and Mexico, seemed destined to surpass, if 
not compete, with the dominant position of the U.S. However, the regional power 
structure emerged as distinctly asymmetric, a point that will be elaborated. The period 
before strong power asymmetry became a characteristic of U.S.-Latin American relations 
provides a baseline for comparison to examine state behavior.
Chapters four. five, six and seven continue in the format of chapter three. Each 
case study chapter reviews a time period after World War II in the Americas region, and 
how security relations were shaped by the fluctuation of power asymmetry. Important 
events such as overt expressions of U.S. military dominance and economic upturns and 
crisis are closely examined to show any evidence of change in cooperative behavior. 
Because the U.S. has consistently been the dominant power in the region by any measure, 
regional security relations have been regularly dictated by a pattern of U.S. action and 
Latin American reaction. Therefore much of the research focuses on U.S. policy 
initiatives and the impact they have on regional security relations.
Chapter four examines the period from World War II until the 1960s. This era is 
primarily marked by an increase in Latin American goodwill towards U.S. leadership and 
U.S. distraction with the onset of the Cold War. Many Latin Americans were expecting a
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version of Marshall Plan for their region, being disappointed with the U.S. response to 
rebuild former Axis member states and ignoring the needs of regional allies. Although 
the U.S. committed itself to binding security treaties with the region during this period, 
security relations suffered in part because of the U.S. policy imperative to concentrate on 
Europe. Hope was renewed because of initiatives implemented by the Kennedy 
Administration in the early 1960s. only to lead to disillusionment when the U.S. 
commitment waned in the later part of the decade.
Chapter five concentrates on interregional relations during the 1970 to 1980 
decade. Some analysts characterized this era as one of U.S. neglect towards Latin 
America since the U.S. was focused on what it perceived as Cold War priorities. This 
sentiment is well represented by former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger 's well- 
known comment that the only important politics are those that occur between 
Washington. London and Moscow. This chapter will show that what was perceived as 
neglect by the U.S.. is in part explained by the broader issue of a global economic crisis. 
The perception that U.S. power was in decline grew, and events of the decade such as its 
retreat from Vietnam, and economic problems prompted its leaders to reduce national 
commitments and search for alternatives to unilateralism. The analysis will show the 
regional disengagement of the U.S. during the bulk of the 1970s only reinforced the Latin 
American perception of U.S. dominance.
Chapter six addresses the decade from 1980-1989. Security relations during this 
period became increasingly polarized, as Cold War competition increased. The 
government of Cuba supported revolutionary movements in the region and beyond, and 
U.S. policy became more aggressive at combating what it perceived as communist
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activity. Latin American leaders generally discounted the U.S. perception that domestic 
revolutions were motivated by outside forces and believed Washington's interventions 
were motivated by a desire to dominate the region. The 1980s also marked the beginning 
of the Latin American shift away from state-planned economic policy and 
authoritarianism.
Chapter seven, the last case study chapter, deals with the end of the 1990s to the 
present. The era is marked by a significant change throughout the Americas. The 
political and economic landscape was thoroughly altered, along with most of the 
contentious security issues of the past. This chapter explores whether cooperation 
improved with the easing of Cold War tensions and relative political stability in the 
region. Chapter eight summarizes the major study findings, and then it offers the major 
conclusions of the study.
Assuming this study supports the power asymmetry theory, it should provoke a 
reassessment of hegemonic stability theory. Perhaps more importantly, it might show the 
limits of regional security cooperation that will curb high expectations shared by both 
Latin American and U.S. leaders during the last hundred years. During times of 
increased power asymmetry leaders from both sides may learn to better understand the 
constraints on the regional partnership. The study results may also draw lessons from 
regional security successes and shed light on new strategies to circumvent the power 
realities that limit the U.S.-Latin American security relationship.
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CHAPTER H
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY. POWER ASYMMETRY AND
SECURITY COOPERATION
The purpose of this chapter is to review the scholarly literature related to 
hegemonic stability, power asymmetry and security cooperation, and explain how they 
relate to the main topic of this study, U.S.-Latin American security relations. The first 
section describes the central points of hegemonic stability theory and references key 
criticisms of the theory. The second section reviews the theoretical debate on the 
dependent variable, security cooperation. The hegemonic stability literature addresses 
how security cooperation may occur due to the presence of a hegemon. The third section 
discusses power asymmetry and the debate surrounding alternative power distribution 
models. Hegemonic stability assumes that a system dominated by one power is more 
likely to create stability. Not all scholars agree with this assumption. By nature, a 
hegemonic system contains a large power differential between the hegemon and other 
states. The third section will outline how power asymmetry is used in this study and how 
it may lead to less security cooperation under the beneficial structure of hegemonic 
stability.
The fourth section briefly addresses other theories that also focus on the regional 
security cooperation problem, mostly from the perspective of state level theory. These 
theories are important to note because they are representative of the majority of the 
theoretical debate in the region. However, this study demonstrates that the systemic 
effects of power asymmetry have more influence over hemispheric relations. The last 
section explains power asymmetry and security cooperation in light of the literature, and
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based on these explanations identifies indicators of power asymmetry and security 
cooperation.
This study assumes that the structural level of analysis is preferable to the state 
level of analysis or cultural studies. As Kenneth Waltz states,
“It is not possible to understand world politics simply by looking inside of states.
If the aims, policies, and actions of states become matters of exclusive attention or
even of central concern, then we are forced back to the descriptive level; and from
simple descriptions no valid generalizations can be logically drawn."1
For example, one can claim Latin American or U.S. culture is to blame for a lack of 
regional security cooperation, culture being a characteristic of states, or of a system. The 
next step in such an analysis is to list the attributes describing U.S. culture and Latin 
American culture. Left with two lists of disparate characteristics the author must assume 
that the system is a sum of its parts, and make value judgments in order to reach such a 
conclusion. Such a process removes the scholar further from the ideal goal of total 
objectivity and invites criticism of the use of such inductive methodology.
Another argument against state-level theory is that state-level variables are the 
most important to examine system level outcomes, one must believe that units will not 
influence each other’s actions. Waltz points out that if this is not a likely assumption 
since “in the history of international relations...results achieved seldom correspond to the 
intentions of actors.”2 Because the dealings of an actor do not always achieve their 
intended outcome, a description of an actor’s motivations is not likely to be helpful in 
explaining systemic behavior.
1 Kenneth Waltz, “Reductionist and Systemic Theories.” in Neorealism and its 
Critics. ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York: Colombia University Press, 1986), 52.
2Ibid.
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To make a connection between state-level phenomena and its influence on the 
system, the internal characteristics of states must be relatively consistent over time to 
explain systemic trends. In this study that assumption could be made about the U.S. since 
it has maintained the same government for over two hundred years. However, Latin 
American states have not experienced this level of stability, making any explanation of 
systemic trends from state-level causes more difficult to prove. To account for regular 
state behavior that is produced by internal processes it must be assumed that these 
internal processes remain relatively consistent over time. This assumption would be 
difficult to prove since a multitude of variables contribute to state decisions, including 
other states, and the interests affecting policy decisions frequently change as w ell/
This study uses the systemic level of analysis as described by Kenneth Waltz. In 
relation to systemic theory Waltz explains. "...How the organization of a realm acts as a 
constraining and disposing force on the interacting units within it.*"1 In this study the 
presence of a dominant power is the organizational aspect of the system under scrutiny.' 
Waltz also explains that systemic theory should explain the consistent behavior of units 
despite their differences. This study focuses on the continuity of U.S.-Latin American 
relations under U.S. dominance since the end of the U.S. Civil War, and seeks to explain 
security relations by noting the variation of U.S. dominance as an explanatory element.
•>Waltz asks the question. "If changes in international outcomes are linked directly 
to changes in actors, how can one account for similarities of outcome that persist or recur 
even as actors vary?” Ibid., 53.
4Ibid.. 60.
5Waltz supports the emphasis of study on the major powers in a system, stating, 
“The units of greatest capability set the scene of action for others as well as for 
themselves.” Ibid., 61.
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Systems theories maintain that outcomes are produced by a system's structure. 
The structure is key to understanding a system because they designate constraints on the 
actors. These constraints shape actor behavior by rewarding and punishing particular 
behaviors. These rewards and punishments create consistent actor behavior, as 
seemingly disparate individuals become far more predictable when acting in a group.
The process of the structure creating consistent behavior is referred to as socialization, 
put bluntly, “Socialization reduces variety.”6 The socializing effect of a structure creates 
predictability and enables the analysis of state behavior. By comparison, the 
examination of the differences of state behavior to explain the system creates 
incoherencies that undermine analytical efforts.
Although this dissertation contends that the systemic level of analysis will explain 
the greater percentage of state behavior, it also acknowledges the value of state-level 
theories. The utility of the systemic level is that it can bring coherency to state 
interaction of a large period of time, but it does not seek to explain the ramification of 
these policies on the domestic politics of particular states. The direct cause of domestic 
politics is best explained by state-level theory.
HEGEMONIC STABILITY
The example provided by the last 130 years of U.S.-Latin American security 
relations directly supports hegemonic stability theory. The dominance of the U.S. has 
been the central issue in regional security dynamics since the 1870s. Frequently studies 
that focus on regional dynamics must focus more closely on U.S. policy choices since
6Vbi±, 65.
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they are the most important determining factor in security relations. However, the 
description of ‘dominance’ does not adequately describe regional relations. Dominance 
can give the impression of a unipolar power occupying and ruling a system by force 
alone. Although the U.S. has demonstrated it is willing to use military power to enforce 
its will on other regional states, it has not acted as a conquering power, and at times led 
security cooperation efforts that show a remarkable level of support for weaker states in 
the region.
Even though this study utilizes hegemonic stability theory, which emphasizes the 
cooperative relationship between the dominant state and weaker states in the system, it 
focuses on the undercurrent of non-cooperation caused by the presence of hegemony.
The study argues that in the case of U.S.-Latin American relations. U.S. hegemony has 
had a notable deleterious impact on state relations as well as a beneficial one. The 
possibility remains open that the conclusion may yet contradict hegemonic stability, 
perhaps finding the negative impact of a hegemonic system on other states in the system 
make other power alignments preferable to one with a single, dominant state. It is more 
likely that an alternative conclusion may emerge, such as a hegemonic system may 
provide disincentives for states to cooperate. However, these problems illustrate issues of 
a smaller scale compared to the greater stability caused by the presence of a hegemon.
The remainder of this section reviews hegemonic stability theory, drawing out important 
theoretical questions and issues of this work.
A concise definition of hegemonic stability theory was given in chapter one: 
’‘...stability in international relations stems from the presence of hegemony or
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dominance.”7 A major debate surrounding hegemonic stability theory emerged during 
the 1970s. Several authors noted that the unwillingness of the U.S. and Great Britain to 
assume a leadership role and Great Britain’s loss of capability, created a power vacuum 
during the period between World War I and World War II.8 This power vacuum was 
indirectly blamed for interwar economic and security disequilibria that led to World War 
II. In their separate works the authors warned that the U.S. was once again retreating 
from world leadership and similar results could occur. Their fundamental hypothesis was 
that as U.S. power declined, international stability and openness declined, which was a 
thesis resurrected in the 1970s and 1980s.9
In the literature authors disagree on whether the weaker states, or the dominant 
state, has greater incentive to maintain the hegemonic system. Charles Kindleberger 
argues that the hegemon provides stability to a given system, and that stability is a benefit 
enjoyed by less powerful states without their contribution. Stability is therefore 
considered a public good, since all states benefit although only one contributes. In a 
system without a dominant state, free riders, or states that do not contribute to stability, 
will still seek to consume the same amount of public good, yet no state exists to produce
Viotti and Kaupi. 592.
O  ^
Charles Kindleberger, The World in Depression (Berkeley: Berkeley University 
Press, 1973), Robert Gilpin. U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1975), and Stephen Krasner, "State Power and the Structure of 
International Trade,” World Politics 28, no. 3 (April 1976): 317-347.
9Michael C. Webb and Stephen D. Krasner, "Hegemonic Stability Theory: An 
Empirical Assessment,” Review o f International Studies 15 (1989): 183.
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the public good.10 Stephen Krasner argues that when a state obtains hegemony it has the 
ability to provide stability without threatening its core security objectives. The hegemon 
is not concerned with its essential security objectives because it realizes gains from its 
dominance, just as less powerful states may realize the gains from stability.11 Krasner’s 
interpretation o f  hegemonic stability shows that the hegemon has just as much incentive 
to maintain dominance as weaker states that enjoy the ’free’ public goods. The hegemon 
realizes benefits from the relationship such as an increase in income and growth o f 
political power without a commensurate effect on domestic stability. Because the 
hegemon has an incentive to maintain the dominant relationship Kindleberger points out 
that some commentaries describe a hegemonic arrangement as exploitation. These 
analyses contend that the U.S. sought world dominance as early as 1898. a notion that 
Kindleberger finds doubtful since most U.S. political leaders o f  the early twentieth 
century were isolationists.12
Mancur Olson views the gains debate in hegemonic stability from an economic 
perspective. He explains there are two ways that an actor in a given system can increase 
then* gains: either by procuring a larger slice o f the pie, or instituting changes that enable 
the pie to grow larger.13 Rather than debating who gains the most in a hegemonic
l0Charles Kindleberger, "Dominance and Leadership in the International 
Economy: Exploitation, Public Goods, and Free Rides,” International Studies Quarterly 
25. no. 2 (Spring 1985): 244.
11 Webb and Krasner, 184.
12Kindleberger, "Dominance and Leadership,” 247.
l3Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline o f Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, 
and Social Rigidities (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), 42.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
26
relationship, Olson contends that an actor's willingness to legitimize hegemony is 
directly proportional to how much benefit they gain. If the hegemon wishes to keep 
weaker states satisfied with its leadership, it must continue to provide an increasing 
amount of public goods to other states in the system, or provide the necessary support to 
ensure other states are experiencing satisfactory economic growth.
Putting aside the debate concerning whether the hegemon or weaker states in the 
system gain the most, hegemonic stability theory differentiates dominance from a 
symbiotic relationship. However, this study contends that over time this relationship may 
fluctuate and either side may view their contribution as being greater than what they 
receive. When this happens the incentives to support the hegemonic system decline. In 
the case of the U.S. and Latin America, the willingness of Latin American states to 
cooperate on security matters with the U.S. seem to deteriorate when U.S. dominance 
grows. The perception of dominant state exploitation increased as the power gap grew.
There is a debate on how other states come to recognize hegemonic leaders. 
Krasner comments that others recognize the hegemonic state as the primary power 
because it has economic and military capabilities that can be used as a carrot or stick to 
compel other states in the region to accept an open trading structure.14 Webb and Krasner 
argue that to be considered a hegemon a state must take on core responsibilities. These 
responsibilities include: organizing trade liberalization, keeping its market open in times 
of economic crisis, manage the monetary system, supply the international currency, 
provide liquidity, manage the exchange rate structure, supply investment capital and
l4Krasner, “State Power and the Structure of International Trade,” 322.
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encourage development in the peripheral areas of the system.15 Kindleberger believes 
that primacy entails a broader list, including other things such as number of innovations 
produced, productivity growth, and the level of investment in key economic sectors.16 
Kindleberger maintains that economic primacy performs a different function than 
hegemony. Primacy “involves less dominance or hegemony than the public good of 
leadership of the world economy, not ordering others to behave as the leader directs, but 
pointing the way and convincing others of the desirability of following.”1.
Although theorists may disagree to some degree on what constitutes a hegemonic 
power, it is clear the U.S. fulfills the description of a hegemonic state vis-a-vis Latin 
America. The U.S. acts through institutions like the UN and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), to influence Latin American states to make certain domestic reforms or 
negotiate debt payments. The U.S. does not compel Latin American states to perform 
these functions as the Soviet Union ordered Warsaw Pact member states how to allocate 
its funding, meaning the systemic relationship is based on more than just power. It 
encourages development, promotes trade liberalization by maintaining trade policies 
more open than Latin American states, and provides for general stability.
Hegemonic stability theory is argued to have either an economic or security focus. 
Webb and Krasner dispute Kindleberger* s focus on economic primacy. They point out 
that not all states gain equally from the public goods provided by the hegemon, thus their
l5Webb and Krasner, 185.
I6CharIes Kindleberger, World Economic Primacy. 1500-1990 (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1996), 13.
I7Ibid.
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interests in supporting such a system are not constant.18 The economic and social 
problems of developing states, combined with the introduction of a relative gains 
dynamic, creates a security problem in hegemonic structures. Therefore security issues 
become the focus of hegemonic stability, and the ability of the hegemon to provide 
stability comes under pressure from state competition. Because states gain unequally the 
relative gain problem may occur. To this point Robert Gilpin states. “It may very well be 
that in a particular situation absolute gains will not affect relative positions. But the 
efforts of groups to cause or prevent such shifts in the relative distribution of power 
constitute the critical issue of politics.”19 Since not all states seek hegemonic public 
goods at any given time, and some may openly eschew them, the reign of the hegemon 
may tend to be perceived as forceful domination and less benign.
Jonanne Gowa criticizes hegemonic stability theory because it focuses on 
economic cooperation among states as opposed to security cooperation. The focus of the 
discussion on economic issues was consciously motivated by scholars to demonstrate that 
states can move beyond the zero-sum paradigm that characterized nuclear deterrence of 
the era.20 As Gowa writes to the economic focus of the theory, “...hegemonic stability 
theory must include security as an argument in the utility functions it assigns to states 
opening their borders to trade.”21
18Webb and Krasner, 184.
l9Gilpin, 36.
20Stephen Krasner. “Preface,” in International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1983), vii.
2IJoanne Gowa, “Rational Hegemons, Excludable Goods, and Small Groups: An 
Epitaph for Hegemonic Stability Theory,” World Politics 41, no. 3 (April 1989): 308.
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This dissertation recognizes the primary importance of the security aspect of 
hegemonic stability theory, although identifying that the hegemon’s economic leadership 
is also vital to maintaining system stability. In other words, economic and military 
policies are both contributors to regional stability and therefore important in examining 
hegemonic stability, but both economic and military concerns are subsets of security. 
This study measures power by both military and economic indicators, reflecting the view 
that both matter to overall security of the region.
Some scholars question more basic assumptions than the military or economic 
emphasis of hegemonic stability theory. Isabelle Grunberg questions the very notion of 
hegemonic states and how one can differentiate between them and non-hegemonic 
states."2 She makes the point that other authors based their definitions of a hegemon on 
power indicators an not the control of outcomes.23 The insight fundamentally asks and 
important question: What is a useful metric to measure hegemony? Grunberg suggests 
that capability alone does not make one state a hegemon. For example. Japan's GDP 
may be higher than China’s, but few would consider Japan the hegemon of East Asia. A 
hegemon must maintain dominance in terms of economic and military indicators.
Further, a historical review must reveal that other states in the region accepted the 
leadership of the state in question on economic and security issues.
“ Isabelle Grunberg, “Exploring the “Myth” of Hegemonic Stability,” 
International Organization 44, no. 4 (Autumn 1990): 434.
■^Grunberg credits Russett with this observation. See Bruce Russett, “The 
Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony; or. Is Mark Twain Really Dead?” 
International Organization 39, no. 2 (Spring 1985): 209, 211.
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Grunberg’s concerns are refuted by Kindleberger's analysis. She demands proof 
of dominance, yet Kindleberger explicitly states that hegemonic states do not lead by 
dominance, but by providing incentives and punishment for specified behavior. 
Punishment may include the use of military force, but less invasive actions are more 
likely to be applied. The relationship between the hegemon and weaker states is 
characterized by a quid-pro-quo interaction in which public goods are traded for the 
benefits of leadership. Direct domination of other states is not a regular feature of a 
hegemonic system since it demonstrates there is little mutual benefit. Historical review 
can ameliorate Grunberg’s concerns at demonstrating the presence of a hegemon.24 
Certain indicators, such as the ability of the system to generate institutions, maintain 
relative stability despite the presence of dominant state, may help define the presence of a 
true hegemon. If a dominant state can exist in a system for many years without 
instigating a durable alliance against it. then its leadership extends beyond simple 
dominance. In one hundred and thirty years Latin American states existed with U.S. 
leadership without being broadly opposed. This is an important indicator of the presence 
of a hegemonic system.
Measuring a system for the presence of a dominant state is not as difficult as 
measuring for a hegemonic system. A method for measuring a hegemon’s presence is to 
test for stable regimes that should indicate the presence of a dominant state. Regimes 
can be defined as "principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around
24Strange supports this conclusion. See Susan Strange, "The Persistent Myth of 
Lost Hegemony," International Organization 41, no. 4 (Autumn 1987): 554.
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which actor expectations converge on a given issue-area.”25 Robert Keohane adds that 
regimes are "...those arrangements for issue areas that embody implicit rules and norms 
insofar as they actually guide behavior of important actors in a particular issue area.”26 
The level to which regimes may guide actors is a controversial topic, however the fact 
that hegemonic leadership can give rise to regimes is less so.
Another potential means of measuring hegemony lies in the degree of system 
socialization. G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan write. "There is a more subtle 
component of hegemonic power, one that works at the level of substantive beliefs rather 
than material payoffs. Acquiescence is the result of the socialization of leaders in 
secondary nations.”*' They found that when domestic instability occurred in a weaker 
state the socialization process was promoted through military and economic 
reconstruction. The hegemon was able to better articulate a new set of norms through a 
more direct approach than trying to passively articulate norms.'8 The transfer of the 
dominant state's norms was more successful when they were inculcated to the weaker 
states elites, then spread to the masses than visa versa. This is an interesting observation 
that may demonstrate moments of greater power asymmetry that may immediately act as 
a detriment to interstate relations, but has the potential to increase stability in the long­
term.
^Stephen Krasner. "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences.” I .
26Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power: Essays in 
International Relations Theory (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), 76.
27G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, "Socialization and Hegemonic 
Power,” International Organization 44, no. 3, (Summer 1990): 283.
28IbicL, 314.
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Other scholars challenge the basic assumptions of hegemonic stability theory. 
Duncan Snidal suggests that hegemony may not ensure the level of stability that many 
assume. Snidal points out that hegemonic leadership can be either beneficial or 
exploitative, whereas collective action avoids this dichotomy since it is by nature 
inclusive of all players. Snidal supports his contention by providing the post-war 
examples of the North Adantic Treaty Organization and the European Community (EC). 
He admits EC collective action was not flawless, but nonetheless was successful at times. 
He admits it took U.S. hegemony to create North Atlantic Security Organization 
(NATO), but argues its continued existence is based more on collective action than 
hegemonic leadership.29 His study concludes that hegemony is not necessary to create 
cooperation, since cooperation can occur through collective action.30 Snidal’s 
observation concerning the EC does not sufficiently acknowledge the fact that EC 
success can be attributed to the hegemonic presence of the U.S. In the post World War II 
period the U.S. was the guarantor of West European stability. Even in the context of the 
post-CoId War era. many European states oppose U.S. troop reduction plans in the 
European theater. Further. NATO is still clearly dependent on U.S. leadership and 
military capabilities.
Despite the arguments of some critics this study accepts the main premise of 
hegemonic stability, that the presence of a hegemonic power will create greater stability 
in a system. As Keohane states on the relationship between hegemonic power and 
stability: “as the distribution of tangible resources becomes more equal, international
29Duncan Snidal, “The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory,” International 
Organization 39, no. 4 (Autumn 1985): 595-569.
20Ibid., 612.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
33
regimes should weaken," and "as the hegemonial state's margin of resource superiority 
over its partners declines, the costs of leadership will become more burdensome.”^1 
However, it also questions the issue of how the hegemonic relationship may deteriorate 
and inhibit the gains generated by hegemony. Figure I shows the relationship between 
security cooperation and hegemony in this dissertation. As the power of hegemony (x- 
axis) increases, the level of security cooperation (y-axis) increases, as predicted by 
hegemonic stability theory. However, when the power of the hegemon becomes 




Figure I. Relationship Between Hegemonic Power and Security Cooperation
The U.S. meets the criteria as a hegemon in its relationship with Latin America as 
described by Kindleberger, Krasner and Webb. It provides stability or regional security
3IKeohane, “International Institutions and State Power," 78-79.
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by maintaining open markets, a strong currency, humanitarian intervention, and 
leadership on a variety of security issues. These are core responsibilities that may burden 
the hegemonic state, and which a dominant state that relies purely on coercion may not 
choose to accept. A hegemonic state leads predominately by setting an example rather 
than forcing weaker states to do its bidding. This suggests that hegemonic stability is 
differentiated from strict unipolarity by the degree of volunteerism inherent in the 
relationship between the dominant and weaker states. In both cases the relationship is 
defined by the presence of the dominant state, however in a hegemonic system the 
dominant state leads mostly by incentive as opposed to military force.
Different theorists focus on different elements of power when describing the role 
of the hegemon. Kindleberger applies the theory to the economic relationship between 
the hegemon and weaker states. Gowa. Webb and Krasner uphold that the stability the 
hegemonic system maintains is a security-centric variable. This study sides with the 
latter, although the analysis does not exclude economic considerations.
The literature contends that the presence of regimes and socialization are results 
of the hegemonic system. The economic or military infirmities of weaker states may fuel 
the socialization process. Socialization may be the engine that spreads the values of the 
hegemon to the rest of the system, but before these values are accepted by weaker states 
they are alien and may be considered a constant reminder of the dominance of the 
stronger state leading to the undercurrent of cooperation suggested in this study. 
Hegemonic stability theory focuses on the presence of regimes as by-products of the 
system. Since the cooperative aspects endowed by the presence of a hegemon produce 
them, the rise and fall of their prominence may be an indicator of security cooperation.
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For this reason the dissertation concentrates on regional organizations such as the Pan 
American Union and the OAS.
Krasner and Webb's contention that states in a given system do not gain equally 
from the public good provided by the hegemon, thus their interests in supporting such a 
system are not constant over time, is a key point in this dissertation. This study 
hypothesizes that weaker states are affected by the degree of power asymmetry when 
determining their gains from public goods provided by the hegemon.
SECURITY COOPERATION
This work examines the proposition that security cooperation in a hegemonic 
system may be directly related to the change of the hegemon's power in relation to other 
states in the system. It proposes that the power asymmetry inherent in a hegemonic 
system may reach a point at which the power is excessive and creates a higher level of 
distrust among the weaker states in the system directed towards the hegemon. This 
distrust is related to the way the hegemon exercises its power in the system. According 
to Ikenberry and Kupchan hegemonic states may exercise their power either through the 
manipulation of material incentives by the hegemon to prompt weaker states to cooperate 
or by a subtler process in which the hegemon is able to alter the substantive beliefs of 
weaker states.
The manipulation of material incentives occurs “through threats of punishment or 
promises of reward, the hegemon alters the political or economic incentives facing other
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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states.”32 The hegemon induces policy change by using the stick and carrot approach to 
change the behavior of other states pursuing their individual interests.
The other way a hegemon exercises power is by socializing the elites of weaker 
states, or altering their substantive beliefs. The socialization of the hegemon's norms and 
values takes place
“...when foreign elites buy into the hegemon's vision of international order and 
accept it as their own—that is, when they internalize the norms and value 
orientations espoused by the hegemon and accept its normative claims about the 
nature of the international system.”33
The successful transmission of norms from the hegemon guarantees some degree of
acquiescence from other states in the system. Both expressions of power work together.
but Ikenberry and Kupchan draw the distinction that altering substantive beliefs
successfully is tantamount to the consolidation of hegemonic control.
This study seeks to identify the level of power asymmetry that indicates an
erosion of security cooperation. Through the review of regional security relations it is
likely that certain indicators, or stress points, may emerge that can be used to indicate
eras of cooperation and non-cooperation. For example, when a high level of power
asymmetry is present it is likely that it will be reflected through regional security
institutions. In other words, institutional effectiveness should decline as the level of
power asymmetry increases. Other indicators of high levels of power asymmetry should
emerge as the historical review in the case study chapters unfolds.
Under excessive power asymmetry the sensitivity level of weaker states is
increased to all hegemonic expressions of power, but particularly to the manipulation of
32Bcenberry and Kupchan, 285.
33Ibid.
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material incentives. Because the manipulation of material incentives is a more visible 
expression of power, weaker states are particularly sensitive when it is utilized. Because 
of the greater than usual level of dominance by the hegemon, the level of awareness 
among other states is raised as well. The effect of excessive power asymmetry extends to 
hegemonic states as well. As the hegemon gains more power it becomes less interested 
in the quid-pro-quo of the hegemonic relationship. As a super hegemon it begins to 
redefine its unstated agreement with partner states, less willing to cooperate through 
multilateral forums, and more willing to take unilateral action. The combination of more 
sensitive weaker states, and a more confident hegemon, undermines security cooperation 
in the system. Although the system still benefits from a surplus of stability due to the 
presence of a hegemon, it suffers from the counter-current created by power asymmetry.
Whereas manipulation of material incentives under conditions of power 
asymmetry helps explain a decrease in security cooperation under hegemony, the growth 
and proliferation of regimes and institutions are thought of by some as indicators of 
increasing cooperation. Some of the regime theory and institution literature maintains 
that regimes and institutions have a greater likelihood of spreading and being successful 
at facilitating cooperation in a hegemonic system. Although the literature defines 
insitutionalization as a more formal codification of norms rules and behavior between 
states, many scholars agree that both regimes and institutions are signs of cooperative 
behavior. Institutionalization is defined as “behavior recognized by participants as 
reflecting established rules, norms, and conventions, and its meaning is interpreted in 
light of these understandings.”34 Regimes are defined as, “ ...principles, norms, rules, and
34 Keohane, International Institutions and State Power, 1.
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decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue 
area.”35 Some theorists argue it is possible to circumvent anarchy through institutions or 
regimes. Arthur Stein comments that cooperation through regimes is possible when 
states recognize areas of mutual benefit. “Sovereign nations have a rational incentive to 
develop processes for making joint decisions when confronting dilemmas of common 
interests or common aversions. In these contexts, self-interested actors rationally forgo 
independent decision making and construct regimes.”36 Stein's reasoning explains how 
the rational actor and anarchy assumptions can coexist with the potential for state 
cooperation.
Some regime theory scholars believe that in order for institutions to foster 
cooperation, the threat level must be reduced to a point that states assess the likely actions 
of other states based on their intentions as opposed to their capabilities/ This 
explanation of state behavior elucidates the nature of security cooperation under power 
asymmetry. Under asymmetric conditions weaker states tend to alter their threat calculus 
to a capability based assessment since they are more threatened by the hegemon's 
overwhelming dominance. During times when the hegemon’s power differential returns
35Stephen Krasner, “Regimes and the Limits of Realism: Regimes as Autonomous 
Variables.” International Organization 36, no. 2 (Spring 1982): 498. The key difference 
between, according to scholars, is that regimes are narrower in subject matter and time 
since they converge on a single issue area. Institutions have a broader scope, usually 
designed to codify cooperation occurring now and assumed cooperation between states in 
the future. They are designed to cover several issue areas at once.
36Arthur Stein. “Coordination and Collaboration Regimes in an Anarchic World.” 
International Organization 36, no. 1 (Spring 1982): 140.
37Ibid.
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to normal parameters weaker states are less likely to judge the threat posed by the 
hegemon in terms of capability, making security cooperation more probable.
Critics of regime theory maintain that they have a marginal impact on interstate 
cooperation if any. Some claim “ ...institutions are basically a reflection of the 
distribution of power in the world.”38 They are based on self-interested calculations, 
have no independent effect on state behavior, and therefore have no power to motivate 
cooperative behavior. Some theorists have searched for a compromise position. Charles 
Glaser asserts that cooperative behavior can be understood within the structuralist 
framework if it is viewed as self help/9 Institutions can be tools used by states to realize 
mutual self-help situations, but are fundamentally still prisoners of state interests. Most 
institutionalists do not believe that cooperation can appear without serving state interests. 
When state interests happen to be congruent with institutions, institutions may function as 
facilitators.40 They maintain that institutions can make a difference, but only in 
conjunction with power realities. None of these views challenge the idea that regimes are 
a result of the presence of a hegemonic power, and their effectiveness reflects stability in 
the system.
Other scholars use the example of interdependence as an alternative to hegemonic 
stability theory and regimes to explain inter-state security cooperation. Richard
j8John Mearshiemer. “False Promise of International Institutions,” International 
Security 19, no. 3 (Winter 1994/95): 7.
39Charles L. Glaser, “Realists as Optimists, Cooperation as Self-Help,” in 
Realism: Restatements and Renewal, ed. Benjamin Frankel (Portland. OR: Frank Cass, 
1996), 156.
4°Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin, “The Promise of Institutionalist Theory,” 
International Security 20, no. 1 (Summer 1995): 43.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Rosecrance and Stein comment “The horizontal interaction of transnational processes is 
higher than at any point since World War I.”41 Growing interdependence tasks 
governments to cooperate, “If they (governments) are to cope with the great transnational 
phenomena of the current age...they must cooperate with one another.”42 Rosecrance 
and Stein admit that although they view interdependence as a potential way for state to 
work around anarchy, “Whether interdependence will emerge as positive or negative will 
depend on old-fashioned cooperation among governments.”43 Keohane and Joseph Nye 
agree, in their volume in which they coin the term complex interdependence. “In 
analyzing the politics of interdependence, we emphasized that interdependence would not 
necessarily lead to cooperation, nor did we assume that its consequences would 
automatically be benign in other respects.*’44 Interdependence is a helpful tool to 
understand the level of hegemony in a given system, but not useful when discussing the 
likelihood of security cooperation. Institutions remain the better indicator in judging the 
level of systemic cooperative behavior.
Many authors who concentrate their research on Latin America are also strong 
institutionalists. David Mares critiques Latin American security issues and believes that 
more thought should be applied to finding workable solutions. He upholds the Peru- 
Ecuador border conflict as a model, and trumpets the role of international financial aid
4IRichard Rosecrance and Arthur Stein, “Interdependence: Myth or Reality.” 
World Politics, 26, no. 1 (October 1973): 21.
42Ibid.
43Ibid.. 22.
44Keohane and Nye, 249.
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and outside arbiters.45 Joseph S, Tulchin and Ralph H. Espach think that the spread of
democracy and free-markets via an organization Like the proposed Free Trade Area of the
Americas (FTAA) are the best way to approach Latin American problems.46 Heman
Patino Mayer is more direct in his institutional belief, stating
“A genuine and effective inter-American hemispheric security system must be 
constructed upon a community of states that has as it is premise the 
acknowledgement of shared responsibilities, interests, and values and expresses 
the decision to assume, preserve, and protect them from situations of risk or 
threat.”47
Farer wrote that institutions such as the UN. OAS, international financial institutions and
48non-govemmental organizations, are contributing to the stability of Latin America.
Olga Pellicer’s work is based solely on regional institutions contributing to security.
explicitly showing the high regard the author has for them.49
One of the divisions between academics on the subject of cooperation pertains to
the examples they are likely to use to illustrate their viewpoint. Realists frequently use
security issues to demonstrate why cooperation is unlikely to occur. Charles Lipson
45David Mares. "Securing Peace in the Americas in the Next Decade,” in The 
Future o f Inter-American Relations. ed. Jorge Dominguez (New York: Routledge. 2000). 
47.
■^Joseph S. Tulchin and Ralph H. Espach. ‘Toward Innovative Strategic Policies: 
A Conclusion,” in Latin America in the New International System (Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner, 2001), 220.
4'Heman Patino Mayer, "The Future of Cooperative Hemispheric Security in the 
Americas.” in Beyond Praetorianism: The Latin American Military in Transition, eds. 
Richard L. Millet and Michael Gold-Biss (Miami: North-South Center Press, 1996), 1.
^ o m  Farer. “Introduction and Overview,” in Beyond Sovereignty: Collectively 
Defending Democracy in the Americas (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 
1996), 4.
49Olga Pellicer, Regional Mechanisms and International Security in Latin 
America (New York: UN University Press, 1998).
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explains the difference by noting that, “Economic issues are characterized far more often 
by elaborate networks of rules, norms, and institutions, grounded in reasonably stable, 
convergent expectations. There are few equivalents in the security field to the 
comprehensive, rule-guided arrangements in trade and money.”50
Lipson points out that two factors work against the ability of security cooperative 
endeavors to succeed. First, the magnitude of potendal loses for a player if cooperation is 
not reciprocated and second, the risks associated with a lack of sufficient intelligence on 
the others decisions and actions.51 Robert Jervis adds “...cooperation is more probable 
when mutual cooperation is only slightly less attractive than exploiting the other, when 
being exploited is only slightly worse than mutual competition.*02 Keohane and Axelrod 
came to similar conclusions using the prisoner’s dilemma model.53 Although they 
maintain that security and economic issues can be analyzed using the same model, they 
contend that actors are more likely to cooperate when it comes to commerce as opposed
50CharIes Lipson. “International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs,” 
World Politics 37. no. 1. (October 1984): 21.
51 Ibid., 22.
52Robert Jervis, “From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security 
Cooperation,” in Cooperation Under Anarchy, ed. Kenneth Oye (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1986), 64.
53Prisoner's Dilemma is a tool to explain state behavior in the presence of 
anarchy. It explains that states are in competition with other states, and how this 
competition thwarts their attempts to strive for the most optimal outcome for their 
individual benefit. For a detailed explanation see Stein, 34-36.
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to military related issues: “Economic issues usually seem to exhibit less conflictual 
payoff structures than do those of military security.”54
Many academics disagree that the presence of cooperation in a system can be 
supported by the example of regimes. At the outset this dissertation remains ambivalent 
on the question of institutions creating security cooperation, although a view on this issue 
may emerge as a product of this research. Instead, it focuses on institutional success as a 
product of hegemonic stability, and power asymmetry. In this context institutions 
become an instrument to explain the difference between hegemony and the onset of 
power asymmetry. As power asymmetry takes hold, the importance of institutions 
decrease as the hegemon increasingly acts unilaterally and weaker states view the 
institutions as tools of dominance by the hegemon. During times of hegemony the threat 
posed by the hegemon is reduced and institution creation and maintenance gamer more 
attention.
POWER ASYMMETRY
This dissertation focuses on high levels of power asymmetry as a factor on 
reducing the level of security cooperation potential among states in a hegemonic system. 
The first assumption leading to this observation is that a concentration of power in one 
state in a given system is more conducive to creating stability, and thus security 
cooperation. The second assumption is that when the hegemon experiences sudden
54Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation Under 
Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions,” in Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The 
Contemporary Debate, ed. David A. Baldwin (New York: Colombia University Press, 
1993), 91.
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power surges compared to other states in the region a condition of power asymmetry 
results. How this power surge will be accounted for in the study will be discussed.
As previously stated, the analysis of this study is performed at the systemic level. 
The distribution of power of the system is the primary determinant of system 
characteristics. This study focuses specifically on unipolarity as delineated by hegemonic 
stability theory and why uni polarity is the most likely systemic structure to create inter­
state cooperation that will provide a basis for the power asymmetry argument.
Three basic power alignments are noted in the literature, unipolarity, bipolarity 
and multipolarity. Highly centralized systems are those with one state at the center of 
power, bipolarity refers to those systems with two centers, and multipolarity is the most 
distributed power structure referring to systems with more than two poles. Each of these 
will be briefly reviewed below along with arguments concerning their qualities in relation 
to stability creation. During the critique of each theory, they will be individually placed 
in the context of U.S.-Latin American relations. The region has experienced both 
multipolarity and bipolarity through the lens of the global system. Multipolarity 
prevailed until the rise of U.S. power during the final quarter of the nineteenth century. 
Pure hegemony existed from the end of the nineteenth century until the 1930s, a brief 
period after World War H, and from 1990 to the present. Global bipolarity overlapped 
with U.S. regional hegemony from the 1950s to 1990.
The argument for the presence of one dominant state in a system was presented at 
the beginning of this chapter. Hegemonic stability theory posits that the presence of a 
hegemonic power in a given system creates more stability among states in the system that 
has a greater likelihood to lead to security cooperation than bipolar or multi-polar
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systems. Hegemonic stability theory also makes the argument that because a hegemonic 
system is more likely to give rise to institutions o f  all varieties, these institutions in turn 
may perpetuate the stability above the singular ability o f  the hegemon. For example. U.S. 
hegemony produced many institutions, the more prominent being the Pan American 
Union, the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB), the Organization o f American States 
(OAS), the Inter American Development Bank, the Treaty o f  Tlatelolco, and NAFTA.
Not all academics agree with the hegemonic stability assessment. Some view the 
influence o f bipolarity as having been a very stabilizing influence on the Americas.
Some scholars suggest that during the U.S.-Soviet Union bipolar rivalry, U.S. power was 
effectively deterred, leading to greater system stability. Edgardo Mercado Jarrin noted 
that Latin American countries sought a  greater degree o f autonomy from the U.S. that 
made them more conscious o f powers like the Soviet Union outside o f  the hemisphere.55 
The Alliance for Progress can be considered as one example of this theory. The 
organization sought to bring greater development aid to Latin American to alleviate 
poverty and keep communist revolutions at bay. Through the prism o f bipolar stability 
one could argue that Latin American states were able to play the Soviet card against the 
U.S. and receive more aid than they otherwise would. In theory, they were able to limit 
the depth o f U.S. penetration by balancing one antagonist against the other.
Richard N. Rosecrance contends that weaker states may benefit from bipolarity. 
“One o f the major characteristics o f the contemporary international scene resides in the
55Edgardo Mercado Jarrin, “The Rivalry Between the Superpowers: A Latin 
American Perspective,” in Beyond Superpower Rivalry: Latin America and the Third 
World, ed. John F. Weeks (New York: New York University Press, 1991), 69.
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difference in attitude and position of the allies of the great powers and neutral states.’06 
He explains that nonaligned nations received benefits of alliance protection and without 
pledging political allegiance to either major power. Augusto Varas specifically cites 
occurrences of Latin American states exercising their relative political freedom: "The 
early relations between the Soviet Union and Argentina, Uruguay, and Mexico serve as 
counterpoints to the difficult relations between these same countries and the United 
States.’0 ' Cole Blaiser adds that although many Latin American leaders were not 
admirers of the Soviet system, even so they reserved the right as an autonomous state to 
do so and "such ties give them room for maneuver and bargaining leverage in disputes 
with the United States.”58
Despite the few perceived advantages of bipolarity in maintaining regional 
stability, many disadvantages resulted as well. Jarrin also noted that the superpower 
rivalry caused domestic strife in Latin America through “...exacerbating the ideological 
differences in Latin America, polarizing positions, and results in domestic confrontations 
on major issues.”59 The polarization of Latin American politics throughout the twentieth 
century has been well regarded as a primary impediment to pluralistic political and 
economic development. Bipolarity also contributed to regional arms races. Some critics
56Richard Rosecrance, “Bipolarity, Multipolarity and the Future.” The Journal o f 
Conflict Resolution 10. no. 3 (September 1966): 325.
^Augusto Varas, “Soviet-Latin American Relations Under U.S. Regional 
Hegemony,” Soviet-Latin American Relations in the 1980s (Boulder: Westview Press.
1987), 17.
58Cole Blasier, The Giant's Rival: The USSR and Latin America (Pittsburgh: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1987), 158.
59Jarrin, 75.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
47
point out that the distribution of arms surpluses was the primary culprit of Latin 
American interstate arms races during the first half of the Cold War. However, both the 
European and the Soviet Union contributed to Latin American arms expenditures as well. 
For example, during the Falkland/Malvinas Island conflict the most lethal weapon used 
by Argentina was the French built Exocet missile. After President Carter's efforts to curb 
U.S. arms exports to the region the Soviet Union became the top arms exporter from 
1979-1983-60 The bipolar competition guaranteed that regional states would always have 
access to military hardware. This situation contributed to arms races in the region that in 
turn, contributed to huge budget deficits that plague many Latin American states until 
today.
The frequency of U.S. intervention in the region during the Cold War. because of 
the perceived threat of communist revolution, is another symptom of instability caused by 
bipolarity. Because U.S. leaders viewed the actions of many Latin American states 
through the prism of the Cold War. the U.S. was more likely to intervene when there was 
a perception of Soviet involvement. During the Cold War Latin American sensitivities 
increased with each U.S. political or military effort to curb revolution, beginning first in 
Central America and Caribbean, but also in less traditional areas such as Brazil and Chile. 
This issue contributed to tension, which plagued U.S .-Latin American relations, affecting 
regional stability in the process.
Even though bipolarity may cause more instability than unipolarity, Joanne Gowa 
shows that multipolarity fares even worse. When Gowa performed an analysis on the 
effects of bipolarity and multipolarity on trade she found a greater likelihood that
60Ibid., 78.
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bipolarity will contribute to an open market system than multipolarity, bringing more 
stability to the system as a whole. The finding led to her comment, “It effectively assigns 
a large role in the opening of post-war Western markets to the transition from a 
multipolar to a bipolar international security system that occurred simultaneously.” 61 
Gowa contends that the refusal of the U.S. to assume a leadership role led to 
multipolarity during the interwar period, destabilizing the global system. Her analysis 
can be interpreted as an indication that the more concentrated the leadership function in a 
given system, the more likely cooperation may occur.
Many scholars agree that a greater concentration of power brings greater stability 
to a system. John Lewis Gaddis comments, “It is a curious consequence of bipolarity that 
although alliances are more durable than in a multipolar system, defections are at the 
same time more tolerable.” 62 Waltz proposes that bipolarity is more stable than 
multipolarity because it is easier for states to track the capabilities of two states as 
opposed to more.6’’ When capabilities are easier to track, the increased transparency 
makes states less concerned with marginal increases and decreases of power. Under 
multipolarity Waltz points out that in Europe every state was continually worried about 
the gains of several other states, refusing cooperative efforts even when mutual gain was 
possible. By comparison bipolarity during the Cold War “created a situation that
61Joanne Gowa. “Bipolarity, Multipolarity and Free Trade.” The American 
Political Science Review 83, no. 4 (December 1989): 1253.
62John Lewis Gaddis. “The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar 
International System.” in The Cold War and After: Prospects fo r Peace, eds. Sean M. 
Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller (Cambridge: MTT Press, 1993), 12.
63Ken Waltz, Theorv o f International Politics (Reading MA: Addison-Wesley, 
1979), 168.
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permitted wider ranging and more effective cooperation among the states o f Western 
Europe.”64
Snidal hypothesized that multipolarity has the potential to be a more stabilizing 
influence on a system because its presence increases the predictability of state behavior. 
He points out that, “Because rational state behavior is less affected by relative gains, 
cooperation is easier under multipolarity.”63 Therefore there is less need for states to 
track each other s behavior, nullifying the argument multipolarity may decrease stability 
because states feel compelled to monitor each other’s capabilities: a more difficult 
proposition in instances of dispersed power arrangements. However. Snidal admits that 
his study does not take into account the argument that identifying and therefore punishing 
non-cooperators in a multipolar setting is more difficult. Because states cannot perfectly 
discriminate behavior in respect to other states, the possibility for decentralized 
enforcement decreases. Without proper enforcement cooperative agreements are more 
difficult. Snidal concludes that. “In brief, there is insufficient evidence to support the 
claim that multipolarity has increased cooperation."66
From the discussion above the conclusion reached is that unipolarity, and thus 
hegemony, is the most likely structure to generate stability and security cooperation. The 
assumption of hegemonic stability that a singular center of power in a given system 
results in a greater chance for cooperation than more distributed systems is supported by
64Waltz, “Reductionist and Systemic Theories.” 58.
65Duncan Snidal, “Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation,” 
in Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate. ed. David A. Baldwin 
(New York: Colombia University Press, 1993), 200.
66Ibid., 201.
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a review of the effects of the three different power alignments on the chances of security 
cooperation. This analysis supports the contention that power asymmetry should be 
treated as a corollary to hegemonic stability.
There is ample evidence that a hegemonic system may increase the prospects of 
security cooperation. However, there is little discussion in the literature that power 
asymmetry may work to erode security cooperation which is the primary focus of this 
study. Therefore, the next step is to determine the likely indicators of power asymmetry. 
The ability to measure state power over time is key to understanding when asymmetry 
occurs. Power measurement in this study is based on economic and security indicators. 
Not only will the study seek to measure power across time to broadly demonstrate the 
hegemonic relationship, but also to show how power fluctuates over time. Data will be 
offered on military spending and GDP of key states for comparison purposes. The 
statistics will show that the regional dominance of the U.S. has existed since the end of 
the nineteenth century and most of the twentieth century. The measurement of the 
relative dominance of the U.S. to the rest of the region over time will chart any sharp 
increases or decreases and will be compared with increases or decreases in security 
cooperation.
Indicators of interdependence are also important to measure security cooperation, 
in both the military and economic spheres. This is because during times of power 
asymmetry it is likely that the weaker states in the system are increasingly sensitive to 
their dependence on the hegemon. Conversely, when the hegemon's power differential 
with weaker states grows at a reduced rate, weaker states are likely to be more amenable 
to the policies of the dominant states, and less sensitive to interdependence. Therefore,
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the study will note increases and decreases of Latin American dependence on the U.S., 
and its general effect on regional relations.
This study will demonstrate many of the assertions made in this section. The case 
study chapters will show that hegemony creates more stability than other security 
structures. The U.S .-Latin American system offers many examples. For the last hundred 
years the region has not witnessed a large multi-state conflict, a claim no other regional 
area can make. On the contrary, the activity of the hegemon guided many regional 
rivalries to a state of peaceful coexistence. Argentina and Brazil maintained tense 
relations since the time of their independence until the 1980s. spending millions of 
dollars during a Cold War arms race. By the 1990s this relationship was so improved 
that the two states signed a historic trade agreement forming the core of Mercosur. 
Argentina and Chile avoided conflict over the possession of territory on their Southern 
border. More recently, a long-standing dispute between Peru and Ecuador was 
successfully concluded by U.S. sponsored negotiations. The record of major conflict, and 
deaths due to conflict, compares favorably to all other regions in the world during the 
same time frame.
Using these power indicators two points of time emerge as moments where power 
asymmetry began. The first one was the culmination of the rise of U.S. power at the end 
of the nineteenth Century. The second one took place after World War II. Two 
examples of a reduction of U.S. power will also be presented, one more dramatic than the 
other. The first one was due to the Great Depression; the second one was due to 
economic crises that occurred during the 1970s.
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OTHER REGIONAL THEORIES
There are many theories besides hegemonic stability that address the change in 
security cooperation among states. These theories include state-level phenomena, such as 
form of government, economic structures, and culture. Although they are worthy of 
review because of their prominence in the regional debate, and because they address the 
security cooperation issue, they do not fit the structural theme of this dissertation.
Culture has become a frequently cited concept since the end of the Cold War. 
Huntington’s volume. Clash o f Civilizations, is symbolic of the popularity and influence 
of culture as a causal variable to explain systemic instability. Huntington points out that 
culture is important to states because, ’’States define threats in terms of the intentions of 
other states, and those intentions and how they are perceived are powerfully shaped by 
cultural considerations."6' However, he turns the realist versus liberal dialogue on its 
side, and shows he may share philosophical qualities with both sides, but also frames 
their debates under the cultural rubric. “States with similar cultures and institutions will 
see common interests.”68 In other words, the primary determinant of whether states will 
cooperate, or not cooperate, is based on the similarity of their cultures.
Huntington believes that the cultural trend of the post Cold War order means that 
globalization is both a negative and positive force. He sees the state losing power to 
international organization as well as cultural sub-groups from within. In the immortal 
words of Benjamin Barber, “The planet is falling precipitately apart and coming
6'Huntington, 34. 
^Ibid.
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reluctantly together at the very same moment.”69 The only place where this may not 
cause chaos is within civilizations, although it may affect civilizations as well. A recent 
example of Huntington’s thesis is the growing security ties between English speaking 
countries. Australia. Canada. New Zealand. United Kingdom (U.K.), and the U.S. As 
these ties grow stronger, the connections of the U.S. with NATO are growing weaker, as 
a clear example of the strength of culture over institutions.
The culture debate in the Americas predates Huntington. The culture-based thesis 
is typically divided into one of two camps in the regional literature, those that hold the 
U.S. accountable for detrimental regional relations, and those that blame Iberian culture. 
Lars Schoultz’s volume. Beneath the United States: A History o f U.S. Policy Toward 
Latin America. is an example of the literature that takes the U.S. to task. A common 
assertion against the U.S. is that its Latin American foreign policy is usually not well 
managed. 0 For example, Abraham Lowenthal suggests three changes to improve U.S.- 
Latin America relations, each one directed at the U.S., as though Latin America had no 
ability to affect change. ' 1 However, Schouitz seems to think the blame is far deeper than 
a benign neglect and inept policies. Schouitz maintains that a feeling of cultural 
superiority, based in part on racial stereotypes, generates a capricious U.S. outlook 
towards Latin America. This policy is also driven by private economic interests, “ ...the
69Benjamin Barber, “Jihad Vs. McWorld,” The Atlantic Monthly (March 1993). 
Available from http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/foreign/barberf.htm, July 21, 2001.
70Abraham Lowenthal, “United States-Latin American Relations at the Century’s 
Turn: Managing the Intermestic Agenda,” in The United States and the Americas: A
Twenty-First Century View, eds. Albert Fishlow and James Jones (New York: W.W. 
Norton and Company, 1999), 134.
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need to protect U.S. security, the desire to accommodate the demands of U.S. domestic 
politics, and the drive to promote U.S. economic development.”72
Schouitz states that all problems between the U.S. and Latin America lie at the 
door of the U.S.: “While security concerns ebb and flow, domestic U.S. politics have 
been central to the explanation of nearly every important issue of U.S.-Latin American 
relations, beginning in the early 1820s....”73 In Schoultz’s essay most U.S. historical 
interventions south of the border were due to the internal machinations of U.S. politics 
with little or no regard for benefit or detriment of other hemispheric states. Schouitz 
maintains that the Reagan Administration's refocus on the perceived communist threat in 
Central America was due to a misinformed U.S. populace. He argues that President Bush 
invaded Panama strictly for his own political aggrandizement and President Clinton’s 
signing of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act was purely a cynical 
measure to gain the state of Florida’s support in the next election. Blame spans the 
century, since it is explained that the 1898 Teller Amendment was responsible for the rise 
of Cuba’s leader. Fidel Castro, and the resulting acrimony between U.S. and Cuba. 4 
Schouitz ends his work characterizing the contemptuous nature of U.S. cultural attitudes 
towards Latin America, explaining that U.S. Presidents have malignantly treated Latin 
American leaders as an: “...unwelcome dog at a garden party, giving us a glimpse of how
^Lars Schouitz. Beneath the United States: A History o f U.S. Policy Toward 
Latin America (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), 367.
73Ibid., 370.
74Ibid., 372.
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little has changed in the two centuries since John Quincy Adams and his generation 
fashioned the mold that still constrains our thinking.”73
It is apparent that Schouitz believes the fundamental problem in Latin American- 
U.S. relation's lies with U.S. culture. Lawrence Harrison believes the opposite, as argued 
in his book. Underdevelopment Is a State o f Mind. Harrison writes that most of Latin 
America’s troubles derive not from the U.S., but from internal dynamics fed by 
undesirable cultural traits. He dismisses dependency theory, already called into question 
by mainstream critics in the U.S. and abroad, pointing out that many former colonies, 
such as Hong Kong, Singapore. South Korea and Taiwan left the ranks of 
underdeveloped states. 6 They would not have been able to do so if the malevolent 
effects associated with dependency theory had truly burdened developing states. In the 
volume Mariano Grodona. a contributing author, lists cultural characteristics 
differentiating developing states from the rest. The author maintains that the values of 
developing states are virtually the same throughout the world, not an isolated Latin 
American phenomenon. Harrison points out that a particularly noteworthy area of culture 
study focuses on problems associated with corruption in developing societies.
Francis Fukuyama agrees with the cultural argument, noting that “virtually all 
serious observers understand that liberal political and economic institutions depend on a
75 Ibid.. 386.
/6Lawrence E. Harrison and Samuel P. Huntington, Culture Matters: How Values 
Shape Human Progress (New York: Basic Books, 2000), xxii.
' Mariano Grodona. “A Cultural Typology of Economic Development,” in 
Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress, eds. Lawrence E. Harrison and 
Samuel P. Huntington (New York: Basic Books, 2000), 47-53.
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healthy and dynamic civil society for their vitality.” '8 Fukuyama believes that the social 
capital in a society, resulting in a particular kind of culture found in all successful states, 
is just as relevant as the financial capital. Family-centric business and politics are a 
characteristic of developing cultures. Fukuyama points out that the lack of trust in 
developing states can lead a tight network of family and friends who depend solely on 
that network rather than on state institutions. These family networks are a shield against 
the problems in developing societies, but can also be a hindrance to modernization. 
Other researchers found that modernization does not automatically lend itself to the 
disintegration of large family groups. “Instead, the modernization process is being 
molded into the existing family and kinship institutions and areas of traditional family 
function.”79 Although these traditional social structures spring-up and are renewed as a 
result of poorly performing national government, their continuation hinders the potential 
improvement of government performance.
Another body of literature concentrates on Latin American reform at the state 
level to address the internal problems of Latin American states. Many analysts contend 
that if the right economic and political reforms were instituted most if not all Latin 
American states would reach new heights of economic and social prosperity. The logic 
continues that if such progress could be made, most security problems that are currently 
on the agenda will be ameliorated. For example, in one of Jorge Dominguez's recent
Francis Fukuyama. Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation o f Prosperity 
(New York: The Free Press, 1995), 4.
79Manuel L. Carlos and Lois Sellers, "Family, Kinship Structure, and 
Modernization in Latin America,” Latin American Research Review 7, no. 2 (Summer 
1972): 113.
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publications he begins by stating, 'Today there are few matters more crucial to the 
construction of democracy in the Americas than how governments deal with an array of 
new security challenges.”80 Notice that construction of democracy is the primary focus 
of the introductory sentence. The assumption is that by instituting internal reforms Latin 
American states will be able to change their condition of underdevelopment. Other 
studies delve deeper into Latin America democracies searching for tendencies in the 
region that may undermine democratic reforms. Scott Mainwarring and Timothy R. 
Scully contend that the successful consolidation of democracy is contingent on the 
institutionalization of a party system.81
The democratic peace theory is one of the more controversial theories of 
democratic development literature. Its proponents and detractors remain divided over its 
utility. David Mares researched the notion that democracies do not go to war with each 
other in relation to the Americas. He found that democratic peace theory did not hold 
true for the region. Mares found that the assumption that voters in a democratic society 
want peace was not something that should be assumed. He also found that, “Variations 
among democratic institutions affect the immediacy and directness of voters’ ability to 
punish or even observe decision-makers.”8"
80Jorge Dominguez, International Security and Democracy: Latin America and 
the Caribbean in the Post-Cold War Era (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 
1998), ix.
81 Scott Mainwarring and Timothy R. Scully, Building Democratic Institutions: 
Party Systems in Latin America (Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1995), 1.
82 David Mares, Violent Peace: Militarized Interstate Bargaining in Latin 
America (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 107.
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A body of literature that addressed the need for democratic reform in Latin 
American states dominated by military rule can also be included in the state-level school 
of thought. Latin American militaries were at one time viewed as the largest impediment 
to democracy in the region. Some works viewed the problem as connected to any state 
with a weak civilian government since the military by nature was organized and 
motivated.83 Richard L. Millet and Michael Gold-Biss has determined that military threat 
to democratic governments has subsided, and the main problem is now the disintegration 
of regional militaries since many lack a clear mission.84 Some of the state-level literature 
focuses on economic reform in Latin America, believing that democracy is dependent on 
a flourishing market economy. Regional agreements such as the NAFTA, the Southern 
Common Market (Mercosur) and the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) 
are all topics of economic development category.
State-level explanations do not have the ability to fully explain the lack of U.S.- 
Latin American security cooperation. They focus on variables that describe 
characteristics of states, but cannot explain how these characteristics directly impact the 
system. By contrast the systemic level perspective allows the scholar to observe and 
address the reoccurring patterns in regional security relations without having to explain 
the internal dynamics of each state. The structural approach allows this study to explore 
the stress points that emerged over time as indicators of the level of security cooperation 
between the U.S. and Latin America.
83For a good example of work on this topic see, Alfred Stepan. Rethinking 
Militant Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone (Princeton: Princeton University Press.
1988).’
84Richard L. Millett and Michael Gold-Biss, Beyond Praetorianism: The Latin 
American Military in Transition (Miami: North-South Center Press, 1996), p. vii.
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CONCLUSION
A foundational point of hegemonic stability theory is that a concentration of 
power into one dominant state breeds stability. At the heart of hegemonic stability theory 
is the assumption that the presence of a strong hegemon is equivalent to a system more 
conducive to cooperation, a secondary effect being stronger international organizations.
This study challenges the notion that the presence of hegemon only creates 
cooperation, and the logic that increases in hegemonic strength only leads to more 
cooperation. Although it may seem intuitive that increasing the power of the hegemon 
leads to more security cooperation, since domination increases and with it the power to 
dictate terms and support more institutions, this study maintains that there is a point at 
which higher levels of power concentrated in the hegemon creates mistrust between the 
hegemon and weaker states. In turn, this distrust creates an undercurrent of non- 
cooperation that may erode the benefits of stability imparted by the hegemon.
There are two ways the hegemon spreads its influence, through manipulation of 
material incentives and altering the substantive beliefs of weaker states. Their 
differences help explain the mechanics of how distrust is manifested under power 
asymmetry. Altering substantive beliefs occurs over long periods of time, socializing 
weaker states so their views are in basic compliance with the hegemon. By comparison 
the manipulation of material incentives are more direct in serving the hegemon’s 
immediate goals, such as ending a conflict or stemming a monetary crisis. Weaker states 
are much more sensitive to the use of material incentives since this expression of 
hegemonic power is far more visible. During times when strong power asymmetry
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exists, the sensitivity of weaker states increases, just as the likelihood of hegemonic states 
to rely on material incentives as a means to spread its influence increase.
Applying hegemon stability theory to the current power alignment in the 
Americas region demonstrates that the region has a hegemonic structure. Although the 
Cold War affected U.S. hegemony in the region during the last century, the U.S. was still 
considered as the primary regional power. Power indicators demonstrate the point, as 
well as the number of U.S. interventions in Latin America compared to Latin American 
regional interventions. Much of the literature on U.S.-Latin American relations 
reinforces this point.35
Many hegemonic stability scholars concentrate on the economic power of the 
hegemon in creating stability in the hegemonic system, however this study focuses on the 
security aspects of hegemonic stability. As Gilpin and others agree, security is an under­
emphasized element of hegemonic stability because the distribution of public goods will 
give rise to a relative gains problem. The relative gains dilemma introduces security 
issues and assures that weaker states in a hegemonic system will compete by finding 
alternatives to the hegemon or aligning with the hegemon. The alternatives to the 
hegemon can be found outside of the system or by forming an internal alliance against 
the hegemon, as the case study chapters will demonstrate.
35The following is a truncated sampling of the literature that supports the thesis of 
U.S. hegemony in the region: Blaiser, The Hovering Giant: U.S. Responses to 
Revolutionary Change in Latin America', James Petras and Morris Morley, U.S. 
Hegemony Under Siege: Class, Politics, and Development in Latin America (New York: 
Verso, 1990); Guy Poitras, The Ordeal o f Hegemony: the United States and Latin 
America (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990).
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The power asymmetry argument supports the assumption that one dominant state 
in a system creates stability, but allows the scholar to make inferences in regard to the 
ebb and flow of the power of the dominant state, and its affect on the system. In other 
words a hegemonic system does not create the same amount of stability in the system 
over time. Power asymmetry assumes that if a particular hegemonic power has a 
comparatively high level of power asymmetry then a reduction of the hegemon's power 
may result in greater security cooperation. The goal of an analysis utilizing power 
asymmetry is that it seeks to explain the lack of cooperation and the instability it causes 
in a hegemonic system.
The history of the OAS is an important example of this dynamic. The U.S.. as the 
hegemonic power, was fundamental to the creation of the organization, but within ten 
years of its inception, the inability of the U.S. to pass motions favorable to its regional 
foreign policy became apparent. The cause can be attributed to power asymmetry. The 
hegemonic relationship allowed enough regional cooperation to create the OAS. It also 
helped that when the OAS was created. U.S. strong hegemony did not yet affect regional 
relations. By 1965 the strength of U.S. hegemony reestablished itself and regional 
security relations suffered accordingly. After this time the OAS ceased to operate as a 
consensus building institution for regional security crises. Hegemonic stability and 
power asymmetry maintain a symbiotic relationship. Hegemonic stability is the 
framework and power asymmetry may provide insight when hegemonic stability is most 
likely to create security cooperation.
The questions raised by power asymmetry are important. The current and 
foreseeable future tells us that the U.S. will remain the primary regional power.
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Nevertheless, it is far more beneficial to elucidate how to derive and sustain cooperative 
behavior under these conditions. Furthermore, the process provides insights for other 
regions.
The review of state level theories of regional cooperation demonstrated that they 
lack utility in trying to explain the broader dynamics of hemispheric cooperation.
Theories that focus on forms of government, types of economic systems or culture point 
to differences between states. However, these differences do not point to a causative 
reason for problems in U.S .-Latin American security relations simply by implicating the 
actions of a state. An explanation of how states interact should not be based on lists of 
characteristics that make them distinct, but of the consistent behavior of units despite 
their individuality. Theories that pertain to culture, to form of government, or to structure 
of economy are not particularly useful at explaining broad patterns in international 
relations. A synthesis of state-level theory usually involves a normative judgment, such 
as Harrison and Schouitz's essays on culture. Harrison makes the final judgment that 
Latin American culture is responsible for its own lack of development and subsequent 
problems with the U.S. By comparison. Schouitz comes to the opposite conclusion: the 
U.S. is the reason for ongoing problems in inter-American relations. The prescription 
recommended in each case is that the culture of either Latin America or the U.S. must 
change. Not only is such a recommendation highly unlikely, but also has polarizing 
effects bound to increase any divide the authors hope to ameliorate. The consideration of 
power asymmetry might explain the fluctuation of security cooperation among regional 
states and recommend courses of action to improve regional security cooperation.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
63
The next four chapters will review particular time periods in U.S.-Latin American 
relations to note when systemic power asymmetry occurs, and how it relates to security 
relations. Chapter three will specifically focus on the roots of hemispheric relations, 
covering the time period from the 1820s until after World War II. During this period the 
U.S. grew into the role of a strong hegemon by the early twentieth century, became a 
weaker hegemon with the onset of the Depression, and at the end of World War II rose to 
strong hegemony once again. The chapter will address the question, as all the case study 
chapters: Did the periods in which the U.S. had a high level of power compared to Latin 
American states result in lesser or greater security cooperation?
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CHAPTER HI 
THE FORGING OF U.S. HEGEMONY (1823-1944)
This chapter offers a brief review of the history of Latin American-U.S. security 
cooperation, from its beginnings in the early 1800s to the end of World War II. The level 
of U.S. power, relative to Latin America, fluctuated from one extreme to the other during 
this time period. The U.S. ascended to regional hegemon after the end of its Civil War. 
By the end of the 1800s it was widely acknowledged as the dominant state in the region. 
The hegemonic status of the U.S. was signified by its initial attempt at building a regional 
security institution, the Pan American Union. As the power of the U.S. grew in 
comparison to Latin American states, so did its penchant to intervene in the Caribbean 
and Central America. By the 1920s regional relations deteriorated to the point that the 
Pan American meetings generated little cooperation and many Latin American leaders 
were suspicious of U.S. motives.
The U.S. economy collapsed because of the Depression and ushered in a new era 
in regional relations. Relations steadily improved, paving the way for close security 
cooperation during World War II. After the war U.S. power swung again in the opposite 
direction, increasing the dominance of the U.S. once again. The power fluctuations 
during this time period provide an important test of this work's main research question.
If there was a notable decrease in security relations between the U.S. and Latin American 
when the U.S. power was at it peak during the early 1900s, and relations improved during 
the time period from 1930-1944, then the conclusion lends support to this dissertation's 
central assertion. Chapter 3 is by no means a comprehensive historical review of all
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security related events during this time frame. The chapter specifically concentrates on 
issues especially pertinent to regional security.
GROWTH OF POWER ASYMMETRY
Simon Bolivar and James Monroe were the authors of the two initial efforts to 
create institutionalized inter-American security. Simon Bolivar attempted to integrate 
Spanish American states by proposing a security pact. Bolivar and Jose de San Martin 
led their forces to victory over Spanish troops during a war that lasted fifteen years, 
ending in 1825. The victory resulted in the independence of Argentina, Bolivia. Chile, 
Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela.1 Bolivar was motivated to bring the former Spanish 
American colonies together in a security pact involving Argentina. Central America. 
Chile. Colombia. Mexico, and Peru." Bolivar's ultimate goal was “to form a truly 
American League, a society of brotherly nations, a society whose federated strength 
could oppose [European powers].'0 To this end he proposed a meeting, the Congress of 
Panama, inviting the representatives of former Spanish American colonies in 1826.
‘Bolivar's dream of a united Spanish American Republic never reached fruition 
and in 1830 the Gran Colombian Union ceased to exist when Venezuela and Ecuador 
withdrew. Bolivar commented. “America, is ungovernable. Those who have served the 
revolution have plowed the sea.” See, Thomas E. Skidmore, Modem Latin America 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 33-35.
2Although Argentina signed a formal treaty with Colombia, it was only a 
demonstration of friendship rather than a deeper expression of security cooperation. J. 
Lloyd Mecham, The United States and Inter-American Security, 1889-1960 (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 1961), 30-31.
3Gerhard Masur, Simon Bolivar (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 
1969), 411.
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The U.S. was supportive of the arrangement as a security measure against 
intrusive European powers, and was invited by Bolivar to participate to the extent the 
U.S. was interested.4 Despite the invitation, Bolivar was not seeking U.S. membership. 
As he once stated, “The North Americans and Haitians would be a foreign substance in 
our bodv.*° He actually viewed the U.S. as an equal rather than a guarantor of Latin 
American independence, thinking that a united Spanish America would compete with the 
U.S. for power and authority.6 Bolivar viewed Great Britain as the guarantor of the 
security for his new state, a plan Britain opposed because its over-extended security 
commitments during the period.
President James Monroe was supportive of Bolivar's initiative to keep European 
states from seeking to re-colonize Latin America. He stated to a British minister on the 
topic of Latin American independence that the system of modem colonization was in his 
mind an abuse of government and should immediately come to an end. The British were 
already showing their antipathy to the diffusion of U.S. influence in the Caribbean.8 
British concerns caused the U.S. to be cautious in its support of Bolivar's security 
commitment to the Pan-American initiative. As a consequence Monroe instructed the
"^Mecham. The United States and Inter-American Security. 31-33.
5Masur. 411.
•ibid.. 417.
'Noble E. Cunningham, Jr., The Presidency o f James Monroe (Lawrence, KA: 
University Press of Kansas, 1996), 439.
g
John P. Humphrey, The Inter-American System: A Canadian View (Toronto: 
privately printed, 1942), 25.
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U.S. attending the meeting to show support for the growing republican movement, but 
not to commit to any arrangements during the Congress of Panama.9
Monroe had set the tone for future U.S. policy when he issued what came to be 
known as the Monroe Doctrine in late 1923. Bolivar’s document and the Monroe 
Doctrine differed although both aimed at creating regional solidarity against European 
intervention. Bolivar’s pact was issued through a multilateral process in the Congress of 
Panama, the original Monroe Doctrine was a unilateral declaration. Both documents 
were opposed to European intervention in the Americas. Monroe was ambivalent about 
supporting the emerging republican sentiment in Latin America, and avoiding the 
provocation of European powers, particularly Great Britain. As former President Thomas 
Jefferson advised Monroe. ’’Great Britain is the nation that can do us the most harm of 
any one. ... and with her on our side we need not fear the whole world.” 10 The hope was 
that the Spanish-American republics could consolidate themselves into a single state, an 
ambition that seemed tenuous at best. Therefore, the U.S. had to avoid a situation in 
which it was forced to face a hostile European power alone. U.S. leaders were also 
concerned that political turmoil in the newly independent Latin American Republics 
would make an enticing opportunity for ambitious European states. As Monroe's 
Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams said, “It was one thing to tell Europe to keep its 
hands off the Western Hemisphere, but it was another to join hands with those weak
9Mecham, The United States and Inter-American Security, 38-39.
l0Paul L. Ford, The Works o f Thomas Jefferson (New York: G P . Putnam's Sons, 
1904), 318-321.
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Latin American governments in the spirit of equality and fraternal affection.”11 The 
Monroe Doctrine was an internal compromise created to defend U.S. ideals abroad, and 
protect U.S. domestic interests. It boldly warned the more powerful monarchies of the 
world, chiefly Spain and France, to not meddle in American affairs. However, it 
moderated its audacious warnings by stating the U.S. did not seek to interfere in the 
internal matters of Europe.12 The Monroe Doctrine amounted to a foreign policy 
statement with no enforcement mechanism.
In 1847 a second Latin American conference convened in Lima. Pern. This 
meeting was focused on repelling the efforts of Spain to reestablish its control over 
Ecuador, a former colonial possession. The former President of Ecuador. General Juan 
Jose Flores, headed the effort. He created an army composed of Spanish and British 
forces and garnered the support of Britain and Spain. The states of Bolivia. Chile. 
Ecuador. New Granada (present day Colombia), and Peru attended the Lima meeting. A 
U.S. delegation was invited in an observer capacity. The U.S. Charge d* Affaires. J. 
Randolph Clay, led the contingent.13 Attending states were able to agree on at least one 
important point: Reaffirmation of the nonintervention principle originally proposed at the 
Pan American meeting. Clay wholly supported the conclusion, assuming it was directed 
at Europe and therefore coincided with U.S. policy goals. However, some analysts point 
out that the principle of territorial integrity was directed against the U.S.. as the U.S. was
1 Barnes C. Humes, My Fellow Americans: Presidential Addresses That Shaped 
History (New York: Praeger, 1992). 33.
l2Dent. 3. The original message was not intended to be controversial, but Dent 
points out that the Library of Congress lists over 425 analytical works focus on this piece 
that make it the most studied presidential doctrine in the history of U.S. policy.
l3Mecham, The United States and Inter-American Security, 41.
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involved in a war against Mexico at the time.14 The U.S. sought security measures to 
guarantee regional state sovereignty from any threat outside o f  the region, Latin 
American states also wanted the same guarantee, but also to include protection from U.S. 
interference. This important difference would be a key issue in how both sides viewed 
regional security through the twentieth century.
Latin American states were wary o f U.S. expansionism, but they were even more 
alarmed at the more imminent threat o f European intervention. From their viewpoint a 
powerful U.S. could be not only a potential competitor in security and trade issues, but 
also an advocate in keeping European interventionism at bay. Despite its doubts about 
the U.S., "the victory o f the Union in the U.S. ks Civil War drew the U.S. and the sister 
republics o f the Western world into closer bonds o f friendship.” 13
The growing power differential between the U.S. and Latin America created a 
short-term impression that the U.S. could play the role of a benevolent security guarantor 
for the region. In the later part o f the nineteenth century it was the only state in the 
Americas that had the power to deter colonial ambitions. However, at the first sign of 
U.S. interventionist activity, the security arrangement’s unilateral origins would 
eventually lead to problems in the regional security dialog. During the U.S. Civil War, 
France and Spain attempted to regain former possessions in the new world. Spain tried to
,4John Bassett Moore, The Principles o f American Diplomacy (New York: Harper 
and Brothers, 1918), 381.
l5SamueI Flagg Bemis, The Latin American Policy o f the United States (New 
York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1943), 115. The Union victory provided an 
obstacle for European regional ambitions not only in Latin American, but in the U.S. as 
welL British support o f the Confederacy also promised a return o f  British influence in 
the U.S. if  the Confederacy had been victorious. A Confederate victory also would have 
allowed a new wave ofEuropean conflict and colonization in Latin America.
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bolster its presence in the Caribbean by reoccupying the city of Santo Domingo. Spain 
also took the Chincha guano islands off of Peru, rich in valuable nitrate deposits. After 
the Union’s victory in 1864 the U.S. pressured Spain to vacate both territories. Spain 
relented, cognizant of the military capability of the U.S. Under U.S. insistence Spain left 
Santo Domingo, and the Peruvian islands by 1865.16
France invaded Mexico with the support of Britain and Spain. At the cessation of 
Civil War hostilities Secretary of State William Seward demanded France remove its 
troops from Mexico. Seward invoked the Monroe Doctrine and placed 25.000 soldiers 
under the command of General Sheridan on the U.S.-Mexican border.1 The threat forced 
France to capitulate, fully withdrawing from Mexico by 1867. These examples of the 
U.S. defending Latin America from aggression outside the hemisphere gave legitimacy to 
the Monroe Doctrine as a regional security institution, despite the fact it was unilaterally 
mandated and enforced.
The U.S. also played a positive role in regional security relations, playing a 
leading role in trying to bring the Paraguayan War to an end, which lasted from 1865- 
1870. The war began by a series of events that escalated the conflict to a major war by 
1865. Paraguay began the conflict by seizing Brazilian territory in what it believed to be 
a preemptive strike. The attack pitted Paraguay against Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay. 
The war was enormously destructive, killing an estimated 200,000 Paraguayans alone.
t6Ibi<L, p. 112.
I7Ibid.
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and reducing its prewar national population of 75 percent.18 The Triple Alliance lost over 
100.000. The conflict was the bloodiest in Latin American history.
In 1867 the U.S. began to make notable efforts to broker a peace treaty between 
the combatants.19 Although the combat continued until the Brazilian led forces crushed 
the Paraguayan opposition, the role of the U.S. was notable in that it assumed a 
prominent regional struggle that did not directly involve U.S. interests. The actions of 
the U.S. helped secure its maturing position of regional hegemon, demonstrating 
leadership in most security issues, even when the U.S. was not directly affected.
In the immediate aftermath of the Civil War the status of the U.S. changed from a 
major regional power to a world power. U.S. foreign policy became more assertive in 
defending its foreign interests. In the mid-1800s U.S. presidents had been constrained 
from aggressively asserting U.S. interests because of the Monroe Doctrine. By 
comparison, after the Civil War. the growing power of the U.S. allowed President 
Ulysses S. Grant to pursue a regional security policy using the Monroe Doctrine as a 
validating tool. Grant harbored ambitions of expanding U.S. influence in the Caribbean 
in order to secure naval bases. Permanent basing could strategically position the U.S. to 
protect the Atlantic sea-lanes from European encroachment. Grant wished to annex the 
Dominican Republic to this end.20
I8Thomas E. Skidmore, Brazil: Five Centuries o f Change (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), 62.
l9Ibid.
20Bemis, 114.
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The U.S. Congress actively blocked Grant's plans for expansion, doing so in the 
name of anti-imperialism. However, the preponderance of U.S. power continued to have 
an influence on the realignment its interests and foreign policy. As U.S. military and 
economic capability began to dwarf Latin America's, its ability to affect change, through 
military and economic means increased. From the perspective of weaker states, outside 
involvement in domestic affairs, whether the cause altruistic or not, still amounted to 
unwanted intrusion into their internal affairs and smacked of the European imperialism 
many American states had fought so hard against in gaining their independence.
At first the growing asymmetry benefited regional relations. Its newfound stature 
was used to arbitrate disputes between Europe and Latin American states. In one such 
case Venezuela asked the U.S. to invoke the Monroe Doctrine in 1881 to defend it from 
the British. The U.S. agreed, and through diplomacy brought the British to arbitration.*1 
By the end of the nineteenth century favorable opinion of the Monroe Doctrine was not 
universal in Latin America, but it was still viewed positively in many quarters. In 1894 a 
monument was erected in Rio de Janeiro in honor of Monroe. The official U.S. dispatch 
to Washington read:
“Their [the Brazilians] aim is to erect a monument in honor of the great American 
statesman and the doctrine that bears his name. It is also their desire to bring 
about the solidarity of the American Republics, carrying them from without 
European influence or interference.”**
The year after the monument was dedicated in Brazil the Dominican Republic’s Charge
de Affaires. Mr. A. Wos y Gil. requested U.S. assistance against a potential French
Gaddis Smith, The Last Years o f the Monroe Doctrine, 1945-1993 (New York: 
Hill and Wang, 1994), 24.
~  Foreign Relations o f the United States: 1895 (Washington. D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1896), 48.
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intervention.23 Republican political movements throughout Latin America viewed the
U.S. as the model for the hemisphere. As early as 1878 Brazilian liberals openly
contemplated U.S. institutions as a “splendid illustration of the principles of free
government... who constructed a great free government in defiance of the traditions of the
monarchies of Europe.”24
It is notable that Latin American states did not seek a separate security
arrangement to balance against the U.S. at this time. The natural distaste of the U.S. for
conquest, due to its anti-colonial history, contributed to a Latin American sense of
security. The U.S. was certainly in a position to press its economic and military
advantage farther. Former U.S. Secretary of State Seward wrote to this point:
“I can confidently say that the United States is not seeking nor desiring any 
conquest here or abroad, and that, contrary, they seek and desire nothing more in 
regard to any part of America than that it may safely remain, under the care of its 
own people, in the enjoyment of republican institutions.”25
The Latin American perception of the U.S. was benign since there was no
collective response to the growing power differential between regional states and the U.S.
This fact is demonstrated by the lack of an active security dialogue among Latin
American states. However, the more the U.S. intervened during the close of the century.
the more Latin American faith in the U.S. as a guarantor of regional security eroded.
23The statement reads, “In case of such an event transpiring (French intervention), 
I beg to say to your excellency that my Government, in defense of its rights and the 
principles of justice upon which its cause is based, is disposed to resist all coercive acts 
and to solicit the assistance of the Government of the United States.” Ibid., 240.
Foreign Relations o f the United States: 1879 (New York: Kraus Reprint Group, 
1966), 130.
25Foreign Relations o f the United States: 1864 (New York, Kraus Reprint Group, 
1965), 19-20.
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When U.S. power grew, and Latin American states remained weak, the U.S. was able to
intervene nearly unhindered. As some Latin American states politically faltered, the U.S.
continued to intervene to prop up or replace regional governments. The repetition of
these events began to force a Latin American realization that the U.S. perceived other
regional states as a second-class citizen in regional security affairs. H.S. Ferns noted the
growing Latin American resentment:
"They [the U.S.] had robbed the Mexicans of their frontier lands: Texas. New 
Mexico, and upper California. They had bought the Russians of Alaska. By the 
1890s they were looking for fresh fields of influence to control. The purely 
defensive doctrine of President Monroe was subtly transformed into a claim to 
primacy in the two American continents.” 26
Whereas the Monroe Doctrine worked to the advantage of Latin American states when
they sought to marginalize European ambitions, the opposite effect was that the U.S. was
able to invoke the document without being concerned that regional states may disagree
with their reactions.
Most of the goodwill shared among the states of the new world began to dissipate 
as the century drew to a close. The Baltimore Affair, a regional incident that occurred 
between the U.S. and Chile, demonstrated the level of growing anti-U.S. sentiment 
during this time-period. The Baltimore Affair was precipitated by U.S. involvement in 
the internal political affairs of Chile. The U.S. was supporting the government of 
President J.M. Balmaceda against the forces of the Constitutionalist. Balmaceda claimed 
the presence of a U.S. Naval warship, the San Francisco, was present to directly support 
him. These claims were denied by the ships captain, but to no avail: the 
Constitutionalists considered the U.S. as a threat. Supporters of Balmaceda filled the
26H.S. Ferns, Argentina (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969), 119.
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U.S. embassy for protection, and the new Chilean government demanded they be turned 
over to them for trial."7 The U.S. embassy refused, and popular sentiment in Santiago 
rose against the U.S., prompting large demonstrations outside the U.S. compound.
During these events sailors from the US.S. Baltimore were permitted to visit the 
city on shore leave. There was an altercation in a saloon between two U.S. sailors and a 
Chilean sailor. When the U.S. sailors attempted to leave they were assaulted by a mob, 
one being killed, the other being seriously injured. Thirty-six other crewmen from the 
Baltimore were detained over night then released.28 Tensions dissipated by January of 
1892 due to three separate acts by the Chilean Government. To avoid war Chile 
withdrew a request for the recall of the foreign representative of the U.S..29 "disavowed 
an offensive statement by its own Washington envoy, and suggested that the Supreme 
Court of the U.S. adjudge the question of damages suffered in the Baltimore matter.”30 
The U.S. responded favorably to these measures ending the crisis and averting open 
conflict.
The Baltimore Affair had a lasting impression on Chileans. Joyce Goldberg 
explains. "The Chilean abhorred the arrogance and impatience of the U.S. in the
2'Henry Clay Evans, Jr.. Chile and Its Relations With the United States (Durham: 
Duke University Publications, 1927), 144-145.
28Ibid, 146.
29Oscar Espinosa Moraga. La Postguerra del Pacifico y  la Puna de Atacam 
(1884-1899), (Santiago de Chile: Editorial Andres Bello, 1958), 66.
30Robert N. Burr, By Reason or Force: Chile and the Balancing o f Power in South 
America, 1830-1905 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), 197.
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Baltimore affair—the insulting way in which they were forced to capitulate.”31 What the 
U.S. considered a minor incident had a strong affect on the Chilean national outlook 
towards the hegemonic power of the U.S. Chile realized that the U.S. could have a large 
impact on its internal affairs, but Chile had little impact on the foreign policies of 
Washington. Resentment towards the U.S. led Chile to refuse participation in the 
Chicago Exposition of 1893, and to support Spain against the U.S. in the War of 1898/*
As the power of the U.S. grew and European influence waned. U.S. interventions 
in the Americas tended to look less altruistic and more in U.S. self-interest. By this time 
the U.S. government was fully recovered from the economic and political consequences 
of the Civil War. National industrial development was flourishing, the Western frontier 
was mostly settled, and the growth of U.S. capital had to be invested outside of the 
country. Some analysts believed growing U.S. prosperity influenced the tendency to 
intervene during this period. The U.S. had to look abroad for other markets in order to 
compete with European rivals. In support of these ambitions the U.S. began to increase 
its sphere of influence to protect growing U.S. foreign interests and trade routes in the 
Caribbean.33
The U.S. became a world power during this period, and most of Latin America 
could not maintain the same level of growth. The pattern of colonization in Latin 
American, compared to the U.S., is one potential explanation for the divergence in
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development. The Spanish and Portuguese colonists were more interested in exploiting 
the wealth of the new world with hopes that this would increase their social status in their 
home countries of Spain and Portugal. The driving force behind Iberian colonization was 
to ... "seek their fortune in the shape of gold and silver and to return home with it as soon 
as possible.”34 Since their time in Latin America was to be as brief as possible families 
were almost always left in Europe, only occasionally visiting the Americas if at all. Not 
only did the families of colonizers remain in Europe, but frequently their capital was sent 
home as well, depriving Latin American states the ability to foster the development of 
financial institutions. This experience contrasted markedly to that of the U.S. and Canada 
that were primarily settled by families looking for new life rather than supporting the old.
Another contrast between U.S. and Latin American colonization concerned the 
settlement of border issues. As the U.S. embarked on its era of manifest destiny— 
spreading from the Atlantic seaboard to the Pacific—Latin America remained mostly in 
political turmoil. The U.S. filled in its continental borders by 1868; today many parts of 
South America are still plagued by border disputes.35
Latin America's political turmoil contributed to a weaker position, making their 
ability to expel European domination difficult. The Argentine and Brazilian elite 
supported British economic investment. This situation eventually led to a natural distrust
34Ibid.. 12.
35It must be noted that the expansionism of the U.S. during this era was primarily 
accomplished at the expense of Mexico (acquisition of the territories of Texas. California 
and Oregon). Bemis* analysis blames Mexico's political anarchy and poor decision­
making as much as manifest destiny policy of the U.S. for the Mexican American War 
(1846). Bemis, 54.
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of Britain by both states. The degree of entanglement led to calls for British intervention 
in Argentina by English businessmen when Argentine political instability occurred.36
By contrast, because the U.S. was bom upon the military defeat of the strongest 
European power, colonizing powers avoided direct confrontation with the U.S. The same 
could not be said for most of Latin America. In Mexico there was little resistance to 
French occupation during the mid to late nineteenth century due to monarchist 
sympathizers among Mexican elite. Brazil existed as a monarchy with strong ties to 
Portugal from 1823-1889, and if not directly under the control of a European power, 
severely constrained by them because of debt or political pressure. Schnieder believes 
that in the case of Brazil its late political development is mostly responsible for its overall 
development problems: "Although it contributed to a prolonged period of internal peace and 
stability, this system [monarchy! had negative implications for political development because 
parties lost any capacity to serve as vehicles for modernization and change—a situation prevailing 
to the present.” 37 The fractured societies of Latin American, lacking a significant middle 
class, did not seem to be cohesive enough to form strong institutions that could withstand 
outside influences or create internal political stability.
THE PROMISE OF PAN AMERICANISM AND THE REALITY OF 
WILSONIANISM
Under the rubric of the changing power dynamic between the U.S. and Latin 
America, the first Pan-American Conference was held in 1889. Since the time of Bolivar 
and Monroe the power of the U.S. had grown considerably. The U.S. had traditionally
36Fem, 118.
37Ronald M . Schneider. Brazil: Culture and Politics in a New Industrial 
Powerhouse (Boulder Westview Press, 1996), 42.
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sought to keep European interests from interfering in its domestic affairs. Secretary of 
State James G. Blaine particularly viewed Great Britain’s extensive commercial 
involvement in Latin America as a threat to the U.S. Blaine's purpose for convening the 
meeting was to establish the U.S. as the leading economic and military power in the 
region, and by this action, countermanding British influence.38
Blaine's personal experiences led him to regard all European powers with 
suspicion. France's and Spain's attempts to take advantage of the U.S. preoccupation 
with the Civil War angered him. but British partiality for the Confederate side during the 
Civil War instigated a extreme Anglophobia within him /9 Many Latin American leaders 
shared Blaine's opinions. Based on these mutual interests, the U.S. and Latin American 
delegates agreed to oppose any territorial acquisitions by aggression or conquest.40 
Blaine thought that a security agreement might support Latin American stability, and this 
stability would increase trade between the U.S. and the rest of region. To this point he 
said "First, to bring about peace and prevent future wars in North and South America; 
second, to cultivate such friendly, commercial relations with all American countries as 
would lead to a large increase in the export trade of the United States..."41 The U.S. 
began to assume duties as the regional hegemon as it continued to arbitrate regional
38Edward P. Crapol. James G. Blaine: Architect o f Empire (Wilmington, DE: 
Scholarly Resources Inc., 1998), 118.
39Joseph Byrne Lockey. Essays o f Pan-Americanism (Port Washington N.Y.: 
Kennikat Press, 1939), 5 1.
•“ Crapol, 120.
4lLockey, 53.
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conflicts, such as the War of the Triple Alliance between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay,
and Uruguay, and the Pacific War involving, Chile Bolivia, and Peru, among others.42
Blaine's opening comments to the thirty-seven delegates emphasized his
ambitious goals 4j During the opening moments Blaine noted to participants, “...no
conference had ever assembled to consider the welfare of territorial possessions so vast,
or to contemplate the possibilities of a future so great and so inspiring."44 Blaine
followed his introduction with a statement that he regarded as the Pan-American Creed:
We believe that we should be drawn together more closely by the highways of the 
sea. and that at no distant day the railway systems of the north and south will meet 
upon the isthmus and connect by land routes the political and commercial capitals 
of all America.
We believe that hearty cooperation, based on hearty confidence, will save all 
American States from the burdens and evils which have long and cruelly afflicted 
the older nations of the world.
We believe that a spirit of justice, of common and equal interests between the 
American States, will leave no room for an artificial balance of power like unto 
that which has led to wars abroad and drenched Europe in blood.45
Despite Blaine's visionary words, and extensive efforts, the conference did not
accomplish all that he had hoped for. Some progress was made. He was able to gain
consensus on the adoption of four declarations, and more importantly the establishment
of a bureau of information in Washington. This bureau was titled the International Union
42The War of the Triple Alliance (1865-1870) pitted Argentina, Brazil, and 
Uruguay against Paraguay. The War of the Pacific (1879-1883) resulted in the defeat of 
Bolivia and Peru by Chile. Blaine personally involved himself in the mediation of the 
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o f  American Republics. This institution still exists, evolving into the Pan-American 
Union, and in 1948 becoming the Organization o f  American States.
The efforts o f Blaine continued as the U.S. and its Latin American counterparts 
committed to meet in Mexico City. Despite growing resentment o f the U.S. during the 
period, the meetings continued in Rio de Janeiro, and then in Buenos Aires. None o f the 
Pan American conferences before the Great Depression made notable progress on 
security issues. U.S. regional assertiveness was an impediment. The eviction o f  the 
Spanish from Cuba in 1898, and subsequent occupation o f  the island angered some 
hemispheric leaders. Howard J. Wiarda explains, The Spanish-American War o f 1898 
led to “considerable sympathy in Latin America toward Spain and to a common suspicion 
o f  and even hostility toward the United States, which had humiliatingly defeated 
Spain.”46 Latin American states interpreted President Theodore Roosevelt’s “big-stick” 
diplomacy as evidence o f a growing policy o f  interventionism by the U.S. Roosevelt's 
regional policies resulted in Cuba and Panama being claimed as protectorates. The U.S. 
assumed customs control over the Dominican Republic. Its unilateral activities created 
considerable mistrust by Latin American states. J. Lloyd Mecham points out that this era 
gave rise to an embedded anti-U.S. element in Latin American society: “Yankeephobe 
intellectuals were becoming popular in Latin America.”47
These events influenced the agendas o f  Pan American meetings (see Table 3.1 
below), and ensured that they avoided important security topics. The most lasting
46Howard J. Wiarda, Iberian-Latin American Connection: Implications fo r  
U.S. Foreign Policy (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), 8.
47 J. Lloyd Mecham, A Survey o f  United States-Latin American Relations (New 
York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1965), 97-98.
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decision taken during the series of five meetings, after the initial conference, was during 
the fourth meeting in Buenos Aires that created the Pan American Union.48 Security 
cooperation was not fully absent in the Americas since states committed to meet under 
the auspices of the Pan-American conferences. However, their inability to address the 
most important issues of the day impeded their ability to make any meaningful progress.
When Woodrow Wilson was elected President, he was determined to reawaken a 
moribund relationship between the U.S. and Latin America, and push
Table I. Pan-American Conferences Before World War II
Conference Citv/Date Conference City/Date




Sixth Int’l Conf. of 
American States
Cuba. 1928
Second Int'l Conf. of 
American States
Mexico City. 1901 Seventh Int'l Conf. of 
American States
Montevideo. 1933
Third Int’l Conf. of 
American States
Rio de Janeiro. 1906 Eighth Int’l Conf. of 
American States
Buenos Aires. 1936
Fourth Int’l Conf. of 
American States
Buenos Aires. 1910 Ninth Int’l Conf. of 
American States
Lima. 1938
Fifth Int’l Conf. of 
American States
Santiago. 1924
for greater regional integration. The means by which he pursued this goal struck a blow 
to his own cause. President Wilson understood that the U.S. needed to regain the trust of 
Latin American states in order to pursue the broader strategic goal of minimizing the 
European presence in the hemisphere. Wilson’s ambitions ran counter to that of most
■^William Spence Robertson, Hispanic-American Relations with the United States 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1923), 398. Also, the Pan-American Union was 
housed in a million dollar building funded by Andrew Carnegie.
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Latin American states. They were increasingly relying on their European ties as a 
counterbalance to U.S. hegemonic regional power, circumventing U.S. security interests 
that sought to deflect European influence from hemisphere.49 This pattern would repeat 
itself during the 1970s and 80s. It was becoming increasingly clear little progress was 
being made in the regional security dialog. The U.S. continually sought regional support 
to keep other powerful states away from the Americas. By comparison Latin America 
sought support from outside powers to uphold their state sovereignty due to concern of 
U.S. dominance.
Wilson’s methods increased Latin American skepticism concerning U.S. 
intentions. His regional policy reconciled his democratic ideals with the core interests of 
the U.S.50 As many past U.S. Presidents: Wilson believed that Latin American political 
instability created a security problem for the U.S. It formed an environment that allowed 
powers from outside the hemisphere to manipulate the internal affairs of these states. 
Wilson also believed that it was the responsibility of the U.S. to push Latin American 
political development by guiding fellow American states towards constitutional 
democracy. Therefore Wilson had a moral and realpolitik solution: intervene when Latin 
American governments became untenable. Wilson’s policies were considered extremist 
in Latin America. For example, Wilson refused to recognize any regional government 
that came to power that was not democratic. In essence, every Latin American 
government had to be certified by Washington as democratic. This was an unacceptable
49Mark T. Gilderhus, Pan American Visions: Woodrow Wilson in the Western 
Hemisphere 1913-1921 (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1886), 2.
^G . Pope Atkins, Latin America in the International System (New York: The Free 
Press, 1977), 107.
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encroachment on the sovereignty of Latin American states, a paternalism that brought 
regional relations to an all-time low. The U.S. traditionally recognized any Latin 
American government that came to power, its legitimacy judged by the stability it 
created. Wilson’s policies towards the region was a reflection of what Kaman refers to as 
a uniquely U.S. brand of “utopian pragmatism”.51 Latin Americans considered Wilson’s 
policies towards the region as an indirect form of intervention.52
Under Wilson the U.S. militarily intervened in Haiti, Dominican Republic, 
Mexico, and Nicaragua.53 The U.S. also pursued a policy of electoral intervention in 
states it occupied. Repeated intervention stirred Latin American animosity. Latin 
America’s displeasure manifested itself in many ways. Mexico supported the Nicaraguan 
rebel. Augusto Sandino. who fought against U.S. occupation. Argentina was at the 
forefront of regional efforts to push the ideal of hemispheric nonintervention that was 
directed specifically against the U.S. Argentina became a regular antagonist of all U.S. 
led security initiatives during Pan American meetings.54
Two dynamics may have soothed Latin American antipathy towards the U.S.
First. Latin American economic growth surged for sixteen years without pause in the
51 Michael Kaman. People o f Paradox: An Inquiry Concerning the Origins o f 
American Civilization (New York: Knopf, 1973), 298.
52 Atkins, 223.
53For example. Wilson's occupation of Veracruz, Mexico, in 1914 lasted a half- 
year and provoked an unexpected backlash against the U.S.. surprising the Wilson 
administration. Jan Bazant, A Concise History o f Mexico: From Hidalgo to Cardenas. 
1805-1940 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 143.
54Argentina viewed itself as a rival to the U.S. as its economy significantly grew 
before World War I and Argentine leaders frequently played Britain against the U.S. 
Ferns, 119.
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early twentieth century before the Great Depression, averaging thirteen percent a year.53 
Second, most U.S. interventions took place in Central America and the Caribbean, far 
away from Bogota. Buenos Aires. Caracas, and Rio de Janeiro. However, by the 1920s 
Latin American leaders viewed Pan-American cooperation in a negative light due to 
continued U.S. unilateral interventions. Rather than seeing it as a forum for inter­
regional cooperation, many Latin Americans viewed Pan-Americanism as a moniker to 
justify the U.S. imperialistic ambitions.56
RENAISSANCE OF SECURITY RELATIONS
From 1929-1945 there was significant improvement in inter-regional security 
cooperation.5' This was primarily due to the secondary effects of the Great Depression 
on U.S. foreign policy. These secondary effects included President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt's “Good Neighbor Policy”, resulting in less U.S. regional intervention, and the 
corresponding growth of Latin American trust. The U.S. became more conciliatory on 
regional security issues, ameliorating concerns of U.S. regional ambitions. The goodwill 
generated by this era aided the U.S. as it recruited regional allies during World War II.
A key component of the Good Neighbor policy was the Roosevelt 
Administration's affirmation about the principle of nonintervention. Roosevelt 
understood the benefits of a ‘hands-off approach. Domestically, this strategy paid
55Salvatore Prisco m  and John Barret. Progressive Era Diplomat: A Study o f a 
Commercial Expansionist. 1887-1920 (Birmingham, AL: The University of Alabama 
Press, 1973).
36Mecham, A Survey o f United States-Latin American Relations. 101.
^Ibid., 86.
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dividends by giving Roosevelt's Democratic Party strong support in the U.S. South. 
Roosevelt had decided that federal directives on U.S. racial relations should be curbed, 
and to that end let southern state and local governments decide how race relations should 
be managed. Roosevelt hoped to transfer his domestic 'nonintervention policy' to the 
hemisphere and reap similar rewards.38
Roosevelt's strategy sought to avoid regional intervention, but also the advent and 
continuation of the depression played an important role in dampening U.S. enthusiasm 
towards incursion to the south. Because of the depression the pragmatism of the U.S. 
outweighed its idealist impulses. The U.S. could not afford to maintain its past 
interventionist policy as it also dealt with the burden of the depression. Frederick Pike 
remarks “Just as they [U.S. leaders] had found high principles with which to justify 
intervention that sometimes sprang mainly from hopes of economic gain, so now they 
found rationales to justify discarding interventionist policies that cost too much.''39
Although the depression of 1929 affected both Latin America and the U.S.. it 
comparatively affected the U.S. to a greater degree. The U.S. lost the market for its 
manufactured goods, severely impacting its substantial middle and upper classes. By 
comparison, the Latin American elite suffered loses in South and Central America, but 
since the middle class was modest in size there was less disruption in Latin American 
societies. A large part of the population was involved in subsistence agriculture, an
38Roosevelt let the South determine how to run its race relations without federal 
interference, giving the Democrats a great deal of popular support in the region.
Frederick B. Pike, FDR’s Good Neighbor Policy: Sixty Years o f Generally Gentle Chaos 
(Austin: University of Texas, 1995), 164-165.
59Ibid., 165.
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endeavor that continued despite the downturn in U.S. and European demand for Latin 
American raw materials.
Both academics and politicians broadly supported Roosevelt's Good Neighbor 
Policy. Part of the motivation behind U.S. interventions into Cuba, the Dominican 
Republic, Mexico, Nicaragua and the Philippines was tied to the Wilsonian idea that the 
U.S. could recreate its domestic success abroad through direct political, cultural and 
economic change in a given state, brought about through military intervention. By the 
1920s it was becoming clear to policy-makers in the U.S. the "uplift or cultural change 
could not be imposed on others, and therefore...change should not be imposed on 
others."60 After the depression the lesson was underscored by the failure of the economy 
of the U.S. The U.S. had lost faith in its superior economic, political and cultural 
structures, and therefore lost the impetus to wish it on other states.
What seemed to be a setback to U.S. power and self-esteem seemed to benefit 
regional relations. The Good Neighbor Policy was well received in Latin America. Even 
Latin American populists admitted that. "It was a step forward as far as the aggressive 
behavior of the United States was concerned...".61 Argentine leaders traditionally 
viewed all U.S. policies of the era with suspicion. However, several commentaries in 
Argentina were effusive about Roosevelt: “Mr. Roosevelt governs a democracy and 
personifies its ideals of welfare and tranquility, which are the ideals of the whole of
60Ibid.
61 Alonso Aguilar, El Panamericanismo de la Doctrina Monroe a la Doctrina 
Johnson (Mexico: Cuardemos Americanos, 1965), 69.
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America.”62 The New Deal and Good Neighbor Policies made Roosevelt “a symbol of 
high achievement and of roseate hope for the future” in Latin America.63
At the Seventh International Conference of American States, in 1933. all states 
repudiated the practice of unilateral armed intervention. This time, the noninterventionist 
statement was championed by the U.S. delegation. During the Buenos Aires (1936) and 
Lima Conference (1938) the U.S. augmented its popular noninterventionist policy with 
an economic policy designed to increase U.S. imports from the region. The outcomes 
were beneficial for the cause of interregional cooperation. Between 1929-32 the U.S. 
accounted for 35 percent of total Latin American trade, and by 1938 this increased to 45 
percent. During this period trade increased by a total of 236 percent between the U.S. 
and Latin America, comparing favorably to Latin Americas trade with Europe, that 
increased at a substantially lower percent.64 The increase in U.S. trade and decrease in 
intervention improved relations and reduced Latin American concerns of U.S. 
domination.
The amelioration of tensions between the U.S. and Latin America came at a 
fortuitous time for the U.S. Because of the improved climate the U.S. was able to lobby 
Latin American states to support its war efforts against axis powers after the Japanese 
attack on Pearl Harbor. Brazil allowed the U.S. to construct air and naval bases in the 
northeast to defend the Atlantic and against a potential German invasion from Africa. 
Further a Brazilian expeditionary force of 25.000 men fought in Italy, sustaining 451
62Dozer, 28.
63Ibid.. 27.
64Department of Commerce, Foreign Commerce and Navigation o f the United 
States fo r the Calender Year 1937 (Washington, D.C.: 1939), 785-786.
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casualties and 2,000 wounded.65 Other countries contributed. Guatemala allowed the 
construction of a bomber base in its sovereign territory, and Nicaragua a naval patrol 
station near Corinto. Other facilities were erected in Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, and 
Peru.66 Brazil and other regional states gave the U.S. preferential pricing on important 
raw materials. Concerns about U.S. intervention gave way to a high degree of security 
cooperation never previously experienced. The only two states that did not immediately 
cooperate were Argentina and Chile. Chile later relented and chose the Allied side. It 
had been concerned with the problem of defending its long coast from Axis attack. 
However, Argentina remained friendly to the Axis cause during the war due to the pro- 
German disposition of its military and monetary payments it received from Germany.
The creation of the Inter American Defense Board (LADB) in 1942. at Rio de 
Janeiro, was a notable milestone for regional security relations. The LADB was directed 
to be a consulting agency designed to deal with communications security, aviation, naval 
protection of shipping and transportation.67 It was created to allow closer coordination 
between the U.S. and its allies during the war. but due to its success has endured until 
today. The security cooperation by Latin American states would not have occurred 
without the sharp decrease in U.S. power that essentially abrogated the interventionist 
policy of the Wilson era. When U.S. power decreased, regional security cooperation 
improved.
65E. Bradford Bums, A History o f Brazil (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1993). 359.
66Mecham, The U.S. and Interamerican Security, 221.
67Ibid.. 224.
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Today the LABD mission's include: providing technical military advice and 
consultant services to the OAS. overseeing an academic program through the Inter- 
American Defense College, and convening a meeting with member states representatives. 
The meeting is composed of an organization, the Council of Delegates, are from twenty 
member countries, and meets bimonthly to review approaches on common security 
issues.
CONCLUSION
As U.S. hegemony grew during the 1800s two discemable trends emerged in 
order. The first was that the U.S. was increasingly recognized as the regional leader. The 
second was that as U.S. power asymmetry increased. Latin American attitudes towards 
U.S. leadership became less receptive, and U.S. policies became more assertive, forming 
another obstacle to productive security relations. These difficulties can be attributed to 
the growth of extreme power asymmetry in U.S.-Latin American relations.
As the power gap between the U.S. and Latin America increased under U.S. 
hegemony, security cooperation became more tenuous, and as the power gap decreased, 
security cooperation became less difficult. During the formative stages of U.S.-Latin 
American security relations, from the early 1800s to the period after the Civil War of the 
U.S.. neither of the two sides were clearly dominant. Although the U.S. won its 
independence from Great Britain, and won Britain's support of the non-interference 
clause of the Monroe Doctrine. Latin American states were still unshielded from 
European intrigue. The relative equality of regional states was underscored by Bolivar's 
view of the U.S. as a regional competitor rather than a guarantor of Spanish American
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security. Despite hegemonic overtones, the Monroe Doctrine was not threatening to 
Latin America states, gaining acceptance in Latin America since all regional leaders were 
concerned about European encroachment on their sovereignty, but few were 
apprehensive that intervention might occur from the U.S. One might be tempted to 
conclude that this time period shows multipolarity may generate security cooperation, 
however states must regularly meet through an established institution to demonstrate 
some level of cooperation. Regional states were mostly in a formative stage and this 
stage of regional maturity would not be reached until the end of the century.
The U.S. Civil War had several outcomes that deeply affected the regional 
security dynamic. An immediate impact was an increase in regional interventions by 
European powers as they sensed a power vacuum, since the U.S. was preoccupied by 
internal conflict. Another outcome was the ascendancy of the U.S. to the position of 
regional hegemon, a position it has not yet relinquished. The U.S. ended the Civil War as 
an emerging world power, championing regional security cooperation by ending the 
French occupation of Mexico, the Spanish occupation of Santa Domingo and the attempt 
to broker a peace agreement in the Paraguayan War. After this point the Monroe 
Doctrine became the focus of regional security, enjoying a degree of support in Latin 
America despite its unilateral nature. This period lasted until the 1890s. when Latin 
American opposition to U.S. hegemony began to more openly assert itself during the first 
Pan American conference, and the Spanish American War.
As U.S. power grew, so did its foreign interests. When the century drew to a 
close, U.S. power was increasing in the region. With the growth of U.S. power, the 
Monroe Doctrine increasingly resembled a tool for U.S. dominance from the Latin
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American perspective rather than a regional security institution. The growth in U.S. 
power coincided with an increasing Latin American mistrust of the U.S.. producing an 
environment ill suited to create security cooperation. The Baltimore affair is a 
manifestation of this dynamic. The U.S. was able to dictate a favorable outcome in this 
situation due to its dominance. Chile grew to resent the influence of the U.S. in its 
internal affairs, and its inability to commensurately affect U.S. policy.
Blaine inaugurated the first Pan American conference in 1889 to address mutual 
security interests in the region, the first indicator of hegemonic institution building. The 
conference produced some positive results, but a single demonstration of U.S. goodwill 
was not enough to overcome growing Latin American pessimism about U.S. intentions. 
Blaine hoped to draw Latin American states closer to the U.S. by showing the strength of 
its economic and political structures. Some Latin American dignitaries were impressed, 
but not convinced that they must adopt U.S. practices to achieve the same results at 
home. Further, a few delegates interpreted U.S. vitality as a threat.
The Pan American conferences continued despite the growing schism between the 
U.S. and Latin America. U.S. military activities in Cuba, Haiti. Nicaragua, and Panama 
raised alarms throughout the region. Wilson’s unabashed policy of intervening in Latin 
American states was a sign of strong hegemony of the U.S. To many in the U.S.. 
Wilson's policy that sought to generate more regional democracies was morally correct. 
The Latin American perception of these policies was that they perpetuated U.S. 
domination. Any positive impact of the Pan American meetings was nullified by the U.S. 
rise to strong hegemony, reflected in its active regional interventionism. The irony of the 
Monroe Doctrine began to emerge: through the document the U.S. guaranteed the safety
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
93
of the America's from outside intervention; however, Latin American states increasingly 
viewed the primary threat as the U.S., emanating from within the region.
The trend of higher levels of power asymmetry and Latin America discontent 
continued until the advent of the depression in 1929. affecting regional security by 
discouraging states from socializing the political and economic values that the 
hegemon openly encouraged. Although the U.S. was able to establish a regional 
institution to address security issues, the growing power asymmetry in the system 
abrogated the full effectiveness of the institutions. Although the Good Neighbor 
Policy ameliorated regional tensions to some degree, the U.S. still did not win support 
from Argentina and Chile during World War EL and had to grant concession to Brazil 
and Mexico to secure their backing.
The U.S. had neither the ability nor the desire to continue Wilson's 
interventionist policies as a result of the depression. The depression dampened U.S. 
hegemony and laid the groundwork for a rapprochement between regional states.
The U.S. clearly maintained the status of the dominant state in the region, but lacked 
the will or capacity to actively intervene as in the past thirty years. The Roosevelt 
Administration's Good Neighbor Policy, that eschewed regional interventions, was a 
symbol of the reduced regional hegemony of the U.S. The cooperative behavior 
among regional states slowly resuscitated the concept of a regional security 
partnership. World War II was the catalyst to introduce a new era in regional security 
cooperation by prompting the creation of the IADB that was specifically tasked with
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researching security issues and recommending actions based on the studies it 
produces.68
The strength of U.S. hegemony after World War II foretold that the OAS would 
have limited effectiveness as a security cooperation institution. The actual level of power 
asymmetry was at its apex after World War II, when the U.S. comprised half of the 
world's GDP. Despite the high ambitions for regional security after the war. cooperation 
minted during the early 1940s seemed to completely dissipate by the late 1950s. Chapter 
four demonstrates a pattern repeated in the study: the growth of U.S. power compared to 
Latin American states leading to difficulties in regional security cooperation.
68The Organization O f American States And The Inter-American Defense Board 
(Washington, D.C., OAS, 2000), http://www.oas.org/csh/engIish/newdocOas%20Jid.htm, 
October 4,2001.
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CHAPTER IV 
THE RISE OF STRONG HEGEMONY (1945-1969)
From 1945 to 1969 U.S.-Latin American security relations began from a solid 
foundation, freshly minted by four years of economic and security cooperation against 
the axis powers during World War 13. Rather than sustaining this solid foundation the 
following fifteen-year period had a corrosive effect on inter-American security relations. 
By 1969 security cooperation levels had deteriorated to their lowest point since before the 
depression.
The 1945-1969 time-period supports the argument of this dissertation that 
extreme power asymmetry may erode the security cooperation gains realized by 
hegemony. The more state leaders are made aware of the over-bearing presence of a 
dominant hegemon the less likely they are to participate in security cooperation schemes. 
Multiple interventions reminded Latin American states that the U.S. had the capability to 
interfere without consultation in their domestic affairs. Each successive intervention 
during this time period provoked even stronger reactions from regional states against U.S. 
policy. Interventions during this period included Guatemala (1954), Cuba (1959), and 
the Dominican Republic (1965). Instead of bolstering regional unity against the 
perceived threat of communism, each intervention served to unify Latin America against 
the U.S. as it reminded them the overwhelming dominance of the U.S. gave it the 
capability to manipulate regional politics with ease.
Unilateral actions by the U.S. eroded the effectiveness of the OAS. The OAS was 
the only multilateral tool of consultation, and when it began to fail Latin American states
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began to reconsider their economic and military dependencies on the U.S., realizing the 
extent to which U.S. dominance had grown. Suddenly, Latin American leaders 
scrutinized every aspect of U.S. Latin-American relations.
The Kennedy Administration noted the ground swell of anti-American sentiment 
and initiated the Alliance for Progress to shore-up regional support for the U.S. Although 
appreciated, the Alliance for Progress did not mark an effort on the scale of the Marshall 
Plan, as many Latin American nations hoped, and in reality only demonstrated a modest 
increase in total U.S. aid to the region. It is likely, the effort had a positive impact of 
some kind in suppressing radical anti-U.S. sentiment, but the beneficial impact of the 
Alliance for Progress was offset by what Latin American leaders perceived as the U.S. 
preoccupation with Soviet expansion that was one cause of U.S interventionist activity.
REGIONAL HEGEMONY
Table 2 demonstrates the significance of the power differential between Latin 
America and the U.S. Latin America's total GNP was only fourteen percent of the GNP 
of the U.S. in 1963. and by 1969 remained at fourteen percent. Brazil has the largest 
economy in Latin American, and it grew by 27 percent during the six-year period. 
Mexico's GNP had a higher rate of growth at 36 percent. By comparison, the growth of 
the GNP of the U.S. was only 24 percent. Although Latin American growth rates were 
higher than the growth rate of the U.S.. it was not enough to substantially alter the 
fourteen percent gap in total GNP.
The amount of total U.S. military expenditure displayed in Table 3 also 
demonstrates the dominance of the U.S. in the region, hi 1964, the lowest year of U.S.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
97







r { - - .





1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969
□  Brazil 
■  Latin America
□  Mexico 
□ U .S .
Note: The numbers in the Y-axis are in Smillions. in 1975 current dollars. Source: U.S. 
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Trade 
1963-1973 (Washington, D.C.: USACD, 1975), 17. 23,46. 61.
defense expenditure, the total equaled nearly $52 billion. The combination of 
Argentina’s, Brazil’s. Mexico’s and Venezuela’s defense spending equals roughly $1.3 
billion. The U.S. far exceeded Latin American spending as a percent of total GNP well. 
In 1967 the U.S. spent 9.5 percent of its GNP on defense. The highest rate of defense 
spending in the same year was Brazil at 2.7 percent of total GNP.
These statistics show that despite the fact that Latin American states did not have 
comparable resources, Latin American states did not feel threatened enough to 
dramatically increase defense spending to match U.S. annual levels. This reinforces the 
notion that the system was hegemonic and not purely based on dominance or rule of 
force. Defense spending remained relatively consistent during the eight-year time frame
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Table 3. Annual Military Expenditure, 1963-1970
Argentina Brazil Mexico U.S. Venezuela
1963 308 333 112 52,295 181
1964 393 678 128 51.213 144
1965 414 487 136 51,827 166
1966 473 625 168 63,572 172
1967 342 740 168 75.448 198
1968 380 746 188 80.732 194
1969 435 803 205 81.443 193
1970 486 1054 220 77.854 204
Source: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. World Military Expenditures and 
Arms Trade. 1963-1973 (Washington, D.C.: USACD, 1975). 23, 31, 35. 36. Numbers 
are millions of U.S. dollars, in current 1972 dollars.
for all states. Since Latin American states did not directly respond to U.S. economic and 
military strength by increasing their own defense expenditures, it seems U.S. dominance 
was relatively accepted, meaning that although the U.S. might not enjoy total support for 
its leadership, the resentment was not strong enough to overcome the benefit of public 
goods produced by the U.S. It is also interesting to note that Mexico’s total military 
expenditure was the lowest among the Latin American states listed on Table 3. despite its 
geographical proximity to the U.S. Although Mexico was one of the greatest detractors 
of the U.S. in the region during this period, it apparently did not view the U.S. as an 
imminent threat.
FORMATION AND DEGENERATION OF GOODWILL: 1945-1959
At the beginning of the post World War H era there were few outward symptoms 
of the problems that later came to characterize hemispheric security relations. Significant 
cooperation between the U.S. and most regional states during World War n , along with
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almost twenty years of a lack of U.S. military and political involvement in the region, 
contributed to a constructive era of regional relations. However, the dramatic economic 
and military growth of the U.S. in the World War II era led to new global responsibilities 
that made the U.S. redefine its regional role to the detriment of regional security 
cooperation. The U.S. began to view the region less as a partner in security cooperation, 
and more of a detriment as its rivalry with the Soviet Union ensued. The threat of 
communism became a regular focus of U.S. policy.
The growth of U.S. power during the war was impressive: during World War H 
fifty percent of the global GNP was concentrated in the U.S. Yet by the end of the war 
the U.S. had ninety-eight divisions stationed overseas.1 The military posture of the U.S. 
resumed less exaggerated proportions as the post World War II era emerged, however, 
they demonstrated the preponderance of U.S. regional strength compared to Latin 
America. The vast asymmetry in regional power that resulted in the strong hegemony of 
the U.S. did not immediately translate into a deterioration of relations. Just as after the 
Civil War. when the U.S. quickly ascended to the top tier of states in the global 
community, the sudden rise of the U.S. seemed to bring a flurry of security cooperation 
that deteriorated in the following years.
Immediately following World War II security cooperation coalesced around Pan- 
Americanism. Several Latin American states directly aided the U.S. cause by ensuring 
the supply of critical war materials; in return the U.S. cooperated with Latin American 
governments to solve internal economic problems associated with Latin American efforts
lJoseph S. Nye, Jr., Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature o f American Power 
(USA: Basic Books, 1990), 71.
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Table 4. U.S. Lend Lease Aid to Latin America
Country Amount in $ 
Millions
Country Amount in $ 
Millions
Argentina NA Guatemala 3.1
Bolivia 5.5 Haiti 1.4
Brazil 361.4 Honduras .4
Chile 23.2 Mexico 39.3
Colombia 8.3 Nicaragua .9
Costa Rica Panama NA
Cuba 6.6 Peru 18.9
Dominican Rep. 1.6 Uruguay 7.1
Ecuador 7.8 Venezuela 4.5
El Salvador .9
Total 493.0
Source: John Child. Unequal Alliance: The Inter-American Military System. 1938-1978 
(Boulder: Westview Press. 1980). p. 48.
to support the allied cause.2 The U.S. demonstrated part of its economic support for Latin 
American states that cooperated during and after the war through a program called Lend- 
Lease aid/ Child states “Lend-Lease was the major component of the U.S.-Latin 
American military bilateral relationship and was. in effect, the precursor of the Military
2For example the Commodities Credit Corporation, credits supplied by the 
Export-Import Bank, contracted to purchase most the crops of Latin American states 
(e.g.: wool of Uruguay, cotton of Nicaragua, etc.) since Latin America lacked adequate 
markets during the war. Edgar B. Brossard, “The Effect of the War on Trade in the 
Americas,” Pan American Union. Bulletin. LXXVT (December 1942), 661-667.
’The lend-lease program was an arrangement for the transfer of war supplies, 
including food, machinery, and services, to over thirty nations whose defense was 
considered vital to the defense of the United States in World War n . The Lend-Lease 
Act. gave the President power to sell, transfer, lend, or lease such war materials. Leon 
Martel, Lend-Lease, Loans. and the Coming o f the Cold War: A Study o f the 
Implementation o f Foreign Policy (Boulder: Westview Press, 1979).
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Assistance Program of the post-War years.”4 Table 4 shows that Brazil received seventy- 
three percent of the aid. Brazil was the primary benefactor because of the costs associated 
with the construction of airbases in the North of Brazil, and financial costs associated 
with its direct military involvement in the European theater. Many Latin American 
states joined the allied cause during World War II. One exception was Argentina that 
remained neutral—in reality leaning towards the Axis side—until March 1945, on the eve 
of Germany's surrender. During the 1942 Rio de Janeiro Pan-American Conference, 
Argentina actively sought to dissuade other Latin American states from siding with the 
U.S. The U.S. retaliated by halting arms sales and loan credits. Argentina maintained its 
stance due to concerns of U.S. overt aggression and due to the strong U.S. alliance with 
Brazil.5
Although most countries did not have the military capability to directly aid U.S. 
operations in the Pacific or European theaters, they instead gave the U.S. raw materials at 
well below market prices. For example, Chile honored an arbitrary price placed on 
copper during the war. Chile’s acceptance below market prices incurred economic losses 
estimated in value from S 107 to $500 million.6 Brazil not only gave raw materials such 
as rubber and coffee to the US at devalued prices, but also directly took part in the war 
effort. In August of 1942 Brazil declared war on Italy and Germany. President Vargas
4John Child. Unequal Alliance: The Inter-American Military System, 1938-1978 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1980), 47.
5See, David Rock. Argentina 1516-1987: From Spanish Colonization to Alfonsin 
(Berkeley,CA: University of California Press, 1987), 247-253.
^Theodore Moran. Multinational Corporations and the Politics o f Dependence:
Copper in Chile (Princeton. NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977), 61.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
102
sent a 25,000 man expeditionary force, one division, to fight in the Italian campaign in 
late 1944. The division saw significant action in Italy, sustaining loses of 451 soldiers 
with 2.000 wounded.7
With the norm of security cooperation pervading hemispheric relations, the IADB 
was created to aid with the war effort. The IADB was the first dedicated security 
institution of the Americas, created in 1942 after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.
The organization’s primary focus was to plan the defense of the Western Hemisphere 
against the Axis threat. U.S. strategists thought that German successes in North Africa 
would provide them with further motivation to invade South America from East Africa. 
After the war there was much debate about the mission of the IADB. The U.S. wanted to 
maintain the Board, other states, such as Brazil, wished to create a permanent 
organization since the LADB was designed as a temporary measure.s The role of the 
IADB is defined by the OAS "to strengthen the ties of military cooperation between the 
American nations with a view to their common defense."4 Many Latin American States 
that had contributed to the allied cause were expecting greater rewards for their loyalty 
than the U.S. offered. What they did not expect was to witness the U.S. channel billions 
of dollars into Asia and Europe, primarily benefiting former axis enemies, while scant 
attention was given to Latin American economic conditions.
' Bums, 359.
SM. Margaret Ball, The OAS in Transition (Durham NC: Duke University Press. 
1969). 38 L
9OAS Secretary General Annual Report, 1964-65 (Washington. D.C.: Pan 
American Union, 1965), 10.
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The divide between U.S. goals and Latin American goals were reflected in how 
each sought to take advantage of inter-American relations. To solidify its position as 
regional hegemon, the U.S. sought to standardize military equipment in the region by 
exporting its arms surplus to regional states.10 The effort had two advantages: 
standardization of equipment would guarantee some degree of interoperability among 
armed forces in case they had to face a common threat, and it guaranteed the U.S. as the 
primary supplier of arms to the region, also keeping foreign powers out the hemisphere.
The 1948 inter-American conference at Bogota, established the Organization of 
American States. In some ways this occasion symbolized the gulf in Latin American and 
U.S. perceptions about inter-American relations. Regional security cooperation that led 
to the Bogota conference began during the opening stages of World War II. During the 
inter-American conference that took place in Havana. July 1940. the delegates approved a 
statement “ ...an attack on one American state is considered as an attack on all American 
states.”11 At the Bogota Conference the U.S. understood the creation of the OAS as a 
symbol of hemispheric solidarity based on common democratic principles, overlooking 
the fact that most of its regional allies were at best partial democracies. The U.S. also 
viewed the OAS as a tool to manage Latin America: “Americans could run their own 
affairs far away from the UN Security Council where Soviet veto power might be 
decisive.”12
l0Walter LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America 
(New York: W.W. Norton Company, 1984). 92.
11 Foreign Relations o f the United States, Vol. V, (Washington D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1940), 188.
12Ibid., 93.
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By comparison Larin American states viewed the OAS as means to address 
economic and social problems. David Green points out that Larin America thought the 
special relationship endowed them with the right to expect more economic aid to alleviate 
its underdevelopment: “Seeing a growing U.S. economic commitment to European 
construction, some Larin Americans feared that all the prewar and war time plans for 
postwar development projects in Larin America would once again be relegated to 
oblivion."’13 The divergence of views contributed to the deterioration of relations that 
seemed destined to become more polarized. As one analyst explained. “Pan- 
Americanism moved into the 1950s with its Northern component growing increasingly 
conservative, its Southern component increasingly restive, and much of the glue being 
supplied by alleged Soviet threats to hemispheric security, the Panama Canal, and *our 
way of life.* *’14 With two divergent sets of expectations, security cooperation soon 
began to erode.
The cooperation generated by convergence of American states against the axis 
powers became institutionalized with the creation of the Rio Treaty of Reciprocal 
Assistance in 1947. The Rio Treaty is part of the triad of institutions that constitute the 
Inter-American system, the other two being the Charter of the OAS and the Pact of 
Bogota. The Rio treaty was originally proposed in 1945, before there was a specific 
threat from the Soviet Union. The treaty directs that members must come to the aid of 
any regional state endangered by an outside power. Any armed attack by a power outside
l3David Green, The Containment o f Latin America: A History o f the Myths and 
Realities o f the Good Neighbor Policy (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971), 170.
I4Lawrence E. Harrison, “Waking from the Pan-American Dream.” Foreign 
Policy 5, no. 1 (Winter 1971-72), 2.
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of the region is considered an attack against all. Signatories to the Pan-American Union 
Treaty are obliged to recall chiefs of diplomatic missions, break diplomatic relations, 
engage in economic sanctions and armed force against any outside aggressor.13 No state 
is bound to use armed force until all members approve the measure. In order for a 
measure to pass, two-thirds of the signatory members must agree to the action. Perhaps 
the greatest achievement of the Rio Treaty was that it turned an informal regional 
association into a formal regional security association. The success of the founding of 
regional security institutions symbolized growing trust between regional states, and a 
general acceptance of U.S. hegemony.
The Rio Treaty was followed by the creation of the OAS in 1948 at the Bogota 
conference. The document became known as the Bogota Charter and served as the 
constitution for the members of the nascent organization. The Charter established three 
primary organs. An assembly was established to deal with broad policy guidelines. The 
most important organ was the Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs to act as the Organ 
of Consultation for hemispheric security threats, settling inter-regional disputes and 
collective security measures against outside aggression. The Meeting of Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs consults with the Advisory Defense Committee that is composed of high 
ranking military officers from each country.16 The Council of the Organization of 
American States (CO AS) is composed of one ambassadorial representative from every 
member state. The most important role for CO AS turned out to be the prominence of one
l5Mecham, The United States and Inter-American Security, 282.
l6Atkins, 317.
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of its subordinate organs, the Inter-American Economic and Social Council that 
coordinates OAS economic and social programs.17
The Pact of Bogota, or Inter-American Treaty on Pacific Settlement, was created 
during the 1948 Bogota conference to mediate regional disputes and consolidate the 
obligations undertaken in connection with previous treaties. The Pact of Bogota entered 
into effect with thirteen states ratifying it at the initial conference in 1948.
Regional security cooperation during this period continued outside the realm of 
hemispheric structures. Latin America was a key ally to the U.S. in the UN assembly 
during the pre-World War II years. For example, during the pre-World War II years they 
wholly supported an U.S. sponsored resolution concerning the Korean conflict, enabling 
the legislation’s passage, even if they did not volunteer to send troops directly supporting 
for U.S. in the Korean War.18
DECREASING COOPERATION UNDER HEGEMONIC BEHAVIOR
Signs of impending problems between the U.S. and Latin American security 
relations began to surface a few years after World War II. Argentine leaders were 
traditionally the greatest impediment to U.S. leadership since the first Pan American 
conference in 1889. and despite the degree of regional security cooperation after the war. 
remained antagonistic. President Juan Perdn led a populist ‘third way’ movement that
I7Ibid.. p. 318.
l8John A. Houston. Latin America in the United Nations (Westport CT: 
Greenwood Press, 1978) 105, 290.
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sought a path between capitalism and communism.19 The goal of Perdn was to obtain a 
position of neutrality for Argentina and encourage other regional states to do the same. 
The reality was that these efforts were aimed squarely at constraining the regional 
hegemony of the U.S.
Argentina had never been a strong regional ally to the U.S.. so although Peron's 
actions were evocative, they did not generate much concern in Washington. However, 
other problems began to appear. As previously stated, Latin American states were 
generally disappointed at the amount of resources the U.S. made available for Latin 
American development. Regional states that allied themselves with the U.S. expected a 
greater reward for their loyalty during the war, and the lack of U.S. attention drew a 
negative response. Latin American disappointment over the lack of U.S. economic 
support gave impetus to the creation of the Organization of Central American States in 
1951. Dozer states that. ‘*this movement of closer Latin American cooperation was 
inspired, in part, by the desire of some Latin Americans to free themselves from 
domination by the United States.*’20 The Latin American movement towards regional 
trade agreements gained momentum into the 1960s. resulting in the creation of the 
Andean Common Market and the Latin American Free Trade Area (LAFTA). Gavin 
Boyd and Yale Ferguson trace the inception of these organizations directly to insufficient 
support of the OAS. leading some countries to bypass the OAS.21
I9Dozer, 316.
20Ibid., 321.
2lGavin Boyd and Yale Ferguson, “Latin American Regionalism,” in Regionalism 
and Global Security, ed. Gavin Boyd (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1984), 143.
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After years of the institution of Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy the U.S. began 
a pattern of intervention in Latin America once again. The most controversial of these 
was in Guatemala (1954). Cuba (1959), and the Dominican Republic (1965). Although 
the U.S. did not directly intervene by the use of U.S. troops in the first two cases, it 
played an important role that concerned the U.S. Latin American security partners. The 
strength of U.S. regional hegemony began to express itself through the increase in 
interventions, just as the Good Neighbor Policy had represented U.S. weakness, resulting 
in a decline of intervention.
The willingness of states to participate in U.S. sponsored regional security 
cooperation was diminished by U.S. involvement in the overthrow of the Guatemalan 
Government in 1954. Guatemalan instability began after a coup by General Ponce in 
1944. As a result, Juan Jose' Are'valo was elected President of Guatemala. His platform 
of social, political and economic reform polarized the national political debate because of 
the general perception of his communist leanings. Ponce wanted to overthrow Arevalo 
and sought help from the U.S. In 1951 President Arbenz was elected, and he intensified 
Arevalo's controversial policies.
Under the direction of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles the U.S. prompted 
other OAS states to support a resolution that called for appropriate action against the 
domination of the political institutions of an American state.”  Although the U.S. sought 
OAS approval to take action in Guatemala, Secretary of State Dulles warned that the U.S.
~Foreign Relations o f the United States: 1952 (Washington D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1972), 299-300.
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was prepared to take unilateral action with or without regional support.23 On June 18. 
1954, Lieutenant Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas and two hundred men that had been 
trained by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) entered Guatemala to take control of 
the government. The plan depended on the psychological impact, utilizing the radio to 
convince Arbenz a massive invasion was taking place, when actually a far smaller action 
occurred.24 The Guatemalan Army refused to defend Arbenz, leading to his resignation 
on June 27.
Although the U.S. was able to procure the support of the OAS, it resorted to 
strong-arm tactics that raised issues about the ability of Latin American states to make 
independent decisions. Latin American diplomats at the tenth inter-American 
Conference in Caracas were pressured by the U.S. to support a measure that allowed the 
Guatemalan intervention to occur.25 Latin American delegates were disillusioned by U.S. 
tactics, and by the fact that the U.S. did not announce any new aid programs as a favor 
for their loyalty. Richard Immerman reports that general Latin America disillusionment 
resulted from the response of the U.S. to events in Guatemala and performance during the 
Caracas Conference.26 Piero Gleijeses writes that Latin American governments were 
frustrated over the outcome of the Guatemalan Conference. They supported what they
^Gaddis Smith, The Last Years o f the Monroe Doctrine (New York: Hill and 
Wang, 1994), 81.
24Cole Blaiser, The Giant's Rival: The USSR and Latin America (Pittsburgh: 
Pittsburgh University Press, 1987), 27.
^Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, Bitter Fruit: The Untold Story o f the 
American Coup in Guatemala (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Co, 1982).
26Richard H. Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy o f 
Intervention (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982).
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viewed as a weakening of the Pan American ideal yet received no pledges of economic 
aid in return.27 The actions of the U.S. worked to de-Iegitimize the OAS as a multilateral 
tool, in the process sensitizing Latin American states to the U.S. hegemony.
Latin American states objected more strongly to U.S. actions against the Cuban 
revolution. In I960 Fidel Castro began to expropriate all U.S. owned properties in Cuba. 
In response, the U.S. withdrew its ambassador from Havana.28 The Eisenhower and 
Kennedy Administrations approved the military training of Cuban exiles to be used in an 
operation to overthrow Cuban leadership. The Bay of Pigs invasion took place in April 
of I960 and failed primarily due to poor operational and strategic planning. Castro's 
increasingly pro-communist stand reduced his popularity within his own army and with 
the general population.29 However, the inability of the exile forces to coordinate 
operations with anti-Castro elements on the mainland doomed any chance of success/0
President John F. Kennedy sensed failure and ordered no further support for the 
U.S. trained force as it invaded Cuba. Without U.S. naval and aircraft support to provide 
cover for the invasion force, the operation was doomed to fail. After Cuba's success at 
repelling the invasion, internal security forces smashed the domestic resistance through 
the mass arrest of any real or suspected collaborators. The Bay of Pigs failure abrogated
2'Piero Gleijeses, Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United 
States. 1944-54 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 340.
28Jaime Suchlicki. Cuba: From Columbus to Castro (Washington: Brassey's US 
Inc.. 1990), 163.
29Ibid., 164.
■^Suchlicki reports that anti-Castro forces were only told about the invasion the 
day it happened since the exile community believed their ranks may have been penetrated 
by Castro informers. Ibid.
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any further direct attempt to unseat the Cuban government by Cuban exiles or U.S. 
leadership.
Latin American reaction to the U.S. intervention was far from the total support 
that U.S. leaders had sought. Latin American states understood the Cuban-U.S. dispute 
as a dominant power exerting influence over a weaker one. not as part of a larger 
communism vs. democracy ideological struggle. Latin American leaders became more 
inclined to side with Cuba because they could identify with Cuba’s vulnerable position in 
regard to the U.S. The Latin American view of the U.S. deteriorated after the Bay of Pigs 
incident, and support of Castro increased throughout the region/1 Even before the Bay of 
Pigs. Paterson found that as the U.S. explored OAS mediation to the Cuban Revolution. 
Latin American diplomats had already began to express sympathy for Castro/' The 
Cuban dilemma provides a looking glass into the deeper problem of U.S.-Latin American 
security cooperation during the Cold War. The U.S. viewed the security threat as 
emanating from outside the region whereas Latin American states increasingly viewed 
the U.S. as the security threat. The difference in perception is intimately tied to the 
overwhelming power of the U.S. in the region. Because of strong hegemony, the U.S. 
was free to act unilaterally. Regional approval was usually sought by the U.S., but was 
not perceived as a determining factor by policy makers in Washington. Because Latin 
American leaders understood the U.S. only used the OAS as a pretext for its policies and
3IBoris Goldenberg, The Cuban Revolution and Latin America (New York: 
Praeger Publisher, 1966), 241.
32Thomas G. Paterson, Contesting Castro: The United States and the Triumph o f 
the Cuban Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 257.
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demonstrated an unwillingness to accept decisions against it as binding, they began to 
lose faith in the institution.
Once Fidel Castro gained power and became a self-proclaimed communist the 
U.S. continued to encounter difficultly garnering regional support against Cuba. The 
U.S. contended that all forms of communism were instigated by a foreign source the 
Soviet Union. Latin American policy makers disagreed. As Ball states: “Latin 
Americans were disposed to feel that an indigenous communist movement represented a 
legitimate exercise of self-determination against which the American republics were 
precluded from taking action...“.JJ> The U.S. requested that the OAS condemn Cuba for 
inviting Soviet and other communist intervention into the region. Cuba responded by 
counter-condemning the U.S. for its aggression and intervention. Latin American states 
at the meeting accepted neither statement, another blow to the U.S.34
In the autumn of 1961 a resolution was introduced in the OAS to call a meeting 
about the issue of Cuban human rights abuses and conducting subversive activities 
against its neighbors. Six Latin American states did not support the position of the U.S. 
on the matter: Argentina. Bolivia. Brazil, Chile Ecuador, and Mexico. Although the 
conference was finally held, the best result the U.S. procured from the proceedings was 
an agreement from other states that Marxist-Leninist principles were antithetical to the 
values of the inter-American system/5 A tepid anticommunist proclamation was quite
33Ball, 459.
34Ibid.. 460.
35Gordon C onneil-Sm ith, The Inter-American System (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1966), 177.
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different than the U.S. goal to have unanimous support in its quest to have Cuba expelled 
from the OAS. Fourteen states eventually voted with the U.S., while six abstained. Brazil 
and Mexico abstained from approving the measure, important regional players the U.S. 
needed to demonstrate unanimity.36
If U.S. support o f  interventions in Cuba and Guatemala disillusioned regional 
states and polarized them against the U.S., the direct intervention against the Dominican 
Republic in 1965 increased Latin American determination to bring U.S. dominance under 
control. Lowenthai points out that when the U.S. Marines landed in the Dominican 
Republic, the last time the U.S. had committed to such an action was over forty years 
earlier. “Despite repeated involvements in Latin American politics—in Argentina, in 
Guatemala, and particularly Cuba—the United States had, since 1928, always kept its 
actions short o f overt military intervention.”37 The U.S. not only broke the norm of direct 
intervention, a norm established by Hoover and Roosevelt that dramatically improved 
relations over the years, but it did so without consulting the OAS, knowing the OAS 
would disapprove. This act significantly damaged inter-American relations and solidified 
the impression of the U.S. as a malignant hegemon throughout much o f the region.
The Dominican Republic was continually in turmoil under the increasing 
unpopular Rafael Trujillo regime. Out o f twenty security incidents in the Caribbean
36Ibid.. 178.
37Abraham F. LowenthaL, The Dominican Intervention (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1972), I.
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between 1948 and 1959 the Dominican Republic was the focus of nine of them.38 
During this time, the U.S. utilized the inter-American forum to address the situation in a 
regional setting. Secretary of State Christian A. Herter emphasized the inter-American 
commitment to nonintervention over other principles. He believed that overthrowing 
regimes, even when regarded as anti-democratic, produced disorder and gave a political 
opportunity for the manifestation of communism/9
Actions by the Dominican Republic gave the OAS reasons for consternation. In 
1959 an aircraft, flying with the complicity of the Dominican Government, accidentally 
dropped leaflets over Curasao that were intended for Venezuela. The leaflets implored 
the Venezuelan Army to overthrow the current regime. In later incidents Trujillo was 
found to have ordered the assassination of the Venezuelan leader and further supported a 
military uprising in Venezuela. Despite the Dominican Republic's acts against the inter- 
American norm of non-intervention, and the distaste of Trujillo throughout the region, the 
OAS agreed to sanctions but would not support direct intervention.40 This was the first 
time the OAS agreed to sanctions but was motivated by other reasons than U.S. pressure. 
Latin American states strongly disapproved of Trujillo's attempted assassination of 
another regional leader; they cared little for the anticommunist agenda of the U.S.41
j8G. Pope Atkins and Larman C. Wilson. The Dominican Republic and the United 
States: From Imperialism to Transnationalism (Athens, GA: The University of Georgia 
Press, 1998). 92.
39Herter*s position was stated as the Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs in Santiago Chile, 1959. Ibid., 97.
40Ibid., p. 100.
41 Ibid., p. 102.
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In 1961 Trujillo was assassinated and the U.S. dispatched eight ships with a 
Marine contingent of 1,800 men as a deterrent against any movement by the Trujillo 
family to retake power. Although the U.S. did this without consulting the OAS, there 
was no open Latin American criticism of the action.42 The U.S. committed forty-five 
military advisors to retrain Dominican forces under the U.S. Military Assistance 
Advisory Group. Aid was increased by the Kennedy administration to validate the 
Alliance for Progress program, the aid disbursed after democratic elections resulted in the 
nomination of President Juan Bosch. However, U.S. efforts were to no avail, Bosch was 
overthrown by the military in 1963. In April 1965 pro-Bosch forces, or constitutionalists, 
clashed with military supporters, or loyalists, throwing the Dominican Republic into civil 
war. The loyalists requested U.S. intervention, and by the end of April, five hundred U.S. 
Marines landed when it appeared the constitutionalists would win. Eventually, the U.S. 
reached a total of 20.000 troops at the apex of the intervention.43
The Dominican intervention was a turning point in U.S .-Latin American relations. 
The U.S. helped prevent the constitutionalists from gaining power but the action had a 
deleterious impact on relations since the U.S. had not consulted with the OAS before it 
intervened.44 The U.S. worked to receive OAS approval after the intervention by
42Connell-Smith, 176.
43The U.S. viewed Bosch and his supporters as being too far to the left and 
therefore the U.S. believed his leadership was inviting another Cuban-style revolution.
As a consequence the U.S. did not want to suffer the same fate twice in its own backyard. 
Dent. 146.
44Bruce Palmer Jr., Intervention in the Caribbean: The Dominican Crisis o f 1965 
(Lexington: Universtiy Press of Kentucky, 1989), 139-143.
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supporting the creation of an OAS force to assume peacekeeping duties.45 The OAS 
voted to pass the measure with the minimum number of votes allowable, fourteen. The 
force was composed of soldiers from Brazil, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, 
Nicaragua and Paraguay. The regional nature of the force symbolically demonstrated 
unity, however. Chile, Mexico, Uruguay, and Venezuela strongly objected to U.S. 
actions.46 Further, the cosmopolitan nature of the OAS force seemed to be a maneuver to 
give the appearance of OAS support, when in reality the U.S. unilateral action took the 
organization by surprise. President Johnson wanted to bring the operation under the 
OAS umbrella, undoubtedly to use the organization as a legitimizing tool.4' As in the 
case of Guatemala and Cuba, the U.S. Latin American states believed the U.S. was using 
the OAS as a tool of dominance rather than as a tool of security cooperation where it 
consulted with states as equals.
Although the U.S. demonstrated that it would rather have regional approval in the 
Cuban. Dominican, and Guatemalan, interventions it also showed that its dominance 
allowed it to act unilaterally when it chose. The U.S. urge to act unilaterally was 
compounded by other differences with Latin American states. Latin America thought 
economic and social issues were the most relevant to their security and the U.S. thought 
the Soviet threat was of primary significance. As the schism between the U.S. and Latin 
America became increasingly apparent to Latin Americans, their support of U.S. 
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when the U.S could similarly identify their states as security threats. In short, the 
region's power asymmetry eroded security cooperation.
The U.S. also played a role in the Brazilian military coup that took place in March 
and April, 1964. President Juan Goulart. a controversial figure in Brazilian politics, 
polarized the Brazilian electorate and alienated the military by handpicking military 
leaders sympathetic to his political cause. Goulart increased tension by signing decrees 
that enforced expropriation of private land and industries without compensation and 
declared the Constitution unjust and obsolete.48 Brazilian military leaders assumed from 
these remarks that Goulart was closely allied with communist revolutionaries and sought 
to usurp the Brazilian constitution.49 Mass demonstration occurred both for and against 
Goulart. convincing the military that a coup would be widely popular. At the height of 
the crisis the governors of all the major states aligned themselves against Goulart.
Goulart had some support by the military, but only in the senior enlisted ranks. The 
lower ranking enlisted and officer corps were largely against the Brazilian President. By 
April Goulart was on his way to exile in Uruguay.
The U.S. was indirectly involved in the coup, being responsible for providing 
training and support for the Brazilian military. One-third of the Brazilian active duty 
generals in the Brazilian Army received some form of education and training from their
■^Ronald M. Schneider. The Political System o f Brazil: Emergence o f a 
Modernizing Authoritarian Regime (New York: Columbia University Press. 1971), 93.
49Robert Wesson, The United States and Brazil: Limits o f Influence (New York: 
Praeger Publishers, 1981), 36.
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U.S. contemporaries.50 U.S. training focused on the perceived communist threat, 
teaching counterinsurgency tactics to Latin American students.31 The Central 
Intelligence Agency was also indirectly involved by infiltrating Brazilian labor unions, 
and waged a campaign to alter Brazilian public opinion.52 The U.S. embassy played a 
role by letting potential military conspirators know that the U.S. would not disapprove of 
a coup if it occurred.33 The role of the U.S. is perhaps best summed up by Lincoln 
Gordon, the U.S. ambassador to Brazil during the crisis: “Brazil is a very large country 
with a very active political life of its own, and the American voice, although a significant 
one, is in no sense a controlling one."54
Although the U.S. was not directly involved, the U.S. was partly responsible for 
the military coup. Its power was so great in the region that any Latin American political 
leader must have the implicit backing of the U.S. as the regional hegemon or they would 
find their ability to rule much more difficult. In Goulart’s case, he firmly embraced many 
policies that placed him in the pro-communist camp. This prompted the U.S. to be less 
active in helping the Goulart government with its debt renegotiation and to lessen
30Alfred Stepan. The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1971), 130.
51 Wesson. 40.
52Winslow Peck. "The AFL-CIA,” in Uncloaking the CIA, ed. Howard Frazier 
(New York: The Free Press, 1978), 264.
53Wesson, 40-41.
54U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Nomination o f Lincoln Gordon 
(Washington D .C .: Government Printing Office, 1966), 7.
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economic aid.55 The degree of U.S. control resulted in a backlash by 1968. Brazil's 
military leadership took an authoritarian turn at this time, leading the U.S. to further its 
distance from the regime. When the Brazilian military consolidated its control, the move 
contributed to the nationalist sentiment of the Orlando Geisel government. Growing 
nationalism combined with growing condemnation from Washington caused the Geisel 
regime to end close relations with the U.S.56 Attacks occurred against U.S. interests, 
protesting the U.S. role in Brazil. In 1966 the home of the U.S. consul was bombed in 
Porto Allegre. the U.S. Information Service building was bombed in Brasilia. Radical 
students and Catholic activists blamed U.S. ’imperialism* for all of Brazil’s problems.57 
In protest, nationalist kidnapped the U.S. Ambassador on the date of Che Guevara's death 
as a symbolic gesture.
Most U.S. presidents shared Eisenhower's outlook towards inter-American 
relations. He believed that regional peace and prosperity would benefit Latin American 
states, but more importantly keep communism at bay, and therefore serve general U.S. 
interests.58 This was the primary impetus behind President Kennedy's ambitious Alliance 
for Progress initiative (AFP). Policy makers in the Kennedy Administration thought ”the
55Thomas Skidmore, Politics in Brazil: An Experiment in Democracy. / 930-1964 
(New York: Oxford University Press. 1967), 271.
56Thomas E. Skidmore, The Politics o f Military Rule in Brazil. 1964-85 (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 192-193.
^Ibid., 101.
58Stephen G. Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy o f 
Anticommunism (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1988), 64.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
120
U.S. must seek to bring about stability at a tolerable level of social organization without 
leaving the transformation to be organized by communists.'00 To this end twenty-two 
billion dollars were disbursed to the region from 1961-1970. The Kennedy 
Administration devoted eighteen percent of the foreign aid monies of the U.S. to Latin 
American, whereas the Truman Administration spent three percent and Eisenhower nine
TableS. Latin American Aid Sources, 1961-1970
1961 1962 1963 1964 1965
US Bilateral Aid 1.403.1 838.8 897.0 450.5 950.5
International 
Financial Institutions 1.025.6 898.9 733.6 577.4 1.017.6
Bilateral OECD Aid 85.9 151.9 197.2 180.8 208.0
Annual Total 2,514.6 1.889.6 1.827.8 2.208.7 2.176.1
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970
US Bilateral Aid 
International 1.072.0 1140.8 1114.6 693.2 687.1
Financial Institutions 1.067.6 978.7 1.433.4 1.215.3 1.508.8
Bilateral OECD Aid 176.7 157.6 157.6 81.2 192.8
Annual Total 2316.6 2,277.1 2.705.6 1.989.7 2.229.5
Accumulated Total 32.911.30
Source: Organization of American States, Inter-American Economic and
Social Council. Latin America's Development and the Alliance fo r  Progress (January
1973). p. 79.
39John Lewis Gaddis. Strategies o f Containment: A Critical Appraisal o f Postwar 
American National Security Policy (New York: Oxford University Press. 1982), 224.
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60percent. Table 5 shows that bilateral aid from the U.S. formed a significant amount of 
total aid to Latin American during the 1960s. During 1961 U.S. bilateral aid made up 
55.7 percent of total aid, and in 1968 it comprised 41.2 percent.
The AFP sought to stabilize the economies, societies, and government institutions 
of all Latin American states. The Kennedy administration frequently made comparisons 
between it and the Marshall Plan, eventually regretting the comparison. As the Marshall 
plan had to instigate the recovery of shattered economies, the AFP was weighted with 
changing the entire foundadon of a society. As pointed out by one observer 
“The new program called for new industries, new ways of farming, new systems of 
education and health care, new attitudes toward government and community 
responsibility, new relationships between city and country, landlord and peasant, 
manager and worker.*'61 The indicators of success for the AFP were to improve the life 
and welfare of Latin Americans, and to this end stimulating economic growth in Latin 
America at the rate of at least 2.5 percent per year. Although it is difficult to measure the 
program's impact since many of the infrastructure projects give indirect benefits, the 
stated goal of 2.5 percent annual growth was not met. In a broad sense neither did it 
engender regional democracy in the short-run as Latin America experienced a wave of 
dictatorships during the late 1960s and 1970s.
60Stephen G. Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy 
Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1999), 154.
6‘Lincoln Gordon, “The Alliance at Birth: Hopes and Fears,” in The Alliance fo r  
Progress: A Retrospective, ed. L. Ronald Scheman (New York: Praeger, 1988), 76.
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Despite the ostensibly constructive intentions of the AFP, in some way the aid 
further reinforced Latin American perceptions of U.S. regional dominance. Many Latin 
American observers perceived the AFP to be a method of further subjugating Latin 
America to the U.S. These critics point to the fact that money was given in the form of a 
loan rather than grants, grants being the preferred method and was the primary form of 
monetary disbursement under the Marshall Plan. Arthur Schlesinger. Jr. counters this by 
pointing out.
“If the Alianza's secret purpose was to lock Latin America more firmly than ever 
into U.S. capitalist hegemony, presidential speeches stimulating and legitimizing 
Latin American ambitions for economic independence and structural change 
seemed an odd way of going about it.” 62
What was stated fifteen years prior to the beginning of the AFP was ironically reinforced
during the programs ten year period. “The more favors we (Latin Americans) receive
from the Yankees, the less we like them”.63 Henry Kissinger noted that the AFP’s
“programs for social and economic improvement were both welcomed and resented.”64
The ubiquitous presence of the U.S. in Latin American minds was reinforced by the
Cuban. Dominican, and Guatemalan interventions, although the AFP was aimed at
ameliorating these tensions it reminded Latin Americans that the U.S. had more influence
over their lives than their own governments. It is no surprise that the AFP bought the
U.S. positive, but limited goodwill from Latin America.
62 Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.. “Myth and Reality,” in. The Alliance fo r Progress. ed. 
L. Ronald Scheman (New York: Praeger, 1988), 69.
63Enrique Santos. El Tiempo. (Bogota) I March 1945.
64Henry Kissinger, Years o f Renewal (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1999),
704.
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CONCLUSION
The power asymmetry of the U.S. substantially grew after World War H, as 
measured by basic power indicators. Because the hegemony of the U.S. went through a 
period in which it avoided entanglement in regional politics from the late 1920s to the 
early 1950s, Latin American security cooperation with the U.S. did not immediately 
suffer from the extreme power asymmetry. Before the end of World War II. when the 
power asymmetry had been diminished by the Depression, there was great improvement 
in the willingness of Latin American states to work with the U.S. on security issues. The 
period immediately after World War II witnessed the fruits of hegemony, represented by 
the establishment of the LADB. the signing of the Rio Treaty and the creation of the OAS. 
all three institutions remain important in the inter-American security relationship.
Maingot makes an interesting distinction concerning the U.S. and the Latin 
American view of sovereignty that began to emerge as security relations deteriorated 
during the 1950s and 1960s. Latin Americans began to increasingly define sovereignty in 
a state-centric way that allowed them to resist U.S. leadership, and the U.S defined 
sovereignty as democratic governance, that gave them a virtual mandate to intervene in 
the region.65 As extreme hegemony began to emerge between the U.S. and Latin 
America. Latin American leaders increasingly sought to use the non-intervention 
principle of the OAS as a tool to contain U.S. dominance.
Based on this interpretation of sovereignty Latin American states became less 
willing to commit to security cooperation endeavors with each incident of U.S. 
involvement in the internal affairs of regional states. Regional states disliked U.S.
65Maingot, 190-191.
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activities in Guatemala, but still supported U.S. declarations in the OAS that recognized 
the new government. There were stronger reservations against U.S. involvement during 
the failed Cuban invasion that coalesced against U.S. anti-Cuban activities in the OAS. 
The U.S. role in the 1964 military coup awoke a Brazilian nationalist sentiment that 
opposed the U.S., manifested by attacks against its interests and the nationalist policy of 
the Geisel administration. The direct U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic drew 
alarm throughout the region that an era of strong U.S. dominance had returned and had to 
be resisted.
Divergent Latin American and U.S. views on the goals of security cooperation 
and the execution of it nullified some of the goodwill generated by the AFP. The goal of 
the AFP was to reduce regional instability by ameliorating Latin American poverty: 
institutionalizing democracy and spreading free markets, all typical of many U.S. 
regional foreign policy initiatives since the time of President Grant. However, the U.S. 
sought to help Latin America deter what it perceived as communist activity. The U.S. 
considered all revolution as indicators of Soviet intervention into the region. Many Latin 
American leaders viewed the revolutions as originating from domestic causes. They 
considered them indigenous and therefore protected by the right of state sovereignty.
Since the Nixon Administration considered the AFP unsuccessful, it was inclined 
to look elsewhere to deter what it perceived as a communist threat. The logic was that if 
normalization of relations with China could deter the Soviet Union, then Soviet efforts to 
foment revolution in Latin America could be abrogated, and U.S.-Latin American 
security relations would improve. The improper assumption in this policy is that tensions 
between the U.S. and Latin America had global roots, when the nature of the quandary
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was primarily regional. What the U.S. viewed as a problem of communism supported by 
Soviet activity, Latin America leaders perceived as aggressive and unilateral U.S. foreign 
policy.
Chapter five concentrates on the 1970-1979 time frame. The problems created by 
the U.S. interventions in the 1960s had a lasting impact on regional security relations in 
the next decade, acrimony reaching even higher levels. The U.S .-Brazilian special 
relationship that lasted throughout most of the century came to an end in the mid-1970s. 
Several Latin American states signaled their uneasiness with U.S. hegemony by making 
attempts to lessen their dependency. They sought out other trade partners to counter U.S. 
dominance in trade, arms supplies, technology, and financial support. The regional 
security relation's difficulties were made worse by the two global economic crises that 
occurred during the 1970s. These downturns weakened the U.S. economy, but also 
severely afflicted the growth of Latin American states, further hampering efforts at 
security cooperation.




Security cooperation continued to deteriorate during the 1970s. This dynamic 
was complicated by the surge in Larin American economic growth followed by the 
impact of the world oil crisis in the early 1970s and U.S. recession in the late 1970s. 
Although U.S. political activities were less prominent than during the 1960s, any benefit 
accrued was nullified by other factors. The U.S. reiterated its policies maintaining that 
Latin American economic growth was not a regional priority. Instead it continued to 
focus on Soviet expansionism brought to the forefront by the Guatemalan and Cuban 
situations from the 1950s. Even the military government of Brazil that the U.S. helped 
bring to power in 1964 began to distance itself from the U.S. because of diverging 
interests. Larin Americans leaders reinforced their position that what the U.S. perceived 
as communist activities in the region, were largely of domestic origin, not a threat posed 
from the Soviet Union that would legally call for the enforcement of the Rio Treaty. The 
U.S. quietly disagreed, realizing it would not win regional support in the OAS for its 
view, and continued to have the perception that any communist movement symbolized 
foreign intervention through the Soviet Union until the election of President Carter. U.S. 
interventions declined during this period, but it did not ameliorate Larin American 
suspicions of U.S. dominance.
Regional relations in the 1970s took place against a backdrop of economic 
turmoil. The oil crisis and U.S. recession both affected Larin America worse than the 
U.S. The U.S self-perception was that of a state in decline, and its foreign policies
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toward the region became less engaged as a result. Although the U.S. was experiencing 
economic problems, the collateral effect was worse in other states of the region. Latin 
American economic decline after several years of growth furthered reinforced insecurities 
about U.S. hegemony.
Latin American economies substantially grew in the early 1970s along with 
domestic spending. Its spending spree in the early 1970s caused most of the region to 
mirror U.S. gloom when the global economic crisis ensued. Although basic indicators 
show that asymmetry between the U.S. and Latin America remained constant. Latin 
America was suffering from hyperinflation and indebtedness, giving its leaders the 
perception the power asymmetry gap was growing. The further deterioration of regional 
relations prompted many Latin America leaders to actively search for an alternative to 
U.S. hegemony.
Chapter five begins by reviewing the basic power indicators of the U.S. and 
compares them to those of the two largest Latin American economies. Brazil and Mexico. 
In order to emphasize U.S. hegemony, the GNP of the U.S. is compared to an aggregate 
of all Latin American states. The second section addresses the popularity of dependency 
theory in the region as a means to describe the negative aspects of the hegemonic 
relationship. Dependency theory was derived as an explanation for the lack of the 
development in particular areas of the world. It focused on external factors such as their 
colonial history and the capitalist world system, rather than internal factors such as the 
presence of traditional societies. For example. Francis Fukuyama notes that traditional 
societies that are dependent on familial ties rather than the state for their well-being. In 
turn Fukuyama believes this dependency on the family perpetuates “low-trust” societies.
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undermining state legitimacy.1 The rise of dependency theory seemed to be a reflection 
of the deteriorating relations between the U.S. and Latin America. The role of the Soviet 
Union was also an important factor in regional security relations during the 1970s. How 
Soviet political and economic actions shaped the U.S .-Latin American security 
relationship are discussed.
This chapter describes how U.S. policy under President Jimmy Carter sought to 
reengage Latin America in a security dialog. However, his initiatives had mixed results, 
and security cooperation continued to decline. The inability of regional states to 
effectively cope with the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua was symbolic of the 
enduring impediments to regional security cooperation. Despite attempts by U.S. leaders 
to address the crisis in a multilateral fashion, the failure of this effort was another setback 
for the hegemonic relationship between the U.S. and Latin America.
REGIONAL HEGEMONY
Table 6 shows that the hegemonic status of the U.S. remained intact despite the 
economic problems of the U.S. in the mid 1970s, and a recession in the later pan of the 
decade. In 1970, the GNP of the U.S. was slightly more than $1.5 trillion, increasing to 
over $2 trillion by 1979, representing a 25 percent increase. By comparison Latin 
America's cumulative GNP stood at $311 billion, increasing to $511 billion by 1979. a 
forty percent increase. Brazil has the largest Latin American economy. Its GNP was $95 
billion in 1970, increasing to nearly $200 billion by 1979, a 50 percent increase. Latin
‘Fukuyama, 62-63.
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Mexico's GNP increased by 34 percent during the same time frame. Despite gains by 
American economies as an aggregate, they still only amounted to a quarter of the GNP of 
the U.S.
In terms of total GNP the U.S. gained more than Latin America as an aggregate. 
However, Latin American exports and imports from and to the U.S. decreased during the 
1970s, also decreasing Latin American dependence on the U.S. The Inter-American 
Development Bank reported that in 1950 Latin America exported 48.3 percent of its 
goods to the U.S., this decreased to 32.1 by 1975.











■  Latin America
□  Mexico
□  U.S.
Source: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. World Military Expenditures and 
Arms Transfers 1970-1979 (Washington, D.C.: ACDA, 1982), pp. 45,51, 69, 81. The 
numbers in the Y-axis are in constant 1978 million dollars.
Imports decreased just as sharply, from 50.1 percent from the U.S. in 1950, to 35.9 
percent by 1975. The same trend occurred in trade with Europe. Inter-Latin American
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trade picked up some of the surplus, with Latin America exporting 9.6 percent of its 
goods to other Latin American states from 1960-64, but increasing this total to 14.3 by 
1975. The import numbers are similar, Latin American importing 12.6 percent of its 
goods internally in 1960-64. and increasing to 19.4 percent by 1975.'
The annual military expenditure of the U.S. and Latin America also demonstrates 
the continuation of U.S. hegemony. Table 7 shows that the military expenditure of the 
U.S. was $122 billion in 1979. By comparison the four states combined equaled not quite 
S5 billion, or less than five percent of the U.S. total. Brazil's expenditure as a percent of 
GNP remained relatively steady, hovering at an average of 1.2 percent; Mexico's was
Table 7. Annual Military Expenditure. 1970-1979
Argentina Brazil Mexico U.S. Venezuela
1970 594 882 249 77.854 279
1971 489 988 285 74.862 3691.096 333
1972 483 1.288 364 77.639 356
1973 600 1,392 414 78.358 388
1974 804 1.480 582 85.906 463
1,859 553
1975 1.206 1.890 567 90.948 551
1976 1.290 2,042 444 91.013 560
1977 1,535 1.719 466 100,925 632
1978 1.793 108.357 643
1979 1.640 122.279 569
Source'. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. World Military Expenditures and 
Arms Transfers 1970-1979, pp. 45, 51.69, 81. Numbers are in constant 1978 millions of 
U.S. dollars.
zEconomic and Social Progress in Latin America (Inter-American Development 
Bank, 1976).
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roughly half of that. Argentina had the highest expenditure as a percent of GNP. 
reaching its zenith in 1978, at 2.8 percent. The lowest year of U.S. expenditure was 
1978, at 5.1 percent of GNP, still much higher in comparison to Latin American states. 
The general trend in the hemisphere was a decline in defense expenditure, probably due 
to global economic problems in the 1970s. The only state to defy this trend is Argentina 
that actually increased defense spending from 1.6 percent to 2.8 percent of GNP in 1978.
These statistics broadly demonstrate that the hegemony of the U.S. continued 
during the 1970s. Despite the continuation of U.S. dominance there are also indications 
of a lessening in comparative power to Latin American states. Latin American imports 
and exports to the U.S. decreased, and Latin American economies as a region increased 
proportionately more than U.S. economy, a trend accentuated by Brazilian and Mexican 
increases that had a greater average than the region. These statistics suggest a decrease in 
power asymmetry. However, this time period demonstrates why power indicators may 
not always tell the complete story. Both the U.S. and Latin America experienced 
economic difficulties that in turn affected their willingness to cooperate. The U.S. also 
suffered from unprecedented domestic unrest due in part to the Vietnam War. The 
remainder of this chapter will detail the effects of these events on regional security 
cooperation to determine if the change in power asymmetry increased or decreased the 
level of security cooperation.
THE FAILURE OF DISENGAGED HEGEMONY
The disengagement of the U.S. in the region was instigated by the combination of 
Latin American recalcitrance and the continued U.S. preoccupation with the Soviet
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Union. The Vina del Mar Consensus was presented through the Special Commission for 
Coordination of Latin America (CECLA), by Latin American leaders, to President Nixon 
in 1969. It stated that the inter-American system was in a state of crisis.3 It explained that 
the interests of Latin America were not those of Washington and that Latin America gave 
more than it received from the United States.4 The declaration demonstrated the 
cumulative impact of the continuation of strong hegemony.
During the Nixon Administration domestic economic crisis and external security 
issues preoccupied the U.S. leadership. The U.S. had lost the Vietnam War. and suffered 
through an oil embargo and inflation. One U.S. mainstream weekly magazine declared 
that the U.S. was “clearly facing a crisis of the decay of power”.5 Although these events 
did not signal the permanent decline of U.S. power, they certainly helped give context to 
the foreign policies of both President Richard Nixon and Jimmy Carter, that consciously 
sought to limit the expression of U.S. power.
Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger realized that the U.S. needed to extricate 
itself from the Vietnam conflict due to its growing unpopularity at home and due to 
concerns that the U.S. had globally over-committed itself. The U.S. gradual withdrawal 
from Vietnam represented the limits to U.S. power and a change in U.S. strategic 
thinking. The ensuing U.S. policy became known as the NLxon Doctrine. The Nixon
3HeraIdo Munoz and Carlos Portales. Elusive Friendship: A Survey o f U.S. 
Chilean Relations (Boulder: Lynne Rienner. 1991).
'‘Heraldo Munoz. “The Inter-American System: A Latin American View,” In 
Alternative to Intervention: A New U.S.-Latin American Security Relationship. eds. 
Richard J. Bloomfield and Gregory F. Treverton (Boulder Lynne Rienner, 1990), 30.
5“The Decline of U.S. Power,” Business Week, 12 March 1979: 37.
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Doctrine began as an innocuous press briefing and boiled-down to three constituent 
elements: the U.S. will keep all of its treaty commitments, the U.S. will provide a shield 
if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of an ally, and in cases involving other types of 
aggression, the U.S. will furnish military and economic assistance when requested in 
accordance with our treaty commitments. However, the U.S. would look to the nation 
directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for 
its own defense.6 Kissinger’s concise summary of the Nixon Doctrine was. “our interests 
must shape our commitments, rather than the other way around.” '
Neither Nixon nor Secretary Kissinger considered the Nixon Doctrine a retreat 
from the international arena, but the oil crisis of 1973 made U.S. leaders realize limits 
and the concurrent need to reduce U.S. commitments. On October 19. 1973, Arab oil 
producing countries decided to begin an oil embargo in order to express their collective 
displeasure concerning U.S. support of Israel during the fourth Arab-Israeli War of the 
same year.8 The Arab embargo was lifted in less than a year. March of 1974. but the 
impact on the U.S. economy coalesced to the national perception of decline and 
vulnerability that began with the Vietnamese conflict.
Even before the oil shock of 1973. the U.S. was recovering from inflation induced 
by the combined effects of soaring food prices and currency devaluation. Table 8
6Gaddis, Strategies o f Containment, 298.
Annual foreign policy report. February 18, 1970. Public Papers o f the 
Presidents: Richard M. Nixon, 1970, 118-119.
8United States Energy Information Administration, World OilMarket and Oil 
Price Chronologies: 1970 - 1999, http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/ chron.htmI#al973, June 
19, 2001.
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Official Price of Saudi Light








1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Source: United States Energy Information Administration. World Oil Market and Oil 
Price Chronologies: 1970- 1999. Available from http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/ 
chron.html#al973. June 19. 2001. The Y-axis is in $ per barrel of oil.
shows that the price of oil dramatically increased in a short time causing global economic 
destabilization, from the end of 1973 to the beginning of the 1974. The oil crisis 
negatively affected the U.S. as inflation increased and supply dwindled. The shock of the 
oil crisis was a turning point in how the U.S. viewed the world. It affected not only the 
average U.S. consumer, but also changed the worldview of the average citizen. The U.S. 
was forced to surrender the comfort of energy self-sufficiency and accepted the reality of 
oil dependence. The U.S. regularly preached to trading partners the benefits of 
interdependence but never thought that it might impact the U.S. as well. The panic over 
the oil crisis was magnified by the nationalization of U.S. oil concerns during the last 
decade in Iraq, Iran, Libya, and Venezuela.
The realization of U.S. limits led the Nixon Administration to view Latin America 
as a distant foreign policy priority. The U.S neither paid attention to Latin American 
interests in social and economic development, nor tried to push its anti-Soviet Union
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agenda in the OAS. Blaiser points out that the U.S. was more secure about the non-threat 
of Soviet imperialism during the early 1970s than it had been during the 1950s and 
1960s.9 This led to the continued deterioration of the OAS as a center of security 
cooperation. The U.S. ignored Latin American complaints that led to a continued erosion 
of the ability of the U.S. to lead the region. Changes supported by Latin American states 
occurred during the proceedings of the 1975 OAS San Jose meeting. The first change 
resulted in the introduction of an amendment to expand the definition of security to 
include development issues. Another important change led to the modification of the Rio 
Treaty so that only a simple majority vote was needed to lift sanctions as opposed to two- 
thirds majority rule.10
While the U.S. seemed to abdicate its regional leadership under the Nixon and 
Ford Administrations. Latin American states began to fill the vacuum by charting 
independent foreign policies. Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico had a common economic 
experience during the 1970s. They each celebrated strong growth based largely on 
dependency-inspired economic planning, only to see their progress deteriorate due to a 
combination of over-borrowing, the oil crisis, and the downturn in the U.S. economy. All 
these factors combined to cause hyperinflation.
Towards the end of the 1970s Argentina suffered through the storm of economic 
extremes. Through direct government control of business, subsidization of domestic 
industries, and import substitution policies, the Argentine economy began to show signs 
of improvement in the early 1970s. However, constant hyperinflation and the inability of
’Blaiser, The Hovering Giant, 260.
I0Munoz, “The Inter-American System, 30.
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domestic industries to mature beyond government sponsorship eroded the Argentine 
economy, reducing domestic support for the federal government. By the mid-1970s 
inflation was consistently in the triple digit range. In 1976, the Argentine government 
attempted to resuscitate the economy with a stabilization plan that temporarily slowed 
inflation, but it did not restore growth. Despite inflation Argentina was able to guide its 
economy away from raw product exports to manufactured goods, increasing 
manufactured goods exports from 15.6 percent of total exports to 21.5 percent by 1975. 
However, these gains did not last. Government subsidies were rescinded in 1976 and 
exports dramatically decreased without direct public sector support.11
By the mid-1970s the Mexican economy surged due to the discovery of petroleum 
reserves. In 1974 Mexico produced 2.75 million barrels of oil per day. only consuming 
half of that amount.12 Mexico found a ready customer in its neighbor to the North; the 
U.S. was already suffering from shortages and high prices. Mexico began to mortgage its 
future on its newly discovered wealth, borrowing and spending millions on infrastructure 
projects. When the price of oil sharply declined, Mexico's debt soared from SI 4.5 billion 
in 1975 to $85 billion by the mid-1980s, leading to inflation and monetary crisis.13 
Although Mexico was partially inoculated against the oil crisis because of its domestic 
reserves, these reserves did not last due to the improper management of fiscal policy.
"Rock, 327.
i2E. Bradford Bums, Latin America: A Concise Interpretive History (Englewood 
Cliffs: Prentice Hall. 1990), 198.
I3Ibid., 199.
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Brazil fared no better than Argentina and Mexico. From 1967 to 1974 the 
military leadership remained popular due to soaring domestic and export production, 
leading to growth frequently exceeding ten percent a year.14 The oil crisis reduced 
Brazilian economic expansion that fueled projects such as the design, construction and 
inauguration of an entire capital city, to extreme debt and a trade imbalance. After 1975 
inflation reached triple digits and the foreign debt rose from $5.5 billion in 1970. to $60.8 
billion in 1980.15
The oil crisis reduced Latin American self-confidence, hindering attempts at 
regional security cooperation. Because of its economic vitality in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s. Brazil considered itself ‘the country of the future’. Since the economic crisis 
that began in the mid 1970s Brazilians amended the expression. ‘Brazil is the perpetual 
country of the future'. Before the economic chaos of the oil crisis Latin American 
leaders began to increasingly consider their states as more independent of U.S. 
hegemony, despite the consistent U.S. advantage in GNP and military expenditure. 
Perceptions of growing equality were demonstrated by increasingly independent foreign 
policies. Leaders in Latin American states began to act less restrained in criticizing the 
U.S. in forums such as the OAS and the UN. Whereas before Latin American states felt 
compelled to consider the desires of the U.S., they were now actively seeking 
independence on all fronts.
During the 1970s many Latin American leaders increasingly believed the 
hegemonic relationship was decreasing in value. This view was likely promoted by the
I4Bums, A History o f Brazil, 467.
l5Ibid.
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economic crisis, in e fifed reminding Latin American states o f  their dependence on U.S. 
power in terms of financial backing and as an importer o f Latin American goods. Latin 
American leaders were reminded yet again o f the inability to modify or escape strong 
U.S. hegemony.
DEPENDENCY THEORY AS A REACTION TO ASYMMETRY
The effect o f power asymmetry under strong U.S. hegemony eroded hemispheric 
relations, with the trend becoming worse during the 1970s. Latin American disapproval 
o f the status quo found an expression in dependency theory. Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso, who later became President o f Brazil, was one o f the early proponents o f 
dependency theory. He and other academics developed the construct while trying to 
explain underdevelopment in the Latin American region. Dependency theory is closely 
related to the Marxist theory o f imperialism. Both schools o f thought maintain that 
European colonization and capitalism are the root causes o f the Latin American plight 
rather than domestic structures, such as economic policy or the lack o f political 
stability.16 Dependency places the responsibility o f Latin American poverty on shoulders 
o f the U.S. and Europe: Europe for its historical exploitation o f the region and the U.S. 
for perpetuating imperialistic policies. Bradford Burns defines dependency in the 
following way:
“Dependency describes a situation in which the economic well-being, or lack of 
it. or one nation, colony, or area results from the consequences o f decisions made 
elsewhere. Latin America was first dependent on the Iberian motherlands, then in 
the nineteenth century on England, and in the twentieth on the United States,
l6See, Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, Dependencia e 
Desenvolvimento na America Latina (Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 1973).
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whose decisions and policies directly influenced, or influence, its economic
prosperity or poverty. Obviously to the degree a nation is dependent, it will lack
“independence” of action.”17
Osvaldo Sunkel and Pedro Paz make a direct connection between under-development and 
development, claiming, for example, that the development of the U.S. came at the 
expense of Latin America's underdevelopment.18
In contrast to dependency theory, the modernization school of thought proposed 
that with an higher level of education and economic investment any state could increase 
its standard of living. The Alliance for Progress was planned around these ideas. The 
designers of the Alliance for Progress hoped to jump-start economic development in 
Latin America by giving regional states access to knowledge and financing. In theory, 
institutions rapidly develop, creating political stability as they evolve. Modernization 
theory implicitly blames underdevelopment on indigenous factors. Dependency refutes 
this assumption by claiming exogenous variables are primarily responsible. 
Modernization calls on Latin American states to assume responsibility for their problems 
since it directs them to change political and economic policy to engender domestic 
changes, dependency calls on the outside world to change in order to upgrade domestic 
problems, or support policies that limit external control in the domestic economy.19 The 
economic policy of dependency theory is likely to promote import substitution, strict 
government control of important economic sectors and strict limits on foreign
I7Bums, Latin America: A Concise Interpretive History, 355-356.
l8Osvaldo Sunkel and Pedro Paz, El Subdesarrollo Latinoamericano y la Teoria 
del Desarrollo (Mexico: privately published 1970), 6.
l9Howard J. Wiarda, “Did the Alliance Lose its Way?,” ?” In, The Alliance fo r  
Progress'. A Retrospective, ed. L. Ronald Scheman (New York: Praeger, 1988), 97.
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investment.20 The implementation of these policies led to widespread nationalization of 
many U.S. industries in the 1970s, and growing Latin American antipathy towards the 
U.S. that prompted Latin American leaders to search for alternatives to U.S. hegemony. 
The ascendancy of dependency theory demonstrates the growing adverse Latin American 
reaction to U.S. hegemony. The theory is similar to hegemonic stability in that both 
assume the important role of a central power in the system. Hegemonic stability focuses 
on the positive aspects of hegemony, dependency theory focuses on the deleterious 
impact of the core state on the system. Hegemonic stability focuses on the benefits of 
U.S. leadership, dependency on its problems. The spread of dependency theory during 
the 1970s highlighted the growing resentment towards U.S. leadership.
SEEKING ALTERNATIVES TO U.S. HEGEMONY
Latin American states began to actively seek non-U.S. regional cooperation and 
other world powers as alternatives to U.S. hegemony. Gavin Boyd and Yale Ferguson 
observe that. “Most of the states in this region have strong economic links with the 
United States, but because there is a general desire to overcome traditional U.S. 
dominance, opportunities for U.S. initiatives to encourage and assist Latin American 
ventures in regional cooperation are limited.”21 During this time period several regional 
organizations were initiated, including the Andean Common Market (ANCOM). Latin
20See. Osvaldo Sunkel, “Big Business and Dependencia: A Latin American
View,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 51. No. 2 (April 1972).
2‘Gavin Boyd and Yale Ferguson, “Latin American Regionalism,” in. 
Regionalism and Global Security, ed. Gavin Boyd (Lexington MA: D.C. Heath and 
Company, 1984), 119.
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American Free Trade Association (LAFTA), and the Latin American Economic System 
(SELA).
LAFTA was established in I960 when participating states signed the Montevideo 
Treaty. The firee-market established by LAFTA came into effect in 1973. Its members 
included Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay. Peru. Uruguay 
and Venezuela. LAFTA's goal to create inter-regional trade had only modest success, 
increasing from seven percent in the pre-ffee market era of I960 to fourteen percent by 
1980.22 The states that most benefited were the larger regional powers, Argentina. Brazil 
and Mexico. However, trade with states outside of Latin America was growing at a much 
higher rate. Due to this disparity leaders began to realize that pursuing regional trade 
agreements accrued small gains in GNP and so they focused their efforts elsewhere.
Smith points out that although LAFTA did not accomplish much in terms of encouraging 
trade between Ladn American states, “it came to represent Latin America's persisting 
desire for regional unification."23
In 1968 the Andean Pact was formed between Bolivia. Chile, Colombia. Ecuador 
and Peru with the goal of accelerating economic development by isolating large power 
influences. The pact limited the amount of foreign investment in member countries, a 
move at least in part aimed at the region's largest investor, the U.S.24 Latin American
~IbicL, 125.
"^Peter H. Smith, Talons o f the Eagle, 206.
24Benjamin Keen and Mark Wasserman, A History o f Latin America (Boston. 
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1988), 403. It is contended that the Andean Pact was also formed 
against other regional powers such as Brazil and Argentina. See, Elizabeth G. Ferris, 
"The Andean Pact and the Amazon Treaty," Journal o f Interamerican Studies and World 
Affairs 23, no. 2 (May 1988): 147-148.
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states watched their once promising economies deteriorate during the mid-1970s, the 
growing asymmetry with the U.S. prompting them to redress the mounting imbalance. 
During the 1976 Santiago meeting of the OAS, Lievano and Facio memorandums were 
circulated that called for preferential trade agreements to stimulate Latin American 
economies.25 Inspired by the Group of 77, an organization that was unified by the theme 
of third world development, Latin American states pushed for a treaty of collective 
economic security directed against the U.S. The treaty would have penalized states that 
were judged to act against the economic welfare of others.26
During the 1970s the Soviets made a determined, but subtle, economic and 
political push in Latin America. This was part of a broader Soviet strategy. Porter 
explains: 'The Union of the Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) had been involved 
militarily in local conflicts before, of course, but the magnitude, scope, and apparent 
success of its efforts in the 1970s were perhaps without precedent."2' Soviet global 
ambitions were muted in the Americas because of U.S. dominance and recent history. 
The Cuban missile crisis forced Soviet regional strategy to alter course. The Soviets 
discovered that aggressive action in the Americas was met by fierce U.S. resistance and 
caused greater problems than the effort was worth. Geographical separation made strong 
Soviet support in Latin America economically difficult. Therefore regional Soviet
■^Stephen H. Rogers, “Trade Relations in the Inter-American System," in The 
Future o f the Inter-American System, ed. Tom J. Farer (New York: Praeger Publishers, 
1979), 59.
26Ibid.
27Bruce D. Porter, The USSR in Third World Conflicts: Soviet Arms and 
Diplomacy in Local Wars 1945-1980 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 1.
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political ambitions were largely funneled through their lone regional ally, Cuba, in order
to make their actions less conspicuous.
Although the Soviet Union policy was self-limited in the political arena, it was
more ambitious in trying to form economic partnerships. Latin American insecurities
about the asymmetric power structure, and their precarious economic situation, led many
regional states to actively and passively pursue economic relations with the Soviet Union.
Some Latin American states viewed a partnership with the USSR as a means to
circumvent the imposing influence of the U.S. in their domestic affairs. Cuba being the
most obvious example. Open relations with the Soviet Union demonstrated their
independence from the U.S., and gave Latin American states a potential alternative to the
U.S. as a trading partner.28 Blaiser states to this point
“They [Latin American leaders] welcome ties with the Soviet Union, first and 
foremost as the right o f  an independent state. Second, such ties give them room 
to maneuver and bargaining leverage in disputes with the U.S. Finally, relations 
with the USSR can bring material benefits.”
Even the states that stayed firmly opposed to the USSR benefited gained from the
presence o f the Soviet Union in the Americas.
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico were the most important states for Soviet
strategists.29 Argentina began diplomatic ties after World War II, and Brazil renewed
relations with the Soviet Union in I960. The USSR made a push in the 1970s to
strengthen their Latin American ties. The USSR had maintained diplomatic relations
with Mexico since the Bolshevik revolution. However, this one example was not the
28BIaiser, The Giant's Rival, 158.
29Ibid., 159.
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norm: ten of nineteen Latin American states began diplomatic relations with the USSR 
during the 1970s.
Argentina began a push to broaden relations with the USSR in the early 1970s by 
offering their grain for export; an agreement that increased Argentine exports to the 
USSR until they comprised nearly ten percent of their national output. It was an 
agreement convenient to both sides: the Soviet Union badly needed grain to reconcile the 
difference in their domestic harvest, the Argentines needed hard currency to reconcile 
their debts and trade imbalance. Both sides had the common strategy of using their 
relationship as leverage against the U.S.: the USSR increased its visibility that worked to 
challenge the U.S.. and Argentina used trade as a tool to increase its national 
sovereignty.30
The Soviet Union had broader ambitions for the incipient relationship with 
Argentina, especially when they lost Chile as a key ally after the overthrow of Allende in 
1973. However, the relationship between the Soviet Union and Argentina never obtained 
a political dimension. President Juan Domingo Peron had similar anti-capitalist 
economic policies that the Soviets identified with but Peron was considered a nationalist, 
rather than a communist. Peron used the domestic Marxist political party as a tool to 
maintain power, but dissolved them once his purposes were served.31 After the military
j0Edward S. Milenky, Argentina’s Foreign Policies (Boulder: Westview Press. 
1978). 156.
3lDonald C. Hodges, Argentina, 1943-1987: The National Revolution and 
Resistance (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1988), 140-141.
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coup led by General Jorge Videla in 1976, it became clear that the relationship would 
only be economic in nature thereafter.32
The Brazilian relationship with the USSR was similar to Argentina’s in that it 
primarily focused on economic issues, but also as a way to balance its dependency on the 
U.S. Because the U.S. had begun to limit arms sales and foreign credit, and ruled against 
nuclear technology transfer in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Brazilian military rulers 
felt the need to broaden their relationship with the Soviet Union. Dependency based 
import substitution policies were beginning to show their limits in generating economic 
growth, in turn making the increase of exports an imperative to Brazilian leaders.33
In 1973 President Echeverrfa of Mexico went on a State visit to the USSR with 
the goal of diversifying the country's financial and economic ties.34 Mexico's trade 
balance with the U.S. was tilted heavily in Washington's favor. The U.S. was also in the 
midst of an isolationist mood due to problems associated with the Vietnam conflict and 
its economic troubles, so talks on the topic were unlikely to yield any progress. Although 
President Jose Lopez Portillo also visited the USSR in 1978. and reported substantial 
progress trade between the two states, actual trade between the two states was erratic at 
best. Venezuela also sought out Soviet trade ties in the early 70s. hoping to find 
alternative markets for its oil in the Eastern bloc/5 Venezuela previously demonstrated
3_NicoIa Miller, Soviet Relations with Latin America, 1959-87 (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989), 156.
33Ibid., 172.
34Ibid., 182.
35A. I. Sizonenko. La URSS y  Latino-America A yerv Hoy, translated by Venancio 
Uribes (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972), 149.
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its will to break free o f U.S. influence when it signed the Declaration o f  Bogota in 1966, 
calling for the exploration o f trade agreements with Eastern Europe. Despite its efforts 
little trade actually materialized.
Actions taken by the U.S. to remove President Salvador Allende o f Chile from 
office served to remind Latin Americans o f U.S. dominance. Allende was elected in 
1970. He immediately began to institute foreign and domestic policies unfriendly 
towards the U.S., including the expropriation o f  U.S. privately owned industries and a 
pro-Cuban foreign policy.
The U.S. did not militarily intervene in Chile, but nonetheless was deeply 
involved in events that led to the overthrow o f Allende. The U.S. tried to avert the 
election o f Salvadore Allende in 1970 through subsidizing his opposition and the use o f 
propaganda.36 The U.S. also acted against Allende, once elected, by limiting credit from 
financial institutions, terminating new Export-Import Bank guarantees, and using its 
influence to limit credits from international financial institutions/7 The U.S. also 
financed strikes that preceded the Chilean coup.38
The actions taken by the U.S. to oust Allende added to the problems o f  regional 
security relations. The incident reminded Latin Americans that there were no shields 
against the pressure the U.S. might exert to serve its policy goals. Even when 
democratically elected, their political systems were not immune from U.S. dominance.
36Paul E. Sigmund, The United States and Democracy in Chile (Baltimore: John 
Hopkins University Press, 1993), 54.
37Ibid., 57.
38 Atkins, 234.
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Whether Chileans supported Allende or not, Chilean citizens learned that the U.S. had the 
ability to control their domestic political and economic outcomes, and Chilean citizens 
were unable to influence the policies of the U.S. The indirect influence of U.S. 
hegemony by the means of socialization, such as through culture, raised an awareness of 
U.S. dominance. This form of hegemonic influence was usually considered benign. 
However, the hegemon's diffusion of power through more direct actions, manipulating 
material incentives leading to an impact on Latin American economies and politics, led to 
a direct awareness of the control of the U.S., and therefore more resistance to the 
hegemon.
Attempts by Latin American leaders to find alternatives to U.S. hegemony 
demonstrated their unease with the status quo. Their efforts to initiate regional trade 
blocs and sponsor Soviet relations were an expression of dissatisfaction with U.S. 
policies.
REGIONAL RELATIONS UNDER MODERATED WILSONIANISM
President Jimmy Carter was elected because voters were disillusioned with the 
status quo. Carter took the opportunity to reformulate U.S. foreign policy. Carter's 
foreign policies were motivated by the effort to steer the opposite direction of realpolitik 
that characterized the Nixon years.39 The Carter Administration seemed determined to 
soothe the U.S. public's concerns about dependence by building a foreign policy that 
embraced interdependence. As Jerel A. Rosati observed. “Carter administration officials
39Critics pointed out that Carter was seemingly unable to think in large strategic 
terms, that directly led to many of his foreign policy failings. See, Robert W. Tucker, 
“Reagan Without Tears,” The New Republic 182 (May 17, 1980): 23.
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believed that new issues and actors had to be addressed in a world o f greater 
interdependence and decentralization.”40 Carter believed the traditional conduct o f U.S. 
foreign policy was responsible for creating enemies where cooperation had been possible, 
particularly in the case o f Latin America. The administration believed that policy 
devoted to self-interest, like Kissinger’s practice o f realpolitik, became a detriment as 
other states might become suspicious o f all U.S. actions. Carter and his advisors listened 
to Latin American complaints o f  what they viewed as the U.S. preoccupation with the 
perceived Soviet threat, and tried to craft a policy that was more tolerant o f indigenous 
political movements. The Carter Administration thought the U.S. needed to accentuate 
the positive by pursuing a multilateral approach, believing that other states would 
reciprocate the positive gestures. Therefore Carter purposely cultivated an image that 
Gaddis Smith describes “As the prophet assailing American wickedness.”41
Many o f Carter’s critics, foreign allies and enemies, viewed his concessions as 
signs o f  diminishing U.S. power, rather than as an honest effort to improve regional 
relations. To some, the Russian invasion o f Afghanistan, the intransigence in finalizing 
SALT II. the temerity o f  Middle East states in their policies with the U.S., were all 
indicators that global actors perceived and formulated policy based on declining U.S.
4°Rosati came to his conclusion after exhaustive research that indicated the Carter 
Administration’s primary foreign policy issues by polling the number o f tunes that an 
issue was discussed by key administration officials. Jerel A. Rosati, “The Impact o f 
Beliefs on Behavior The Foreign Policy o f the Carter Administration,” in Foreign Policy 
Decision Making, eds. Donald A. Sylvan and Steve Chan (New York: Praeger. 1984).. 
166.
41 Gaddis Smith, Morality, Reason, and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter 
Years (New York: Hill and Wang, 1986), 242.
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power.42 U.S. fortunes in Latin America were no different. Despite Carter’s efforts to 
demonstrate U.S. good will by showing more tolerance for Latin American revolutions, 
such as in Cuba and Nicaragua, and the regular denouncement o f past interventionist 
policy, Latin America responded with indifference.
Carter Administration policies that had ramifications on hemispheric security 
relations included his initiatives toward Cuba and Nicaragua, arms control, and the 
human rights. During the 1976 presidential campaign, Carter made an issue o f  the large 
arms exporting industry o f the U.S. One o f his first orders o f business was to issue 
Presidential Directive 13 that introduced six new categories o f  controls on arms sales and 
declared arms sales as an 'exceptional’ tool for foreign policy.43 The sudden reduction 
o f arms exports had for-reaching ramifications for inter-regional security relations, 
further weakening inter-American security relations and the growth o f Latin American 
arms industries.
The Carter Administration chose to link U.S. aid with a state’s human rights 
record in order to bring greater morality and consistency to U.S. foreign policy. The 
State Department was told to assign personnel to monitor human rights in every other 
nation, including traditional democratic allies such as Canada, Great Britain, Japan and 
West Germany so as not to show discrimination. These critiques were issued to states 
receiving U.S. aid, having an immediate impact on U.S.-Latin American relations. Each
42For a more in-depth analysis on this point see Robert W. Tucker, “American in 
Decline: The Foreign Policy o f Maturity”, Foreign Affairs 58, no. 3 (May/June 1980):
451-484. Smith also discusses the perception that the U.S. lost the SALT H negotiations 
in Morality, Reason and Power.
43Thomas E. Skidmore, Reversing Course: Carter’s Foreign Policy, Domestic 
Politics, and the Failure o f Reform (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1996), 132.
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nation offered aid with the human rights report rejected the offer, citing the U.S. was 
interfering with their internal affairs.44 The move alienated Brazil, a regional ally of the 
U.S. Brasilia made its displeasure with Washington known when it abrogated its mutual 
defense treaty with Washington in 1975 that existed since the end of World War II.
Latin American antagonism towards U.S. human rights and arms control policies 
grew, as the lack of progress on security issues important to Latin Americans stalemated. 
Indigenous arms industries began to flourish and Latin American states found alternative 
arms suppliers 45 South and Central American leaders thought that Carter’s foreign 
policy measures were an unconcealed attempt by Washington to gain even further control 
of their internal politics. For example. ’"President Carter, by making Argentina a prime 
target of his human rights campaign, had minimized his leverage over the highly 
nationalistic Argentine generals, who bitterly resented what they regarded as outbursts of 
American hypocrisy.”46
U.S. actions further weakened their decaying regional influence in security 
affairs. The U.S. allowed its growing isolation from Latin America to be replaced with 
interests that did not always share Washington’s political and economic agenda.47 For
^Donald S. Spencer. The Carter Implosion: Jimmy Carter and the Amateur Style 
o f Diplomacy (New York: Praeger, 1988), 58.
45SpecificalIy by France. Israel, Great Britain and the Soviet Union, and other 
European states.
46Miller, 162.
4'ChiId predicted this outcome, stating: “...local drives to become self-sufficient 
in arms, show a strong potential for further weakening the IAMS (Inter American 
Military System) and replacing the old system with a new one which might exclude, or 
even be antagonistic to, the United States.” Child, Unequal Alliance: The Inter-American 
Military System, 7955-1978, 189.
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example, the military regimes in Brazil and Peru both adopted policies that marginalized 
U.S. influence in their national affairs, meaning that the U.S. was less able to encourage 
political and economic reforms. In both instances there were opportunities to influence 
their internal policies as they adjusted to meet the economic problems affecting the lower 
and middle classes.48 U.S. human rights and arms control policies fed the nationalistic 
tendencies of these regimes and reduced the effectiveness of U.S. policies designed to 
reintroduce democracy.49 U.S. arms embargoes led to the creation of Latin American 
arms industries. As the political tides in the U.S. turned against the funding of Latin 
American militaries, indigenous industries began to flourish. These industries became 
important centers of nationalism, allowing regional states to express their independence 
vis-a-vis the U.S.
President Carter improved regional relations with Latin America by negotiating 
an agreement with Panamanian officials that gradually transferred the canal to Panama by 
1999.50 Before assuming office he had been warned by other Latin American leaders that 
if he did not mediate the Panama Canal issue to a successful closure, the tarnished 
reputation of the U.S. would become worse. Heeding the advice of regional leaders, his
48John Child. “The Inter-American Military System,” in The Future o f the Inter- 
American System, ed. Tom Farer (New York: Praeger, 1979), 170-171.
49For example, Brazil made an agreement to obtain nuclear technology from West 
Germany. The U.S. criticized Brasilia and insisted that the agreement be modified with a 
promise of enriched uranium. Brazil rejected the offer confirming a long-held Brazilian 
suspicion that the U.S. was striving to keep underdeveloped states technologically 
dependent. See, Roger W. Fontaine, “Brazil: The End of Beautiful Relationship,” in 
Foreign Policy on Latin America 1970-1980, eds. Staff of Foreign Policy Journal 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1983), 104-105.
^ e t e r  H. Smith. Talons o f the Eagle, 271.
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own advisors, and acting on his personal views, he was able to push a settlement through 
Congress by a narrow margin.51 Despite his good faith efforts. Carter did not witness 
significant improvement in regional security relations.
The multilateral front was equally unsuccessful during the 1970s. The Rio Treaty 
and Bogota Pact were proving to be ineffective tools to manage security exigencies in the 
region. As one author observed, “The Pact of Rio de Janeiro was drawn up in 1947 when 
inter-American relations were at the highest level in history.”32 These institutions were 
becoming increasingly dysfunctional as inter-American relations deteriorated. Their 
ability to address the changes in regional security dynamics made them mostly 
ineffective. Latin American suspicions about U.S. interventionist activity remained high, 
emphasized by the role the U.S. played in supporting General Pinochet's ouster of 
President Allende in Chile, and U.S. policies towards Nicaragua. President Carter had a 
strong conviction that the U.S. pursued shortsighted policies in the region, leading to its 
unpopular standing in the hemisphere. This conviction led him to be patient with events 
in Nicaragua, first attempting to convert President Anastasio Somoza into an overnight 
democrat. When this initiative failed Secretary of State Cyrus Vance submitted a 
proposal to the OAS that formed an interim government acceptable to all parties, a cease­
fire. an OAS peacekeeping force and a major international relief and reconstruction
5lHad President Carter lost votes in the Senate the treaties would have lost, the 
final vote being 68-32 for both. Gaddis Smith. Morality, Reason and Power, 114.
52William Manger, “Reform of the OAS: the 1967 Buenos Aires Protocol of 
Amendment to the 1948 Charter of Bogata,” Journal o f Inter-American Studies 10, no. I 
(January 1968): 5.
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effort. Not a single Central or South American state supported the plan.33 Worse, 
President Portillo of Mexico actively lobbied other Latin American leaders to reject the 
peace plan, and “although other Latin Americans pursued a similar objective, Mexico 
efforts at the OAS were interpreted as particularly hostile and anti-American by U.S. 
officials.”34 The experience demonstrated to the Carter Administration that the 
multilateral approach to hemispheric problems was not beneficial in some security issues, 
a lesson the Reagan Administration would utilize. Despite the best effort of the U.S. to 
act in good faith in the Nicaraguan case, the negative impact of power asymmetry on 
regional security relations was too great to overcome.
CONCLUSION
Power indicators reveal the gap in relative power levels between the U.S. and 
Latin America remained firmly intact during the 1970s. Despite the continuation of U.S. 
dominance. Latin American GNP grew at a faster rate than the U.S., and its 
interdependence with the U.S. was partly diverted by a concerted effort to increase inter­
regional trade. A curtailment of arms sales by the Carter Administration in the later part 
of the decade further reduced Latin American dependency on the U.S.. making Brazil and 
Argentina seek out European partners to bridge the gap.
An analysis of the power indicators shows the potential for a reduction in power 
asymmetry, however the influence of economic crisis in the U.S. and Latin America
53Gaddis Smith. Morality, Reason, and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter 
Years, p. 159.
54Robert Pastor and Jorge G. Castaneda, Limits to Friendship: The U.S. and 
Mexico (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1988), 160.
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makes such it difficult to draw such a conclusion. Several events, such as the two 
economic crises, and the loss of the Vietnam War, decreased U.S. power during the 
decade. Scholars and policy-makers of the era believed that the U.S. had to reduce its 
foreign commitment due to shrinking influence. These events are similar to conditions 
after the Depression that led to Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy. However, Latin 
America also experienced severe economic crisis, resulting in the accumulation of 
extreme debts. Latin America suffered equally from the oil crisis of 1973 and from after­
shock of the U.S. economic downturn. These conditions caused hyperinflation 
throughout South and Central America. During the Depression Latin America had 
comparatively less manufacturing capacity, and was less affected by the economic crisis. 
However, by the late 1970s many Latin American states had become more dependent on 
industry, and therefore were more affected by the economic crisis than forty years before. 
Despite a reduction of U.S. activity in the region, especially during the last half of the 
decade, it seemed that extreme power asymmetry continued.
The continuation of extreme power asymmetry in the U.S .-Latin American 
hegemonic system continued to erode the regional stability. The 1970s began with the 
Vina del Mar Consensus that demanded more public goods from U.S. hegemony, 
alienating the Nixon Administration, and setting the tone for the rest of the decade. The 
U.S. began to disregard multilateral tools to solve regional security problems sensing the 
uncooperative atmosphere of the period. Its problems in the region were approached in a 
bilateral manner. The unilateral behavior of the U.S. hardened the Latin American 
position against the overwhelming regional power of the U.S., resulting in their active 
search for alternatives to U.S. hegemony. The Carter Administration attempted to
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remedy the U.S. position by relying on the OAS to bring a peaceful transition of power to 
Nicaragua, but was rebuffed by Latin American states.
Carter's policies towards the region in the last half of the 1970s provided 
excellent litmus to test the negative impact of power asymmetry on regional security 
cooperation. Carter sought to demonstrate that he represented a break from business as 
usual. His strategic motivation was that once Latin American leaders understood that the 
U.S. was not a threat, regional security tensions would dissipate. Despite a concerted 
effort by U.S. policy-makers to correct the ‘sins of the past’. Latin American leaders 
remained doubtful about all policy that emanated from Washington. Carter 
misinterpreted Latin American complaints about what they claimed was a pattern of U.S. 
actions to subjugate them. The Carter Administration thought using U.S. power for 
beneficial regional interests, and not purely U.S. self-interest might improve relations. 
Latin American states, highly sensitized to U.S. dominance, interpreted almost any 
expression of U.S. power as detrimental to their interests. Initiatives by the U.S. were 
viewed as coercive rather than cooperative, and therefore security cooperation reached 
new lows despite the progressive efforts of Washington in the last half of the decade.
Carter misunderstood the basic underlying problem in the Americas. He thought 
it was a general U.S. malaise towards the region, reflected in the foreign policy priorities 
of the U.S.. which created security problems. The true culprit behind the anemic security 
relationship was the continuation of the large power differential between the U.S. and 
Latin American. Latin American leaders were less willing to accept U.S. hegemony as it 
had been in the past. Latin America perceived it was receiving less of the public goods 
offered by the U.S. than was sufficient. The U.S. offered security from revolution as a
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public good and some economic support. By contrast Latin American governments 
continually sought more support for economic and social development, but its requests 
were largely unanswered. Latin America’s willingness to work under power asymmetry 
was quickly deteriorating.
Under Carter, U.S. regional policy was not as one-dimensional as in the past, 
containing overtones of Franklin Roosevelt's Good Neighbor policy. It is no coincidence 
that the Good Neighbor policy was instituted during a period of economic weakness, just 
as Carter’s policy was initiated under a perceived power decline as well. Since 
Roosevelt’s policies engendered better relations, the Carter Administration was hoping 
for the same reaction. Under deteriorating Latin American economic conditions, creating 
the Latin American perception of growing asymmetry despite economic problems that 
affected the U.S. as well, these initiatives accrued very little goodwill in the region.
The popularity of dependency theory reached its apex during the 1970s. The anti- 
U.S. thrust of dependency theory, reflected in the economic policies of most Latin 
American states of the period, was an indicator of negative Latin American perceptions 
of U.S. hegemony. The core-periphery relationship described by most forms of 
dependency theory runs counter to hegemonic stability theory. It described the 
relationship as detrimental to the peripheral states that were subservient to the core state, 
with little hope of increasing their standard of living. By contrast, hegemonic stability 
views the relationship as beneficial to both sides. The growth of the dependency 
paradigm in Latin America was perhaps a manifestation of the detrimental impact of 
extreme power asymmetry.
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Latin American states began to actively search for ways to alleviate U.S. 
hegemony during the 1970s. The two primary alternatives were regional organizations 
and the bipolar rival of the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Many analysts viewed the Soviet 
Union as the primary culprit in the deterioration of U.S.-Latin American security 
cooperation during the 1970s. The reality was that problems in U.S.-Latin American 
relations led to the deterioration in security cooperation, the Soviet Union was simply a 
convenient alternative for Latin American states. Latin American states became 
increasingly less cooperative towards the U.S. as it became apparent that after thirty years 
since World War II. there would be no Marshall Plan for the region. Faced with 
accumulating economic and social problems at home, Latin American states believed the 
U.S. all but turned their backs to the true needs of the region. Latin American leaders 
believed the U.S. was obsessed by their concerns over revolutionary activity, so much 
that many thought it to be a ruse to justify further interventions and increase U.S. 
dominance.
The early 1970s witnessed strong growth in Argentina. Brazil, and Mexico, 
bolstering national confidence in each country. However, deteriorating economic 
conditions associated with the oil crisis negatively impacted the national confidence of 
most Latin American states. Latin American debt began to accrue, as they could not 
finance their domestic fiscal commitments of the early 1970s. Feelings of insecurity 
were bolstered by Carter's foreign policies towards the region despite the 
administration's efforts to take regional concerns into account in case of the Panama 
Canal and Nicaraguan revolution. The Carter Administration's focus on grading the
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human rights and democratic levels of regional states was viewed as another tool of U.S. 
domination.
The 1970s mark a low point in regional security relations and the 1980s would not 
be significantly better. Chapter six reviews the nature of U.S. hegemony during the 
1980s as well as any attempts at regional security cooperation. The Reagan 
Administration controlled U.S. foreign policy from 1981-1989 and maintained a 
unilateral approach to security matter except when left with few other options. Whereas 
the Carter Administration seemed to mimic Wilson's democratic activism. President 
Ronald Reagan mimicked another element of the Wilson legacy, the concern over U.S. 
interventionism.
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CHAPTER VI
THE MARGINALIZATION OF SECURITY COOPERATION (1980-1989)
U.S. hegemony remained steady throughout the 1980s, as did the power 
asymmetry gap. Power asymmetry meant the U.S. would continue to give low priority to 
Latin America, also guaranteeing a minimum of regional security cooperation. The lack 
of regional security cooperation manifested itself in several major events including the 
Falklands/Malvinas conflict; U.S. interventions in Grenada, and Panama; Latin American 
aversion to the anti-Cuban policies of the U.S.; Latin American reaction to U.S. Central 
American policy; the U.S. policy of supporting democratic reform and principles; 
continued Latin American arms exports and arms proliferation; and Latin American 
anger over U.S. technology transfer policy. Each of these topics was contentious in U.S.- 
Latin American relations, and therefore provided a basis for an analysis on the broader 
implications of regional power asymmetry on inter-American relations.
The return of interventionist U.S. policies in the 1980s did not go unnoticed by 
Latin American states. The role of the U.S. in the Malvinas Islands crisis; renewal of 
anti-Cuban policies; and interventionist actions in Grenada. Panama and Nicaragua all 
drew strong criticism from Latin American states. Latin American states demonstrated 
solidarity with Argentina by supporting Buenos Aires in the Malvinas Island conflict.
The opposition between the U.S. and the rest of the region signified a diminished ability 
to execute security cooperation. U.S. direct intervention in Grenada, and covert 
intervention against Nicaragua, was strongly opposed by regional states. The U.S. and 
Latin America continued to disagree over the issue of Soviet ambitions in the region.
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Latin American leaders attempted to circumvent the subject as a means to derail what it 
viewed as U.S. preoccupation with the topic. During the Carter years, the U.S. signaled 
to Cuba that it sought a more constructive relationship with Havana. Reagan ceased 
these efforts and revived a hard-line posture. Cuba, symbolic of competing regional 
security agendas between the U.S. and Latin America, once again, ignited divisions 
between the two sides.
Other areas besides U.S. interventions and Cuba policy continued to irritate 
regional security relations. The Argentine and Brazilian arms-exporting industries, 
weapons proliferation, and technology transfer are interrelated issues separating Latin 
America from the U.S. during the 1980s. Although both Argentina and Brazil were 
experiencing hyperinflation during the 1980s they invested huge sums of money in their 
domestic arms industries. Policy-makers in the U.S. did not understand Latin American 
reticence in curbing their exports to Third World countries, primarily in the Middle East. 
In mm, many Latin American leaders did not comprehend why the U.S. was so 
concerned, and explained U.S. behavior by believing that it was part of a continuing 
effort to dominate Latin America.
During the 1980s the Reagan Administration continued the practice of using 
democracy and human rights as focal points for its relations with Latin American 
countries, policies originating with the Carter Administration, albeit in a more subdued 
manner. Despite general agreement in Latin American states that democracy and 
observance of human rights were desirable, and indeed there were strong movements in 
the 1980s away from authoritarianism, both South and Central American states were 
angered by Washington's efforts to shape Latin American political reform. Regional
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tension increased over the emergence of the drug trade as a theme in regional security, 
which increased U.S. diplomatic and military activity in the coca growing and exporting 
states. There was very little improvement in inter-American relations during the 1980s 
compared to the previous decade.
REGIONAL HEGEMONY
A direct GNP comparison in Table 9 shows that the U.S. maintained its 
dominating economic performance over the primary states of Latin America, including 
Brazil and Mexico. During the 1980s Latin America dependency on the U.S. became 
more pronounced in terms of imports and exports as demonstrated in Table 10. Four key 
states in the region. Argentina. Brazil. Mexico and Venezuela, all increased their exports 
to the U.S.. and imports from the U.S. Brazil and Venezuela generally imported less than 
they exported to the U.S.. while Argentina and Mexico mostly imported more from the 
U.S. than they exported. Judged in a vacuum. Table 6.2 does not demonstrate Latin 
American dependency as increased exports and imports to the U.S. conversely meant that 
the U.S. was able to maintain some degree of influence over their trade. This trend seems 
to denote growing mutual interdependence. However, when taken into consideration 
with Table 9. a case can be made for the lack of reciprocity in growing U.S.-Latin 
American trade. The U.S. total GNP is much larger than all of Latin America combined, 
therefore significant increases in Latin American trade to the U.S. does not translate into 
a similar dependency on the part of the U.S.. since their overall GNP is much higher than 
Latin American states. In other words, $50 million worth of goods reciprocally
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Table 9. Regional Dominance in Terms of GNP, 1980-1989
□  Brazil
■  Latin America
□  Mexico 
BU .S.________
Source: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditure and 
Arms Transfers 1980-1989 (Washington. D .C .: Government Printing Office. 1990). 49. 
55, 73, 85. The Y-axis is in Smillions, in constant 1989 dollars.
traded between the U.S. and Latin America does not carry the same influence in both 
economic sectors. It is less significant to the U.S.. but might be very significant to a 
particular Latin American state. The continuation of GNP growth in Latin America 
during the 1980s without Latin American gains vis-a-vis the U.S.. could eventually lead 
to a decrease in regional security cooperation, as the asymmetry gap might be perceived 
as widening. Table 11 shows that U.S. military dominance remained intact during the 
1980s. The year of greatest U.S. defense expenditure was 1989. with a $304 billion total. 
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Table 10. Import/Exports To U.S. (As a Percentage of Total World Trade)
1980 1985 1987 1989
Argentina Export 8.9 12.2 14.6 12.4
Import 22.6 18.2 16.5 21.2
Brazil Export 17.4 27.1 27.9 24.6
Import 18.6 19.7 20.7 20.9
Mexico Export 63.2 60.4 60.4 70
Import 65.6 66.6 66.6 70.4
Venezuela Export 27.8 46.0 573 51.6
Import 48.2 47.5 44.6 44.6
Source: James W. Wilkie. Eduardo Aleman and Jose Guadalupe Ortega. Statistical 
Abstract o f Latin America. Vol. 34 (Los Angeles: UCLA Latin American Center 
Publications, 1998), 691.
Table 11. Annual Military Expenditure. 1980-1989
Argentina Brazil Mexico U.S. Venezuela
1980 1359 1,899 456 144.000 317
1981 1.647 1,955 671 169.900 310
1982 2.793 2.666 686 196.400 480
1983 2.112 2331 714 268,000 617
1984 2.347 2,561 970 237.100 580
1985 1,847 2,793 1.049 265.800 358
1986 2.075 3.579 967 280.900 490
1987 2.017 4.185 937 288.200 1307
1988 1,989 5,731 962 293.100 647
1989 1.858 NA 875 304.100 407
Source: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. World Military Expenditures and 
Arms Transfers 1980-1989. 87. 95. 100. 101. Numbers are millions of U.S. dollars, in 
current 1989 dollars.
just two percent of the U.S. total. The cumulative totals of the four South American 
states in 1988 equals $93 billion, which is still only three percent of U.S. expenditure.
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U.S. NATIONAL RENEWAL AND LATIN AMERICAN RESPONSE
The 1980s was a decade of U.S. economic renewal. Conversely. Latin American 
economies remained unstable, prone to hyperinflation that contributed to a greater debt 
burden. The combination of the opposing trends did not bode well for the probability of 
regional security cooperation. In the 1970s. the U.S. public elected two presidents that 
introduced foreign policies designed to manage U.S. decline. The 1980 election of 
President Reagan signaled a shift in the national outlook. The era of deterrence during the 
1970s gave way to a new era of activism in the 1980s. Whereas deterrence was 
pragmatic, it also seemed to implicitly acknowledge the limits U.S. power. The 
formation and institution of the Reagan doctrine reflected growing U.S. confidence. In 
turn, this confidence signaled a return to more traditional U.S. regional policies but did 
not seek to reinvigorate the moribund multilateral security organizations that might have 
increased security cooperation.
With a return to more active involvement in regional politics, the U.S. also 
became less tolerant of any Soviet economic or political initiative in the region. Latin 
America always maintained that what the U.S. viewed as Soviet activity in reality had 
domestic origins. The difference in opinion, and resulting U.S. policy, would have a 
strong impact on regional security relations during the 1980s. Soviet regional 
involvement reached its zenith during the 1980s and was the focus of U.S. consternation 
in regional security issues. The USSR had diplomatic representation in three Latin 
American states in 1960. maintained trade with four states, and had no serious political or 
military involvement- By the late 1980s Soviet activity had dramatically increased. The 
USSR had representation with eighteen Latin American states; traded with twenty; hosted
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thousands of Latin American students: furnished military equipment to Cuba, Nicaragua, 
and Peru; and had close political relations to Cuba, Grenada and Nicaragua.1 At the same 
time U.S. financial and military assistance to the region was dramatically reduced in most 
cases, due to U.S. concerns about instigating another Vietnam-type conflict, and due to 
controversy over U.S. support of regional military regimes. Receding U.S. power and 
encroaching Soviet influence during the late 1970s reawakened traditional U.S. policies 
that the Carter Administration had shunned, and became entrenched in the Reagan 
Doctrine.
The Reagan Doctrine had a significant influence on U.S.-Latin American relations 
during the 1980s. The Reagan Doctrine was never officially stated, as in the case of the 
Nixon Doctrine. It emerged from the Reagan Administration's policies towards Soviet 
expansionism through proxies in the developing world. Charles Krauthammer succinctly 
defined the Reagan Doctrine as a demonstration of unabashed support for perceived 
anticommunist uprisings and “...is intended to establish a new foundation for such 
support by declaring equally worthy all armed resistance to communism, whether foreign 
or indigenously imposed.”2
The Doctrine had its roots in Reagan's strong anticommunist beliefs and Jeanne 
Kirkpatrick's expositions on authoritarianism. Kirkpatrick did not label all authoritarian 
dictatorships as antithetical to democracy. It was her perception that dictatorships, such 
as Cuba under Castro, were incapable of evolving into a democracy because of their
‘Lowenthal, Partners in Conflict: The United States and Latin American America 
in the 1990s. 37.
2Charles Krauthammer, "The Reagan Doctrine.” Time, 1 April 1985,54.
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Marxist orientation. By contrast, other dictatorships had the potential to become 
democratic states.3 Therefore, the U.S. actively supported insurgencies that it perceived 
as anticommunist throughout the world, including. Afghanistan. Angola and Nicaragua.
Since the Cuban revolution, the island nation became a symbol of anti-American 
sentiment throughout Latin America. Leaders of the U.S. viewed Cuba as a surrogate of 
the Soviet Union that had to be held in-check due to the perception that Soviet gains 
might result. The rest of Latin America was averse to any U.S. efforts to destabilize the 
Cuban government. Cuba had become a symbol of the growing Latin American 
sentiment wishing to be independent of U.S. hegemony. As President Portillo of Mexico 
once stated. “We will in no way allow anything to be done to Cuba because we would 
feel that it is being done to ourselves.”4 Although there was a perception by some Latin 
American governments that Cuba activity supported revolution in Central and South 
America, regional states felt more threatened by the U.S. encroachment on Cuba's 
sovereignty. The U.S. viewed its efforts to isolate Cuba as part of a global strategy to 
contain communism: Latin American leaders understood U.S. actions as regional strategy 
to dominate them. Latin American suspicions of U.S. Cuban policy were exacerbated by 
domestic economic instability during the last half of the 1970s and the 1980s, in contrast 
to the recovery of the U.S. during the 1980s.
The foreign policy of the U.S.. in order to actively engage what it perceived as 
communist activity, brought the Cuban issue to the forefront of regional politics in the
'Thomas Carothers, In the Name o f Democracy: U.S. Policy Toward Latin 
America in the Reagan Years. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 77.
4Pastor and Castaneda, 161.
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1980s. The confrontation policy was a reversal of the Carter Administration that sought 
to downplay the differences of opinion between the U.S. and Latin American leaders over 
Cuba. Many regional states strongly believed the U.S. regularly over-reacted against 
Cuba. The more candid of these opinions expressed the idea that the U.S. engaged in a 
policy geared toward regional domination. Some critics of U.S. policy during the 1980s 
believed Washington purposely provoked Latin American revolutions to seek alliance 
with the USSR to provide a pretext for U.S. intervention. Critics noted that U.S. policies 
actually encouraged Latin American communist revolution, as Walter Lafeber claimed 
that “Nicaragua, faced such intensified CIA and U.S. military pressure that it moved 
closer to Cuba and the Soviet bloc—exactly the kind of dependency the Reagan policies 
supposedly sought to prevent."3
The OAS played almost no role in the Nicaraguan conflict after its initial rejection 
of the attempt of the U.S. to broker a peaceful transition of power. The Reagan 
Administration clearly ignored the OAS. as “Haig addressed the problem of Nicaraguan 
subversion unilaterally and in and East-West framework rather than regionally and as a 
violation of the Rio Pact."6 Latin American states seemed to abandon the OAS as well. 
Brazil and Mexico issued a joint communique' in 1983 opposing U.S. intervention in 
Central America and SELA unanimously approved a resolution condemning the U.S. 
economic boycott of Nicaragua in 1985.' After difficult negotiations, known as
5LaFeber. 303.
R obert A. Pastor, Condemned to Repetition: The United Stares and Nicaragua 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 232.
'Munoz, “The Inter-American System,” 32.
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Contadora, an agreement was reached in 1987 that introduced a timetable for democratic 
elections. Although Contadora was eventually successful, it was not accomplished 
through the region's primary multilateral agency, the OAS.
The U.S. invasion of Grenada in October 1983 was roundly criticized throughout 
Latin America. An editorial in Folha de Sao Paulo, a nationally distributed paper in 
Brazil, stated: “In sum. Reagan ordered the invasion because he considered unacceptable 
(sic) the constructions of an economic system which disregards the essence of U.S. 
politics...including economics and the '[U.S.] way of life’”.8 Another Brazilian 
newspaper was equally critical of U.S. unilateral policy: “The intervention in Grenada is 
part of a long history, which has its shameful pages, such as the Bay of Pigs.”9 It 
continued by rejecting the assertion that it was a Cold War maneuver, pointing out that 
Reagan’s staunchest ally, Margaret Thatcher, did not approve of the action either. The 
Canadian and Mexican foreign secretaries emphasized their displeasure with U.S. 
unilateral behavior by issuing their denunciation jointly.10 Another editorial bitterly 
denounced the invasion as breaking the international law of non-intervention, which is 
frequently done by great powers against “ ...weak and poor nations and governments that
sGaleno de Freita. “Limited Sovereignty.” (text). Sao Paulo. Folha de Sao Paulo 
in Portuguese (27 October 1983). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information 
Service. FBIS-Daily Report-Latin America, I November 1983 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-LAT- 
1983-V; p. D-l).
9“Invading Lilliput” (text). Rio de Janeiro Journal do Brasil in Portuguese (27 
October 1983). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily 
Report-Latin America, 01 November 1983 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-LAT- 1983-VI; p. D-2).
l0“Sepulveda. MacEachen Criticize U.S. Invasion” (text). Mexico City NOTIMEX 
in Spanish (03 November 1983). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information 
Service. FBIS Daily Report-Latin America, 04 November 1983 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-LAT- 
1983-V; p. M -l). ’
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are docile.” It also rejected the argument that the U.S. was pursuing an overly aggressive 
anti-communist policy, “Deep down, the arguments are intended to maintain zones of 
influence since the force to do so is available.”11
The strong condemnation by Central and South American states demonstrated 
how U.S. unilateral actions further provoked Latin American concerns about U.S. 
dominance. Criticisms by Latin American leaders of the U.S. intervention did not seem 
to take into account that the U.S. had the approval of the Organization of Eastern 
Caribbean States (OECS).12 Also, their strong condemnation of the U.S. seemed to 
discount the growing violence in Grenada leading up to the invasion. Under the guidance 
of General Hudson Austin soldiers from the People's Revolutionary Army shot into 
unarmed crowds of protesters resulting in many civilian casualties. Shortly after this 
event Austin ordered the execution of Grenada's leader. Maurice Bishop, three cabinet 
members, and two union leaders that had been arrested.13 Latin American concerns were 
driven by a broader issue: If they allow any military intervention by the U.S. to occur 
without objection, justified or not, they perceived that they risked the U.S. doing the same
" “Grenada and the Nonintervention Principle” (text). La Paz PRESENCIA in 
Spanish (27 October 1983). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. 
FBIS Daily Report-Latin America. 01 November. 1983 (PrEx 7.10 FBIS-LAT-83-VI: p. 
C-l).
1‘Thorndike states that five of the seven OECS members (Antigua and Barbuda. 
Dominca. St. Kitts-Nevis. St. Lucia, and St. Vincent) involked Article 8 of the OECS 
Treaty. This Article allowed members to take collective security measures against 
external aggression. Tony Thorndike, “Grenada,” in Intervention in the 1980s: (J.S. 
Foreign Policy in the Third World, ed. Peter J. Schraeder (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 1989), 259.
13WiIliam C. Gilmore, The Grenada Intervention: Analysis and Documentation 
(New York: Facts on File Publishers, 1985), 32.
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to them. Tony Thorndike came to a similar conclusion: “The invasion confirmed the 
deeply held suspicions of Central and South American countries that the United States 
remained interventionist, thereby increasing long-term anti-U.S. feelings and further 
damaging an already suffering image.”14 The regional power asymmetry problem 
contributed to the strong Latin American condemnation. Latin American over reaction 
and U.S. unilateralism combined to further divide U.S.-Latin American security relations.
Some regional observers interpreted the Grenada intervention as a precursor to a 
U.S. invasion in Nicaragua.1' A likely analysis by an observer of U.S. politics would 
conclude that the U.S. direct involvement in Nicaragua was very improbable, since the 
U.S. public was still leery of committing itself to such large-scale incursions after the 
Vietnam experience. However. U.S. funding of anti-Sandinista elements, and covert 
activities in Nicaragua, increased Latin American concerns that the U.S. was poised to 
directly intervene yet again in Nicaragua. In order to avoid direct U.S. intervention, 
many Latin American states vociferously supported negotiations between the Contras and 
Sandinistas. Latin American consensus emerged on the issue when the foreign ministers 
of the Contadora Group (Colombia. Mexico, Panama and Venezuela) met with 
Argentina. Brazil. Peru and Uruguay to expedite the Contadora negotiation process.
Their joint proposal was aimed at establishing an immediate cease-fire and therefore 
ending U.S. support for irregular military forces. The goal was to provide a Latin
I4Ibid., 62.
I5For example, see “Paper Says Grenada Prelude to Nicaragua Invasion” (text). 
Mexico City UNOMASUNO in Spanish (31 October 1983). Translated by the Foreign 
Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-Latin America, 04 November 1983 
(PrEx 7.10: FBIS-LAT-83-VI; p. M-I).
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American solution that would reaffirm the principle of nonintervention, a message aimed 
directly at the U.S.16
During the closing month of the 1980s the U.S. intervened in Panama, drawing 
criticism from most states of the region. The U.S. stated that its purpose was to 
overthrow the leader of Panama, Manuel Noriega, and ostensibly to restore democracy in 
the country. Latin American reaction to the intervention was no different than their 
negative reactions to other U.S. interventions in the region. The President of Brazil. Jose 
Samey. condemned U.S. intervention in Panama and claimed the U.S. infringed on the 
ideal of state self-determination.1' The two most prominent Chilean political parties 
denounced the U.S. invasion. The Christian Democratic Party, right of center in the 
Chilean political spectrum and a natural ally of the U.S.. stated the action violated the UN 
and OAS Charters.18 President Carlos A. Perez of Venezuela rejected any justification 
for intervention. Although he admitted that Noriega's dictatorship was offensive, he 
lamented the breaking of the nonintervention principle, demonstrating the traditional
16Mark Falcoff and Robert Royal, The Continuing Crisis: U.S. Policy in Central 
America and the Caribbean (Lanham. MD: Universitv Press of America. Inc.. 1987),
150.
l Benites. Giselle. “Communique Condemns U.S. Actions in Panama" (text). 
Brasilia Domestic Service in Portuguese (20 December 1989). Translated by Foreign 
Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-Latin America, 21 December 1989 
(PrEx 7.10: FBIS-LAT-89-244: p. 35).
I Q
“PDC Issues Communique." (text). Santiago Radio Cooperativa Network in 
Spanish. (December 20, 1989). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. 
FBIS Dailv Report-Latin American, 21 December 1989 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-LAT-89-244; 
p. 36).
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hierarchy of Latin American security concerns as opposed those of the U.S.19 The 
Mexican representative to the UN announced Mexico's official position, stating the 
intervention was a distortion of UN principles and called for the withdrawal of U.S. 
forces."0 An OAS vote on the matter demonstrated regional concern about the U.S. 
unilateral action. Twenty states voted for a measure expressing regret at the U.S. action, 
seven abstained, and the U.S. was the lone dissenter.21 The words of the resolution were 
muted, but firmly directed against the U.S.. specifically mentioning that the military 
intervention was regrettable, and calling for the withdrawal of U.S. troops.
The Panama invasion in 1989 was the last U.S. intervention of the decade. 
President Bush was a stronger adherent to multilateral forums than Reagan, and 
attempted to empower the OAS by pushing it to resolve the Panama crisis. The OAS 
negotiators almost brokered a compromise that allowed a two-year timetable for Manuel 
Noreiga to retire."2 Eventually the OAS mission failed, but perhaps there was a small 
victory in that the Bush Administration made an attempt to reawaken its role as an active 
player in multilateral security cooperation efforts. Despite these efforts, regional reaction
19“Perez Interviewed: Rejects U.S. Action in Panama." (text). Caracas Venezolana 
de Television Canal 8 in Spanish (20 December 1989). Translated by Foreign Broadcast 
Information Service. FBIS Dailx Report-Latin America. 21 December 1989 (PrEx 7.10: 
FBIS-LAT-89-244; pp. 37-38).’
:o“Foreign Secretariat Rejects U.S. Invasion." (text). Paris AFP in Spanish (31 
December 1989). Translated by Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily 
Report-Latin American, 03 January 1990. (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-LAT-90-002; p. 17).
21 “OAS Resolution Expresses Regret on U.S. Action,” (text). Bridgetown CANA 
in English (23 December 1989). FBIS Daily Report-Latin American, 27 December, 1989 
(PrEx"7.10: FBIS-LAT-89-247; p. 1).
""Martha L. Cottam, Images and Intervention: U.S. Policies in Latin American 
America (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. 1994), 158.
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was predictably negative, as Smith states, “From Chile to Mexico, reaction to the 
invasion was swift and negative. Bush had not bothered to consult any Latin [American] 
leaders beforehand.”23
FALKLAND/MALVINAS ISLANDS CRISIS
Some analysts believe the Falkland/Malvinas Islands War was a defining moment 
for inter-American security. On April 25. 1982, the Argentine government invoked the 
Rio Treaty, a security agreement within the framework of the OAS that calls for 
reciprocal assistance among American states to meet acts of aggression generated either 
within or outside of the Americas region. The Rio Treaty was a victory for regional 
security relations simply by being collectively approved by member states. Ball points 
out that ‘The Rio Treaty had turned the regional association into a regional security 
organization.”2'1 Yet the treaty has also served as a reminder of their divisions. Latin 
American states began to view the U.S. as a security threat from within, the primary issue 
being the importance of the preservation of their state sovereignty against U.S. 
encroachment. By comparison, the U.S. viewed the Soviet Union as the most immediate 
threat to regional security, with Latin American state sovereignty of secondary 
importance. The OAS voted in favor of supporting the Argentine position, with eighteen 
for the petition, none against it. and the U.S. abstaining.25 The appearance of a British
"^Peter H. Smith. The Talons o f the Eagle, 274.
24BalI, 27. Further, the Rio Treaty designated security questions to be handled 
through the Meeting of Foreign Ministers (Article 11 of the Rio Treaty).
25Ruben O. Moro, The History o f the South Atlantic: The War fo r  the Malvinas 
(New York: Praeger, 1989), 56.
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task force two days before the vote rallied several Latin American states to the Argentine 
cause despite any misgivings over the role of the Galtieri regime in instigating the 
conflict.
Despite the OAS vote, the US came to the aid of the United Kingdom (U.K.). 
albeit not through direct involvement in the conflict. The U.S. assisted the U.K. by 
allowing the use of Ascension Island as a support base. More specifically, this entailed 
supplying fuel; sidewinder and stinger air-to-air missiles for British aircraft; and phalanx, 
gun systems for some British vessels. The U.S. also supplied up to ninety percent of the 
total intelligence of the U.K. during the conflict.26 The U.S. also supported the British 
sponsored Security Council Resolution 502. which called for the withdrawal of Argentine 
troops from the Falklands.2'
The inability of Latin American states to prevent U.S. support of the British was 
probably not unexpected by OAS members, however the event reinforced growing 
cynicism among Latin American leaders concerning the viability of regional security 
organization. It demonstrated that U.S. power was the real driver behind any regional 
agreement, not Pan American idealism or multilateral principles. More importantly, for 
Latin Americans it showed their own impotence vis-a-vis the U.S. Even when the large 
majority voted against the U.S. there was no enforcement mechanism strong enough to 
curb U.S. dominance. The conflict had the potential of demonstrating a unified regional
26Ibid.. 320.
2TThomas M. Franck, ‘The Strategic Role of Legal Principles,” In The Falklands 
War: Lessons fo r  Strategy, Diplomacy, and International Law, eds. A. Coll and A. Arend 
(Boston; Allen and Unwin, 1985), 23.
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security vision, but had the opposite effect of highlighting the enduring and growing 
fissures between Latin American and U.S. security interests.
DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Under the Carter Administration the U.S. began to apply human rights and 
democracy as standards to transcend the traditional power politics approach. When the 
Reagan Administration assumed executive powers, it publicly disavowed the former 
administration's multilateral initiatives. Despite its public criticisms of Carter 
Administration policies, it did not fully scrap the role of human rights and democracy in 
policy creation towards developing countries. The approach was domestically successful, 
stressing democratic values and human rights, which added credibility to some policy 
decisions. It became the cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy from 1980-1988. and was a 
reflection of past U.S. policies. Mari-France Toinet explains that even before World War 
I. “ ...the United States also believed itself to have a civilizing 'mission' even if it did not 
use that term, and whenever they decided to intervene anywhere it was always in the 
name of democratic principles."28
Whereas the coalescence of U.S. interests and desires to uplift developing states 
was successful domestically, it was both perplexing and cynical to many Latin American 
observers. Policymakers in the U.S. believed this policy created a more coherent and 
predictable standard. leading to a more productive interaction with Latin American 
representatives. However, the policy was unable to distinguish between the security
28Mari-France Toinet, "The Lawyers' Verdict,” in The Rise and Fall o f Anti- 
Americanism: A Century o f French Perception, ed. Denis Lacome (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1990), 196.
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needs of the U.S. and the need for support of Latin American democratic development. 
The presence of an anti-democratic competitor in the region, the Soviet Union, put U.S. 
interests and support of democracy at odds. In essence, whatever the U.S. did to truncate 
the spread of Soviet influence was perceived as a victory for democracy. Latin American 
states viewed the two faces of U.S. regional diplomacy as highly inconsistent. The policy 
was interpreted as at best, benign neglect of regional and domestic realities, at worst, the 
U.S. acting in its interests with no regard for its impact on regional states. The 
differences between the U.S. and Latin America created fertile ground for disagreement 
because many states south of the Rio Grande thought democracy and human rights were 
catchwords to provide new fuel to traditional U.S. interventionist policies.
As proof of their suspicions about U.S. intentions, skeptical Latin Americans 
pointed out that the record of the U.S. in supporting democracy was selective. The U.S. 
claimed it intervened in Grenada and Nicaragua to overthrow non-democratic leaders, but 
looked upon military dictatorships in Chile and Brazil as acceptable.''* As well as taking 
exception to the uneven record of the U.S. in supporting democratic reform in Latin 
America, critics also thought the criteria of the U.S. for deciding what was considered a 
democracy was more than suspect. At one point U.S. policy seemed to treat the holding 
of elections as the requirement for a democracy. Guy Poitras noted, “If simply holding 
elections were the sole requirement of democracy. Central America would be
29For example Pastor states “In justifying its confrontation with Nicaragua, the 
administration [Reagan] discovered and then elaborated a commitment to democracy.” It 
must also be said on this issue that Pastor gives the Reagan Administration credit for 
communicating to military leaders in Latin American America that U.S. support for them 
was contingent on their resolve to institute democratic government. Robert A. Pastor, 
U.S. Foreign Policy Towards Latin America and the Caribbean (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1990), 80.
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substantially more democratic than it actually is.”30 Because the U.S. used democracy as 
the motivation in the interventions in Grenada and Nicaragua, and its military support of 
pro-U.S. elements in El Salvador and Honduras, the policy was judged as either arbitrary 
or unequally enforced. The strong support of the U.S. for democratic ideals seemed to be 
the cover for justifying politics driven by pure self-interest.
It is not difficult to understand the concern of Latin American leaders with U.S. 
regional security policy during the 1980s. since the Reagan Administration’s policies 
varied so widely. Carothers found four distinct U.S. policies towards individual Latin 
American states during the 1980s: democracy by transition (Costa Rica. El Salvador. 
Guatemala. Honduras): democracy by force (Grenada. Nicaragua): democracy by 
applause (Argentina): and democracy by pressure (Chile. Paraguay. Panama. Brazil).’1 
Democracy by transition was initiated when the U.S. believed a state was threatened by 
leftist aggression, and as a response promoted democratic change to provide a bulwark 
against potential communist incursion. Democracy by force consisted of direct 
intervention to overthrow a regime that was perceived as aligned with the Soviet Union, 
which was considered anti-democratic. Democracy by applause refers to a U.S. policy 
that demonstrated support for democracy in a particular state, but did so without direct 
involvement. The most important reason being the U.S. wanted to maintain a 
relationship with the military regimes in Argentina, but did not want to lose it as valuable 
ally in its Cold War confrontation with the Soviet Union.32 Democracy by pressure
^ o itra s , 75.
3ICarothers, 192-195.
32Ibid-, 240.
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policies were not directed against a perceived communist threat, but was similar to 
democracy by transition in that U.S. policy was proactive in trying to influence 
democratic reforms. An example of democracy by pressure is when the U.S. enforced 
arms sales restrictions against the Brazilian military dictatorship. The pattern emerging 
from Carothers* study is that the U.S. consistently supported democratic reform, but 
weighted its most severe responses towards communist dictatorships.^
The same criticisms have been made of U.S. actions to support human rights in 
Latin America. Human rights began to assume a high level of importance in U.S. 
regional policy under the Carter Administration, and were reinforced to a lesser extent 
under the Reagan Administration: “When President Carter was defeated, this growing 
human rights consciousness lost its chief spokesperson but not the public basis of its 
support.”34 However. U.S. human rights enforcement was inconsistent because under the 
Reagan Administration contending political parties controlled the legislative and 
executive branches. They were constantly at odds over human rights observance by 
foreign states and the proper punishment mechanisms. Reagan Administration officials 
wanted a less strict standard to allow them more latitude in policy implementation, the 
legislature called for tougher enforcement.
Since the U.S. did not consistently support human rights, criticism from Latin 
America grew. From their perspective, the U.S. supported human rights as long as it was
j3This was more or less the stated policy by Jeanne Kirkpatrick, the U.S. 
ambassador to the UN in the Reagan Administration. She thought that there should be a 
two-tiered policy applied to dictatorships. Communist dictatorships were less likely to 
reform to democracies so stronger measures were needed. By contrast other dictatorships 
were more likely to be led by less direct pressure.
^Carothers, 242.
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convenient to U.S. security concerns.35 There was also a great deal of Latin American 
resentment in that the U.S. behaved as though it was the custodian of human rights, 
judging other states and distributing rewards or punishment for a state's performance.36
AUTONOMY THROUGH ARMS PRODUCTION
The growth of Argentine and Brazilian arms producers was another point of 
contention between the U.S. and regional arms producing states during the 1980s. The 
disagreement typified many of the impediments to broader security cooperation and 
demonstrated the lack of trust many Latin American leaders had towards the U.S. 
Argentina. Brazil, and other regional states thought U.S. demands on export restrictions 
were solely based in self-interest, not due to strategies meant to truncate Soviet 
expansionism and control the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as U.S. 
policy-makers frequently proclaimed. In contrast, the U.S. thought Latin American 
industries were leveraging U.S. technology transfer and financial support to sell Latin 
American arms indiscriminately to the highest bidder. Each side had a different but still 
credible perspective. The middle ground was elusive on the arms exporting issue and the 
Latin American arms industry issue remained a point of contention during the 1980s.
Argentina, Brazil, and to a lesser extent Chile, pursued additional capacity in arms 
production to obtain greater autonomy, and more specifically, a hedge against U.S.
3:>RafaeI Braun, “The Human Rights Question,” in The United States and Latin 
American America in the 1980s: Contending Perspectives on a Decade o f Crisis, eds. 
Kevin Middlebrook and Carlos Rico (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1986). 
398.
36Ibid., 400.
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influence.37 The motivations behind indigenous arms production expressed the lack of 
trust many Latin American states held towards U.S. hegemony. Achieving greater 
autonomy for its own sake does not demonstrate a specific policy against the U.S. as 
much as a natural need for self-reliance and development. However, autonomy from the 
U.S. denotes a particular insecurity directed towards the U.S. During the 1970s and 
1980s Latin American states diversified their sources for arms primarily from the U.S. to 
France, Italy, Israel, the Soviet Union, the U.K., and indigenous arms production.38
Brazil had been, and remains today, the largest Latin American arms exporter. 
Table 12 illustrates the success of Brazilian efforts to gain autonomy in arms production, 
which can be gauged over a twenty-year period. In 1975 Brazil was able for the first time 
to export S51 million in arms; in 1987-88 the effort reached its apex with $650 and $700 
million in sales respectively. Although the statistics show that Brazil never achieved 
complete autonomy in the arms sector, it was successful in reducing the U.S.* s influence. 
From 1981-1988 Brazil exported more than it imported, while also being able to reach 
this goal in 1992 and 1994. Armored vehicles, missiles and rocket systems generated the 
bulk of earnings from Brazil's arms sales.
37 Argentina. Brazil, Chile, Cuba and Mexico were the only arms exporting states 
during the period from 1985-1995. Mexican efforts to export were almost too small to be 
considered a directed policy, reaching its zenith in value in 1990 at $23 million. Cuban 
arms exports were for the most part not domestically manufactured, for example in 1988 
Cuba imported just over $2 billion in arms and exported $287 million. These statistics 
demonstrate Cuba's search for autonomy vis-a-vis the U.S., but not exclusive autonomy 
in arms production. See James W. Wilkie, Eduardo Aleman and Jose Guadalupe Ortega, 
302-303.
38Lowenthal, 37.
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Table 12. Brazilian Arms Exports and Imports, 1985-1993
Year Imports Exports Year Imports Exports
1985 82 330 1991 166 80
1986 307 330 1992 129 180
1987 349 650 1993 168 100
1988 655 700 1994 103 195
1989 264 120 1995 170 10
1990 172 60
Source: James W. Wilkie. Eduardo Aleman and Jose Guadalupe Ortega, p. 302
The considerable effort by Argentina. Brazil and Chile to produce and export arms was 
two-fold: indigenous arms production would give the state greater autonomy and could 
earn badly needed export capital. In the Brazilian case, plans to achieve greater 
autonomy began in the 1960s, when the Brazilian army's Department of War Material 
and manufacturing interests in Sao Paulo formed an alliance known as Grupo 
Permanente de Mobilizacao Industrial. The alliance sought to convert underutilized 
civilian industries to defense production.39 The goal of greater self-reliance in the arms 
sector was also influenced by the advent of military rule in 1964. lasting until 1985.40 In 
the late 1970s, for the first time in the post World War II period. Brazilian purchases 
from European suppliers and domestic sources were larger than weapon imports from the 
U.S.41 The trend was exacerbated by the Carter Administration's policy to tie the 
distribution of military aid to human rights. Guidelines to the State and Defense
39Clovis Brigagao, “The Brazilian Arms Industry,” Journal o f International 
Affairs 4. no. 1 (Summer 1986): 107.
"^Ken Conca, “Technology, The Military, And Democracy in Brazil,” Journal o f 
Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 34, no. I (Spring 1992): 143.
4ISchmidt, 5.
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departments prohibited states judged to be human rights abusers from receiving any 
military aid.42
Regional arms exporting states also had an economic imperative for their actions. 
From 1974-1994 Brazil accrued five billion dollars in export earnings. These export 
earnings were one of the few bright spots in Brazil’s value-added exports. Despite their 
hard-credit earnings, critics in the U.S. noted that Brazil spent nearly half of its annual 
GDP supporting domestic industries.44 Further, research and development in the state 
supported armaments industries accounted for 20-25 percent of the country’s science and 
technology budget.44 Therefore, whatever profit Brazil gained from arms exports was 
diminished by government investment in domestic industries. A point of contention that 
spread beyond the arms sector concerned issues related to economic development 
strategy. Whereas Brazil and other Latin American states actively pursued import 
substitution policies, the U.S. strongly believed that these policies should play a smaller 
role in economic development.45
42Partrice Franko-Jones, “Public Private Partnership: Lessons From the Brazilian 
Armaments Industry.” Journal o f Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 29. no. 4 
(Winter 1987-88): 50.
4j‘Tomorrow’s Italy,” The Economist, 17 June 1987: 20.
^Conca. ’Technology, The Military, And Democracy in Brazil.” 146.
45Krueger states, “Essentially the argument for protection and inward orientation 
of the economy rested on the presence of imperfections in the market mechanism that 
made it difficult for developing economies to compete and develop. Proponents of 
outward-oriented policies pointed to the costs associated with protectionist policies.”
See, Anne O. Krueger, “Import Substitution Versus Export Promotion,” in International 
Economics and International Economic Policy: A Reader, ed. Philip King (San Francisco 
State: McGraw Hill Inc., 1990), 155.
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The issue of U.S. technology transfer to Brazil and Argentina turned out to be 
another stumbling block in regional security affairs. Brazil had become competitive in 
the arms export industry by selling robust and easy to maintain equipment. Customers 
were not burdened with end-item utilization requirements that the U.S. frequently 
attaches to their weapons exports, and were frequendy given licenses to produce 
Brazilian designed equipment amounting to a technology transfer.46 These qualities gave 
Brazil thirty-six customers willing to buy major weapons systems by the late 1980s.4' 
During the early 1980s Brazil held at least nine licenses to produce major ground, sea. air 
and missile weapons systems: Argentina held eleven.48
The U.S. objected to Brazilian technology transfer for three reasons, first due to 
opposition to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, second it undercut U.S. 
regional influence, and third, it increased competition against U.S. arms producers. 
Brazilian nationalists contended that U.S. measures and objections to Brazilian 
technology transfer were primarily due to the impact it had on arms industries of the U.S. 
This explanation seemed unlikely since Brazilian sales, generally to developing states 
that could not afford U.S. technology, found Brazilian products far less expensive.49 It is 
more possible that U.S. policy-makers were concerned that Brazilian arms sales had the
46David J. Louscher and Michael D. Salomone, Technology Transfer and U.S. 
Security Assistance (Boulder Westview Press. 1987), 89.
47Ibid.. 94. These states are:. Abu Dabi. Algeria, Argentina. Bolivia. Canada. 
Chile, Colombia, Cypress, Ecuador. Egypt, El Salvador. France, Gabon. Guyana,
Honduras, Iraq, Libya. Madagascar, Morocco, Nigeria. Panama, Paraguay, Portugal. 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Sudan. Thailand, Togo, Tunisia. United Arab 
Emirates, United Kingdom. Uruguay, Venezuela and Zimbabwe.
"^Louscher and Salomone, 22.
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potential to undercut U.S. regional influence in Latin America, in the Middle East, and in 
Africa. The U.S. frequently utilizes arms sales as instruments o f foreign policy. Former 
Secretary o f State Vance summarized U.S. arms sales objectives: support diplomatic 
efforts, influence political orientation o f other states, maintain regional balances, limit 
Soviet influence, enhance U.S. access to regional governments, and provide leverage and 
influence with governments.30 Because Brazil sold arms to nearly every state in the 
region and many in Africa, it could potentially stunt U.S. efforts to exercise control via 
the arms trade.
The objections o f  the U.S. to Brazilian technology transfer were mostly centered 
on the possibility o f the proliferation weapons o f mass destruction. The U.S. strongly 
objected to Argentine and Brazilian attempts to sell missile technology to Libya and Iraq, 
and tried to block the West German sale o f nuclear reactor technology to Brazil due to the 
concern the material could be weaponized and resold to other states. Analysts agreed that 
with the new reactor Brazil had the ability to produce weapons grade uranium.51 At the 
time, the sale o f West German nuclear reactor technology to Brazil was the largest 
nuclear transfer to a developing country, and was instantly understood as a threat to 
nuclear weapons proliferation.32 Further, the U.S. expressed concern about the potential 
for the sale to ignite a nuclear arms race between Argentina and Brazil, at the time strong
50Paul Y. Hammond, The Reluctant Supplier: U.S. Decisionmaking For Arms 
Sales (Cambridge, MA: Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, Publishers Inc., 1983), 32-33.
5'Leonard S. Spector, Nuclear Ambitions (Boulder Westview Press, 1990), 251.
S2Norman Gall. “Atoms for Brazil, Dangers for Ail.” in Foreign Policy on Latin 
America, 1970-1980, eds. Staff o f  Foreign Policy Journal (Boulder Westview Press, 
1983), 57.
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rivals. Germany and Brazil couched U.S. objections in terms o f economics: they thought 
the true objection o f the U.S. was the entrance o f German companies into a market niche 
that was formerly filled only by two U.S. corporations, General Electric and 
West ingho use.53
Brazil and Argentina’s missile programs caused consternation in Washington as 
well. Two Brazilian companies, Avibras and Orbita, separately worked on missile 
systems meant for export to Libya and Iraq.34 After the signing o f the Missile 
Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Brazil was unable to procure the parts needed to 
complete its missile sales. Further, the U.S. was able to stop France from supplying 
rocket technology to Brazil although it was purportedly meant for launching satellites. 
Argentina was also working on a clandestine nuclear weapons program and missile 
program, the Condor II. The MTCR signatories expressed concern about the Condor II 
program, in part because o f Argentina’s partner states, Iraq and Egypt. Under U.S. 
pressure, the Condor II was cancelled in 1990.55
The inability o f  Latin American to compromise on these issues was a product o f 
mutual distrust between them and the U.S. From the Latin American perspective it was 
essentially a question o f autonomy. Latin American states wanted to insulate themselves 
from the seemingly capricious effect o f U.S. foreign policy. Latin American states 
producing arms resented U.S. interference, at best believing U.S. policy goals only
53Ibid., 63.
54“BraziL Iraq to Develop Rockets Jointly,” (text). Brasilia O Globo (9 March 
1989). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report- 
Latin America, 6 April 1989, (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-LAT-89-240; p. 51).
55Spector, 230-232.
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factored Cold War interests, at worst believing the U.S. wanted to keep the region 
subjugated to continue forms of exploitation. As one South American commented, 
reflecting broad opinion throughout the region. “Developing countries must develop the 
will to break out of the cycle of technological colonialism/06 Many Latin American 
observers believed the policies of the U.S. were designed to subjugate them both 
economically and in security affairs. It seemed the U.S. had the intent to abrogate 
Brazilian success in arms exports, which was one of the few manufacturing sectors that 
any Latin American state had succeeded in during the late 1980s. Furthermore, by 
denying Latin American indigenous arms production, the U.S. increased Latin American 
dependency on U.S. and European suppliers.
The U.S. had a distinctly opposite view. Regional states that should be allied with 
U.S. initiatives against weapons proliferation and technology transfer to potential 
adversaries were instead turning against the U.S. for profit reasons only. Some U.S. 
analysts pointed to the fact that the only reason Brazil and Argentina's defense firms 
realized any profits was due to huge amounts of state investment, and due to finances 
procured by loans from U.S. controlled financial institutions. Technology transfer, at 
times originally procured from the U.S., angered domestic critics.5' Many critics wanted 
to see U.S. loans direcdy benefit the Argentine and Brazilian populace rather than the 
elite, who reaped most of the financial rewards of the arms trade.
36“Minister Wants to End Technological Colonialism” (text). Bridgetown CANA 
in English (31 January 1984). FBIS Report-Latin America 01 February 1984 (PrEx 7.10: 
FBIS-LAT-84-VI; p. S-3).
^Janne E. Nolan, Trappings o f Power: Ballistic Missiles in the Third World 
(Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1991), 36.
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CONCLUSION
In terms of GNP and defense expenditure, U.S. hegemony was perpetuated 
through the 1980s. The presence of power asymmetry was demonstrated by the lack of 
improvement in security cooperation during the 1980s. Several factors contributed to the 
lack of security cooperation, including: the continuation of unilateral U.S. military 
intervention. large Latin American investments in indigenous arms production, the 
continued Latin American support for Cuba, and signs of Latin American balancing 
against the U.S. on certain security issues.
Direct unilateral military intervention in the cases of Grenada and Panama, and 
indirect involvement in Nicaragua and Cuba, helped contribute to difficulties in regional 
security relations. Because the U.S. by-passed established multilateral forums in most of 
these cases, Latin American leaders had no input into U.S. policies that in turn had a 
great deal of influence over them. An interesting duality to Latin American reactions 
against U.S. unilateral interventions should be noted. Despite the adoption of democratic 
principles in the later part of the 1980s. Latin American states were still strongly critical 
of U.S. policies to force regime change in Cuba, Grenada, Nicaragua and Panama. One 
might expect statements condemning the unilateral manner of U.S. actions from Latin 
American statesmen, but similarly it would be expected that the U.S. receive support for 
initiatives to democratize regional states. The strong Latin American reaction to these 
events demonstrates the high degree of Latin American distrust towards the U.S.
The exhibition of balancing behavior also demonstrated the regional hegemonic 
system was not functioning as effectively as it should be. Latin American states stood 
firmly behind Argentina during the Malvinas Islands dispute with the U.K.. and they
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formed a consensus outside of U.S. leadership to ameliorate the Nicaraguan conflict. 
Although U.S. leadership was far from abdicated, the system seemed to be under 
considerable strain from the use of U.S. power that created a power asymmetry condition.
The OAS and the Rio Treaty continued to be marginalized as tools to facilitate 
hegemonic stability. Despite votes in the OAS that condemned U.S. actions in Grenada 
and Panama, and that supported Argentina in the Malvinas crisis, the U.S. ignored these 
deliberations. The OAS became a forum where Latin American leaders could vent their 
frustrations towards U.S. policies but with little impact on Washington.
Latin American support of Cuba remained strong despite the growth of 
democracy in the region. Latin American states did not agree with U.S. policy aimed at 
undermining the government of Cuba, not because they were ardent supporters of Cuba's 
brand of government, but because they viewed U.S. actions as a breach of Cuban 
sovereignty. Due to the power asymmetry of the U.S during the 1980s. and a 
demonstrated willingness to use it. security cooperation showed little improvement. The 
hegemony of the U.S. began to resemble less of a consensual relationship, that is 
suggested by hegemonic stability theory, and inched closer to that of a purely unipolar 
system, in which power was the primary determinant of state interaction.
The broad base of support for Argentina during the Falkland/Malvinas Islands 
War was another indicator of the schism between U.S. and Latin American security 
interests. Despite the fact that Argentina used force to take and occupy a disputed 
territory, even as an aggressor since the residents preferred U.K. citizenship, OAS 
member states felt compelled to ally with the Galtieri regime. Latin American concerns 
about their own weakness compared to the U.S., and therefore incursions on their
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sovereignty, were so great that became the over-riding determinant of their foreign 
policies.
Burgeoning nationalism and the quest to reduce dependency on U.S. suppliers 
drove the state funding of Argentine and Brazilian arms industry. Despite the 
considerable strain placed on the Brazilian economy, a high level of effort continued until 
the end of the 1980s. Argentina and Brazil demanded the relaxation of U.S. laws 
prohibiting the technology transfer of rocket technology while failing to address genuine 
U.S. concerns about weapons proliferation. The prevailing claim from some Latin 
American leaders was that the U.S. wanted to keep Latin American states as customers of 
U.S. arms, and as a consequence to maintain Latin American indebtedness, when in 
reality most U.S. military equipment in the past had been given to many Latin American 
states in terms of aid packages that did not produce debt upon purchase.'8 The other 
common Latin American argument was that the U.S. only gave its outdated equipment to 
the militaries of regional states to keep these states at an inferior level of preparedness, 
and therefore dependent on the U.S. The development of domestic arms industries in 
several Latin American states during the 1980s was an attempt to circumvent such a 
strategy. However. Conca explains that in their search for autonomy from U.S. 
hegemony, Brazil conversely created domestic insecurity by increasing its economic 
burden through subsidizing defense related industries.59
58For example, the U.S. transferred many arms factories to Brazil under lend 
lease. Ken Conca, Manufacturing Insecurity: The Rise and Fall o f Brazil's Military - 
Industrial Complex (Boulder: Lynn Rienner. 1997), 31.
59Ibid.
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The overabundance of U.S. power during the 1980s, magnified by the increased 
level of U.S. unilateral policies, gave the impression that the U.S. was more of a security 
threat to Latin American states than outside powers such as the Soviet Union. The U.S. 
found that when it acted outside of the security agreements established through the 
hegemonic relationship, it achieved short-term goals at the expense of diminished trust. 
The diminished trust between the U.S. and Latin America created obstacles to achieving 
meaningful long-term security cooperation. These obstacles manifested themselves in 
policy disagreements related to the topics of Cuba, democracy, human rights, 
intervention, and arms control. The inability of Latin American and U.S. leaders to 
mitigate their differences worked to destabilize regional security, countermanding the 
benefits of the hegemonic system.
Although the 1980s was a step backwards in efforts to solidify regional security 
cooperation, the era still witnessed the diffusion of the values of the hegemon in the form 
of market economics and democratic political values. The trend laid the foundation for 
the solidification of democratic and market reforms in the 1990s, which will be described 
in the next chapter. The 1990s witnessed the aftermath of the end of the Cold War. 
leading hopeful observers to assume a golden age in inter-American affairs was just over 
the horizon. However, their assumption was that the Cold War had been the primary 
impediment to regional security cooperation as opposed to power asymmetry. The 
primary inhibitor of security cooperation, power asymmetry, was not significantly 
alleviated therefore little progress was made. New security issues include; the growing 
problem of the drug trade: protection of bio-diversity and the environment; Colombian 
instability and resulting migration of citizens to neighboring states, and issues associated
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with regional trade negotiations. Although these issues are not directly related to the 
Cold War. they still hinder regional security cooperation. Chapter seven explores the 
lack of significant progress in light of the power asymmetry dynamic.
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CHAPTER VH 
AN ERA OF NEW OPPORTUNITIES (1990-2001)
The decade of the 1990s potentially ushered in a new era for inter-American 
relations. The end of the Cold War alleviated the growing division between the U.S. and 
Latin America on the issue of state sovereignty, however other issues emerged to test 
regional security cooperation. These issues included border conflicts, the drug trade and 
environmental protection. Latin American leaders had good reason to hope that the U.S 
would systematically address the economic and social development that they believed 
should be the focus of the public goods that the hegemon should provide.
This chapter will review regional post-Cold War security issues, including: 
competition among trade regimes and their security implications, the drug trade, regional 
relations with Cuba, the border war between Peru and Ecuador, and regional reaction to 
any U.S. action involving military solutions. Gauging bilateral and multilateral 
interaction of regional states coalescing around these issues will help determine the level 
of security cooperation.
The analysis of chapter seven is based on the assumption that regional consensus 
has a greater chance of emerging since the U.S. spent less on defense during the 1990s 
and that affects the overall power asymmetry comparison. Therefore, security 
cooperation should have increased marginally with the slight decrease in the extreme 
power asymmetry that persisted since the 1960s.
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REGIONAL HEGEMONY
The U.S. continued to outpace the GNP performance of leading Latin American 
states from 1990-1999, as demonstrated in Table 13. suggesting that there was no 
reduction in U.S. hegemony during this period. Latin America as an aggregate kept 
pace with U.S. growth. The U.S. economy grew twenty-four percent from 1990 to 1999: 
by comparison Latin America also grew by an equal amount during the 1990s. The two 
largest economies in the region also grew at similar rates, Brazilian GNP increasing 
seventeen percent and Mexican GNP more closely matching the U.S. with a twenty-five 
percent increase in total GNP. The import/export dependency of Argentina. Brazil and 
Venezuela on the U.S. remained relatively unchanged (Table 14). By contrast Mexican












Source: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and 
Arms Transfers 1990-1999 (Washington D.C., ACDA, 2001), http://www.state.gOv/t/ 
vc/rls/rpt/wmeat/99_00, August 10,2002. The Y-axis is in terms of $US million, in 
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imports and exports to the U.S. substantially increased during the early 1990s, 
undoubtedly due to the effects of the culmination of the NAFTA treaty in 1994.
Table 14. Import/Exports to U.S. (As Percentage of Total World Trade)
1980 1985 1987 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
A rgentina Export 8.9 12.2 14.6 12.4 13.8 10.4 11.0 9.1 11.1
Import 22.6 18.2 16.5 21.2 21.5 18.0 21.2 22.6 23.1
Brazil Export 17.4 27.1 27.9 24.6 24.6 20.2 19.1 20.7 19.0
Import 18.6 19.7 20.7 20.9 19.8 23.3 24.5 23.6 24.3
M exico Export 63.2 60.4 60.4 70 69.3 69.5 68.7 78.4 80.4
Import 65.6 66.6 66.6 70.4 66.1 64.8 62.8 68.2 70.6
Venezuela Export 27.8 46.0 57.2 51.6 51-5 52.3 48.2 46.8 50.0
Import 48.2 47.5 44.6 44.6 46.4 47.5 48.3 40.3 43.2
Source: James W. Wilkie, Eduardo Aleman and Jose Guadalupe Ortega. 691.
The defense expenditure of the U.S. continued to be much higher than Latin 
America's, as demonstrated in Table 15. Argentina and Venezuela’s defense expenditure 
declined during this period, while Brazil and Mexico’s rose. Despite the increase in two 
of four countries U.S. expenditure still dwarfed the region. In this time frame the U.S. 
spent the least amount of money in 1996. $271 billion. The total of all four countries 
reaches $21.5 billion, or only 12.6 percent of the U.S. total. Despite the anemic 
comparison, the Latin American total increased from the last decade, which was only 
three percent of the expenditure of the U.S. during a given year. The decrease in the 
comparison can be related to the U.S. post-CoId War draw-down that continued until the 
end of the decade, and the improvement in Mexico’s and Brazil’s economies allowing for
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military upgrades. This may lead one to conclude that although power asymmetry 
remained, the gap shrunk in terms o f overall military expenditure.
Table 15. Annual Military Expenditure, 1990-1997
Argentina Brazil Mexico U.S. Venezuela
1990 3,350 9,560 1,330 306,000 1,220
1991 2.730 7,530 1,510 280,000 2,520
1992 4,470 6,640 1,720 305,000 1,870
1993 4,230 8,450 1,940 298,000 1310
1994 4,730 8,010 2,440 288,000 1,190
1995 4,620 11,200 2,160 279,000 1,440
1996 4,490 13,800 2,100 271.000 1,050
1997 3,700 14,100 4,290 276,000 1,860
Source: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and 
Arms Transfers1990-1997 (Washington, D.C.: ACDA, 2000), 56, 57, 62, 70. Numbers in 
$ millions, current 1998 dollars.
THE REALIGNMENT OF INTERESTS IN THE AMERICAS
The growing convergence o f NAFTA members, and conversely, the growing 
division o f interests between the U.S. and Mercosur, is a  reflection o f regional security 
cooperation. Both trends coincided with the end o f the Cold War and marked a 
significant departure from the historical regional norm. Although other sub-regional 
groupings exist, including the Andean Group, the Caribbean Community and Common 
Market (CARICOM) and the Central American Common Market,' the primary goal o f 
the states in these groups was to strengthen their economies and financial institutions for
1 Peru, Chile and Mexico are also members.
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the rigors of the global economy, and then they would be positioned to enter into larger 
trade schemes such as the proposed FTAA. Although Brazil stated that the creation of 
Mercosur was for similar reasons, Brazil's actions during the 1990s seem to prove their 
ambitions were different. Many analysts familiar with regional politics believe Brazil 
was actively pursuing a sphere of influence in South America and viewed U.S. 
hemispheric dominance as an impediment to this goal. If such a strategy formed the 
nexus of Brazilian strategy for entering Mercosur, then this could prove to be a 
problematic issue for the traditional hegemonic structure of the region.
The 1994 implementation of the NAFTA drastically altered the tone of relations 
between Mexico and the U.S. The core of the treaty began in 1987 when Mexico and the 
U.S. signed a bilateral agreement concerning trade and investment. In the 1990s, 
Presidents Bush and Salinas announced their support for negotiations of a free trade 
agreement, and by 1991 Canada joined the talks. After a contentious debate in the 
Congress of the U.S.. the treaty was signed on January I. 1994.
The NAFTA Treaty had far-reaching consequences beyond bilateral trade. With 
the end of the Cold War the U.S. began to pay attention to the impact of Mexico's 
economic and political instability, particularly to the issues of illegal migration and the 
drug trade.2 During the Reagan Administration Mexico was crippled by a severe 
economic crisis. Washington’s remarkable and costly bailout of Mexico awakened the
2 Adolfo Aguilar Zinser. “Is there and Alternative? The Political Constraints on 
NAFTA,” in Mexico and NAFTA: Who Will Benefit?, eds. Victor Bulmer-Thomas, Nikki 
Craske and Monica Serrano (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994), 126.
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Reagan-Bush Administrations to the threat that Mexican instability posed to the U.S.3 
Despite an overwhelming victory against Iraq in the Gulf War, the experience imbued 
U.S. leaders with the sense that the Gulf region would be highly unstable in the 
foreseeable future. Gulf War instability reminded U.S. leaders of the importance of 
Mexican and Venezuelan oil to the vitality of the U.S. economy. The leadership of the 
U.S. was increasingly forced to realize the growing interdependence of Mexico and the 
U.S., and this realization kept U.S. leaders on course to negotiate and sign the NAFTA 
treaty. Further, U.S. leaders became more sensitive to the rise of trade blocs in Europe 
and Asia.4 Under pressure from global concerns and bilateral issues with Mexico, the 
U.S. was able to pass NAFTA despite its domestic opposition.
The Mexican crisis of 1982 also had a sobering impact on Mexican officials as 
well. President Miguel de la Madrid was able to stabilize the Mexican economy through 
huge cutbacks in the public sector and opened the Mexican economy to foreign 
investment and trade. President Carlos Salinas de Gortari continued Madrid’s policies. 
Salinas worked to improve relations with the U.S.. understanding that the key to
3Portillo borrowed heavily against Mexican oil reserves and spent lavishly. When 
the market collapsed in the early 80s, so did the Mexican economy. In August of 1982 
the Mexican finance minister informed Washington that his country was close to 
defaulting on $80 billion in foreign debt, a scenario that would have repercussions on the 
global economy. The U.S. quickly intervened by: purchasing a large amount of Mexican 
oil in advance, establishing treasury and federal reserve lines of support, restructure 
commercial debt, negotiate emergency measures with the International Monetary Fund, 
and arranging for credits for the import of grains. See. Clint E. Smith, Inevitable 
Partnership: Understanding Mexico-U.S. Relations (Boulder: Lynne Rienner. 2000), 62- 
63.
■*E.V.K. FitzGerald, ‘Trade. Investment and NAFTA: The Economics of 
Neighborhood,” in The United States and Latin America: The New Agenda. eds. Victor 
Bulmer-Thomas and James Dunkerley (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1999), 101.
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improving Mexico's economy was to draw from the strength of the U.S. to the North. 
After signing several bilateral agreements with the U.S.. Salinas proposed a free trade 
area with the U.S. in 1990 for two distinct reasons, to encourage foreign investor 
confidence, and because its overtures to Japan and Europe went largely unheeded.5
For the first half of the century Brazil had a policy of near autonomous alignment 
with U.S. interests. Growing Brazilian nationalism contributed to the deterioration of the 
relationship, culminating in U.S. support of the overthrow of President Joao Goulart. 
Under military rule bilateral relations eventually worsened. In the mid-1970s Brazil 
signaled the official end to the "special relationship” by breaking military ties to the U.S. 
and charting an independent course. During the Carter Administration the issues of 
human rights and non-nuclear proliferation became constant topics, driving Brazil farther 
way from Washington, and in the process, limiting Washington's influence over Brazil. 
Unencumbered by its ties to the U.S.. Brasilia was free to concentrate on achieving the 
latent national ambition of Grandeza, or greatness, it traditionally sought since the 
1800s.° The Brazilian feeling of entitlement to control the continent of South America 
stems from its large size,* its location on the continent of South America, with borders on 
all countries except for Chile and Ecuador, its population which is larger than the rest of
5Clint E. Smith, 72.
^Philip Kelly, Checkerboards and Shatterbelts: The Geopolitics o f South America 
(Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1997), 54, 178.
7Brazil's land area is almost the same as the land are of the U.S., 8,456,510 as 
compared to 9,158.960. CIA World Factbook (Washington. D.C. :Govemment Printing 
Office, 2001), http://www.cia.gov/cia/pubtications/factbook/index.html, August 18,2002.
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South America combined and its abundant natural resources.* From the late 1970s, 
onward Brasilia seemed to define its interests against the U.S. with more frequency.
The explicit logic for the creation of Mercosur was the same as other regional 
trade groups in developing states. Member states wanted to create an internal market and 
economies of scale so indigenous industries could survive the rigors of opening to the 
global market. The official reason for the initiation of Mercosur was to develop the 
markets of member countries to pave the way for broader regional integration. Brazil's 
Mercosur partner countries were originally attracted to the idea of membership in the 
FTAA as proposed by the first Bush Administration, a proposal based on the expansion 
of NAFTA. Argentina and Chile immediately responded they wished to negotiate, 
however, due to President Clinton's loss of fast-track negotiation authority, their calls for 
inclusion had to be delayed.1 Argentina was pushed into Mercosur since its leaders were 
searching for a vehicle to liberalize its economic structure, and was unable to negotiate an 
economic agreement with Washington.10 The economies of Paraguay and Uruguay were
sThe typical Brazilian view on this issue can be explained by a poll taken in 1996 
that asked the unusual question of respondents if they felt Brazil was making significant 
progress towards becoming a great power. Fifty-seven percent of those polled replied 
*ves'. “Glad to be Brazilian.” Latin American Weekly Report, 18 January 1996: 16. 
Further to the point. Hollerman quoted an official of Itamarti. Brazil’s foreign ministry, 
as stating: “Everybody in the Brazilian bureaucracy works in accordance with the 
assumption of ’Manifest Destiny,’ although we don't use that expression.” Leon 
Hollerman. Japan's Economic Strategy in Brazil (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books. 
1988), 20.
9Sidney Weintraub, “U.S.-Latin Economic Relations.” Journal o f Interamerican 
Studies and World Affairs 39, no. 1 (Spring 1997): 61.
l0Lia Vails Pereira, 'Toward the Common Market of the South: Mercosur's 
Origins, Evolution and Challenges,” in Mercosur: Regional Integration, World Markets, 
ed. Riordan Roett (Boulder. Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 1999), 9.
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already deeply integrated to its two large neighbors, Argentina and Brazil, and therefore 
led them to join Mercosur as well.
One reason Brazil aggressively pursued Mercosur was to blunt growing American 
influence and create a more prominent regional position for itself. In the 1990s, "Brazil 
struck out on its own and reasserted that it was primus inter pares in South America.”11 
Slowly, but surely. Brazil began to seek its aspiration of South American leadership by a 
policy of annulling U.S. influence where it could, and cooperating when it must. 
Mercosur gave Brazil a means to counter U.S.-led regional integration and offered an 
alternative to other Latin American countries disenfranchised with U.S. hegemony.
Brazil began to actively seek economic diversification away from the U.S. 
hegemony as early as the 1980s. Roett points out that Japanese commercial banks 
provided substantial lending prior to the 1982 debt crisis.”1- Many Brazilian leaders did 
not consider investments by the U.S. beneficial. For example, one observer noted that 
when Brazilians spoke derisively of multi-national corporations (MNC). they were 
speaking specifically about American MNCs.1’ Japanese diplomats and commercial 
interests made a concerted effort to court Brazil. Their strategy was to utilize Brazil as a 
source of raw materials, a specialization that was viewed as complimentary to Japan's 
expertise in manufacturing. To this end. Japan supported projects in Brazil, such as the
"Riordan Roett. "U.S. Policy Toward Mercosur: From Miami to Santiago,” in 
Mercosur: Regional Integration, World Markets (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers 
Inc., 1999), 114.
l2Roirdan Roett. "Brazil and Japan: Potential Versus Reality.” in Japan and Latin 
America in the New Global Order, eds. Susan Kaufman Purcell and Robert M. 
Immerman (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), 101.
l3Hollerman, 73.
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Carajas dam project and research into growing crops in the dry gerrado in the Northeast 
of Brazil, that would in turn reap dividends by supplying Japan with natural resources.14
However, the nature of their complementary relationship had its limits. Brazil 
wanted the benefits of Japanese technology so it could begin to produce value-added 
manufactured goods and jump-start the creation of a technology sector. The fact that 
Japan was not interested in technology transfer to Brazil diminished Brazilian interest in 
pursuing the Japanese alternative to U.S. hegemony. One Brazilian official noted in 
regard to the Brazilian-Japanese relationship, the employment effects of selling natural 
resources was very small and the technology transfer expected by Brazil was not 
materializing.1' In essence, it seemed Japan was turning Brazil into a client state that 
would limit Brazil’s ability to transform its economy from supplying raw materials to 
developed states to producing assembled goods. Because Brazilians looked to Japan to 
escape a similar relationship with the U.S., Brazilian leaders diagnosed the pursuit of 
Japan as an alternative to U.S. hegemony as an unfruitful policy initiative.
During the late 1990s Argentina and Brazil actively pursued a trade agreement 
with the EU in another attempt to diversify Mercosur trading partners away from U.S.
I4Ibid.. pp. 20-21. Hollerman points out that Japan’s investments are aimed at 
reducing its dependence on the U.S., and thus undermining the products where the U.S. 
has a comparative advantage with Japan: “By its assistance in the construction of 
infrastructure and heavy and chemical industries in Brazil. Japan is strengthening Brazil’s 
competitive power in the low-and middle-technology industries that will seek markets in 
the U.S. and in third areas where the U.S. is fighting to maintain its market share. The 
Brazilian case is thus a model of Japanese strategy in challenging the U.S. through the 
aspirations of others”, 17.
l5The official gave the example of Japanese efforts to develop the gerrado. He 
stated that whatever results Japan obtained were not being given to Brazil, only used by 
Japanese industries to export to Africa. Hollerman, 77-78.
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influence.16 The goals of the EU were similar to those of Mercosur. The EU was alarmed 
as Mexican trade was diverted to the U.S. with the advent of NAFTA, increasing from 
60.4 of Mexico's percent of total trade in 1987 to 80.4 by 1994. The EU realized that if 
the U.S. successfully completed a comprehensive trade agreement with Latin America it 
could reduce European competitiveness in Latin American and U.S. markets.
Confirming their suspicions, during the same time period Mexico's trade with the EU 
decreased from 18.2 to .4 percent of its total trade.1 * The EU was seeking export markets 
to strengthen its global position and was concerned about the enactment of a hemispheric 
free-trade agreement, and thought the FTAA proposal could result in trade diversion, 
threatening its economic growth.18
The chances of Brazilian success in reducing the U.S. profile in South America 
were dependent on U.S. actions during the Bush Administration. The Clinton 
Administration hoped to negotiate the expansion of NAFTA but was unable to do so 
because of the loss of fast-track authority. The resulting lack of regional leadership left a
l6Presidents Fernando de la Rua of Argentina and Fernando Henrique Cardoso of 
Brazil urged a formal European Union-Mercosur pact before the year 2005, an agreement 
which would seek to augment commercial ties between the EU and Southern Cone 
countries. “EU-Mercosur Trade Critical.” Buenos Aires Herald. 28 October 2000.
1 James W. Wilkie, Eduardo Aleman and Jose Guadalupe Ortega, 691-693.
I8Grabendorf notes that: “The EU. like Mercosur, has independently complained 
at various times about the unilateral position of the U.S. and its capacity to gain the upper 
hand in many international negotiations. See Wolf Grabendorf, “Mercosur and the 
European Union: From Cooperation to Alliance,” in Mercosur: Regional Integration. 
World Markets, ed. Riordan Roett (Boulder Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1999), 108.
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power vacuum that Itamarati, the Brazilian foreign ministry, was eager to fill.w Despite 
Brazil's efforts, its exports trade with Japan, the EU and the US had not significantly 
been altered. Total exports, which is frequently used internally as Brazil's most 
important indicator of economic success, increased by only .6 % from 1980 to 1994 to 
Japan, .1% with the EU and 1.6 to the U.S (see Table 16). With the fall of the Japanese 
economy, which the Euro currency, Brazil's trade diversion strategy had little success. 
Brazilian ambitions took another blow when its primary Mercosur partner, Argentina, 
endured an economic collapse in 2001 and is now headed into its tenth year of economic 
stagnation.^ Despite regional attempts to circumvent U.S. hegemony, these efforts 
enjoyed little success.
The position of Argentina on the FTAA was less clearly defined than the 
Brazilian position. Although Argentina was a core state of Mercosur, it also expressed a 
desire to join NAFTA, or the FTAA as a NAFTA follow-on. When Chile began to lobby 
for NAFTA membership early in the Clinton Administration: the Argentine government 
expressed a similar interest.:i Argentina's dual policy, being both pro-Mercosur and
I9Roett described Brazilian negotiating tactics during the FTAA conference of 
1994 as designed to weaken the U.S. position and solidify Brazil's bid to be the regional 
leader. See Roett, "U.S. Policy Towauxls Mercosur." 112-115.
20Japan's economic woes are succinctly described by, Stephanie Strom. 
"Deflation Shackles Japan, Blocking Hope of Recovery,” New York Times, 12 March 
2001, 3.
2lClaudia Dianni,, "Brazilian Officials Assess Argentina’s Support for Chile-US 
Talks,” (text). Sao Paulo, O Estado de Sao Paulo (Internet Version-WWW) in 
Portuguese (6 December 2000). FBIS Daily Report-Americasy 8 December 2000 (PrEx 
7.10: FBIS-LAT-2000-1206). Available from World News Connection, February 19. 
2001.
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NAFTA, concerned Brasilia, since their policy counted on Mercosur to give them 
bargaining power vis-a-vis the U.S., EU and Asia.
Table 16. Brazilian Trade Trends (Exports as Percentage of Total World Trade)
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Japan
Exports 6.1 5.5 6.4 8.1 6.2 6.0 6.7
Imports 4.8 4.3 6.0 5.8 5.6 5.9 5.7
European Union
Exports 27.2 26.9 31.5 31.2 31.9 25.9 27.3
Imports 15.4 14.6 21.3 22.6 n  i 22.7 24.9
United States
Exports 17.4 27.1 24.6 20.2 19.1 20.7 19.0
Imports 18.6 19.7 19.8 23.3 24.5 23.6 24.3
Source: Brazil was chosen as the representative for Mercosur trade as a whole since the 
Brazilian economy dominates the organization and because the so the statistics can be 
directly attributed to Brazil. Statistics taken from, James W. Wilkie. Eduardo Aleman 
and Jose Guadalupe Ortega. 692.
Venezuela had emerged as an important economic power in Latin America due to 
its large oil reserves. Under President Hugo Chavez. Venezuela generally supported a 
united Latin American front to counter U.S. hegemony. Chavez had denounced current 
multi-lateral security approaches to hemispheric relations as antiquated, claiming they 
supported the unilateral approach of the U.S. Chavez had circulated a document to other 
Latin American states suggesting that they should cooperate on creating a new security 
agenda. The strongly worded document stated, "The United States* predominant military 
power has been clear since [the Monroe Doctrine], through the use of an imperialist 
foreign policy of territorial expansion, military conquest, and construction o f an
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American community based on its own [U.S.] concept.”-  Chavez’s vociferous 
opposition to the U.S. was noted by his conduct during the aftermath of a large mudslide 
killing thousands of Venezuelans. Regardless of Venezuela’s need of disaster relief 
assistance, he refused U.S. humanitarian aid that was already en-route. This action was 
to demonstrate that any dependency on the U.S. would not be tolerated. Chavez opposed 
the FTAA. since he had a well-documented resistance to U.S. leadership on most issues.
REGIONAL SECURITY AND THE DRUG TRADE
The current U.S. multi-billion dollar anti-narcotics policy began to take shape 
when President Nixon first declared drugs a national threat at the end of the I960s.r' 
President Reagan re-emphasized the effort when he issued the National Security Decision 
Directive 221 in 1986 that declared drug trafficking a national threat. Aware of regional 
sensitivities, three criteria were established that would allow U.S. military participation in 
Latin American exigencies; host governments had to invite U.S. forces, the Department 
of State or Drug Enforcement Agency had to coordinate U.S. efforts, and U.S. Forces 
were only permitted to fill a logistics role.1-1 Under President Bush the war on drugs 
began to take shape when the Department of Defense was given the task of detecting
~  Venezuela Suggests New Hemispheric Defense System.” (text). Caracas, El 
National (Internet Version-WWW) in Spanish (11 November 2000). Translated by the 
Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-Americas. 17 November 
2000 (FBIS-LAT-2000-1 111). Available from World News Connection. February 19. 
2001.
"^Eva Bertram. Morris Blachman. Kenneth Sharpe and Peter Andreas, Drug War 
Politics: The Price o f Denial (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 105.
_4Bruce M. Bagley, Myths o f Militarization (Corale Gables: University of Miami 
North-South Center Press, 1991), 5.
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illegal narcotics entering the U.S., and integrate command and control of the services for 
interdiction efforts. The Office of National Drug Control Policy was created under the 
executive branch in 1989 with the mission: “...to establish policies, priorities, and 
objectives for the Nation’s drug control program, the goals of which are to reduce illicit 
drug use, manufacturing, and trafficking; drug-related crime and violence; and drug- 
related health consequences.”'  The U.S. regional military command. Southern 
Command, inherited the bulk of the counter-drug mission performed by the military by 
virtue of its geographic area of responsibility that included Central and South America, as 
well as the Caribbean.
The drug certification process of the U.S. was central to its efforts to combat the 
drug trade, and garnered a hostile reaction from Latin American states. The U.S. used 
foreign aid to support Latin American efforts in various forms including; military, 
economic, and law enforcement assistance. In order to continue to receive aid a regional 
state had to pass through the annual drug certification process of the U.S. Latin 
American states were forced to endure a unilateral U.S. process that required 
recertification by a Senate majority vote on an annual basis. If the state failed to meet 
U.S. criteria, then if was exempt from particular forms of U.S. aid. The certification 
process was universally disliked in Latin America as it embodied unilateral measures the 
U.S. imposed on other states, and was therefore viewed as infringing on Latin American 
sovereignty.
^Office of National Drug Control Policy, Available at http//:www.white 
housedrug policy.gov, August 11, 2001.
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There have been efforts to bridge the gap between U.S. policy and Latin 
American objections to drug certification. President Vincente Fox of Mexico proposed a 
plan that replaces the drug certification policy with greater bilateral cooperation with 
regular contact between representatives of regional governments.26 Fox’s conciliatory 
attitude seems to be unique. Other Latin American states believe the U.S. policy to be 
hypocritical, frequently citing the fact that the U.S. is the largest consumer of narcotics in 
the region. The same argument led former Mexican President Zedillo to announce that 
the U.S. should have to undergo its own drug certification.2'  Venezuela has also 
vociferously denounced U.S. drug certification as a breach of its national sovereignty.2*
In 1997 the OAS General Assembly approved a resolution that was cosponsored 
by fifteen members directed against the U.S. policy of drug certification.2'’ In response 
the drug certification policy of the U.S.. the OAS introduced its own multilateral 
certification process in 1998. The Multilateral Evaluation Mechanism is embraced by 
regional states and is being closely examined as an alternative by U.S. legislators. In an 
effort to ameliorate tensions over the issue there were efforts to introduce legislation to
26James F. Smith, “Fox Hails Gains in Talks With Bush." New York Times. 
February 12. 2001.
2/Bill Spencer. “Drug Certification,” Foreign Policy, Vol. 3. No. 24 (September
1998).
2S“VenezueIan Foreign Minister Rejects US Drug Certification Process." (text). 
Madrid EFE in Spanish (2 March 2001). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast 
Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-Americas, 5 March 2001 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS- 
LAT-2001-0302). Available from World News Connection. March 5, 2002.
29“OAS Details Resolution Against US Certification." (text). Paris, AFP in 
Spanish (3 June 1997). Translated by Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FB/S 
Daily Report-Americas, 3 June 1997 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-LAT-97-154). Available from 
World News Connection, March 5,2002.
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the U.S. Senate that would suspend the U.S. certification process for a number of years, 
allowing time to review altemadves based on a multilateral process.30
Latin American leaders are also concerned about the implementation of Plan 
Colombia, a billion dollar aid package given to Colombia to help in the control of illegal 
narcotic trafficking. States that border Colombia are concerned about the lack of 
multilateral consultation in the proposal. To control the drug trade, the Colombian 
government will likely be forced to fight the guerilla insurgency that uses proceeds from 
the drug trade to fund its activities. A civil war in Colombia has already raised 
sovereignty issues due to forced migration from the state. Also, any U.S. involvement 
raises the concern of U.S. military intervention in the border areas. Many bordering 
states also believe that a dislocation of the drug industry in Colombia would force the 
Colombian rebels to simply move their operations into their own territory.
Brazil has reservations about Plan Colombia directly linked to the state’s 
insecurity regarding its own Northern frontier. As early as 1991 Brazil expressed 
dissatisfaction with U.S. involvement in the drug war. some Brazilian government 
officials believing the U.S. had the ulterior motive of wanting to occupy the Amazon to 
protect it from environmental degradation or for its natural resources.31 The 
implementation of Plan Colombia rekindled Brazilian concerns that its authority over 
sovereign territory will come into question. To this point a political leader from the
30Tom Carter, “OAS Pushes Own Drugwar Approach,” Washington Times, 26 
January 2001, 22.
jl Norton Godov, “Government Apprehensive Over U.S. Drug Role,” (text). Sao 
Paulo Folha de Sao Paulo (20 May 1991). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast 
Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-Latin America, 24 May 1991 (PrEx 7.10 FBIS- 
LAT-91-244; 34).
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Amazon region stated, “the real plan is to occupy the whole Amazon region, and not just 
the Colombian area.”52 The specter of U.S. troops near the Brazilian border has 
contributed to rising apprehensions over the possibility of U.S. military intervention. In 
response Brazilian leaders created emergency plans to defend the area, one called the 
Calha Norte and other known as the Amazon Region Protection System.5' Luis Inacio de 
Silva, an influential labor leader in Brazil since the 1980s, and strong presidential 
candidate, has announced his opposition to Plan Colombia. If he were elected President, 
it is likely Brazil would stand firmly against U.S. military aid to Colombia.0
The controversy surrounding the System for Vigilance over the Amazon 
(SIVAM) project provides an example of Brazilian suspicions of U.S. intentions in 
Brazil’s northern frontier. The SIVAM system is intended as a surveillance system for 
use in curbing the trafficking of illegal narcotics and can also be used to monitor 
environmental degradation in the Amazon region.55 Many Brazilians, and in particular 
the military, felt that the system could be used to threaten Brazil's sovereignty because a 
U.S. company was awarded as the primary contractor to construct SIVAM. Although the 
controversy continued for some time because of charges of bid-rigging and other
32Antonia Marcia Vale and Giselle Saporito, “Plan Colombia Rekindles Concerns 
Over Amazon Sovereignty.” (text). Rio de Janeiro, Jom al do Brasil (Internet Version- 
WWW) in Portuguese (26 September 2000). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast 
Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-Americas. 9 September 2000, (PrEx 7.10: FBIS- 
LAT-2000-0926). Available from World News Connection. February 19, 2001.
33Ibid.
34Kenneth Maxwell, “A America Latina Joga A Toalha,” Folka de Sao Paulo 
(April 7, 2002), 7.
35James Mintz, “Raytheon’s Amazon Deal Hits Snag,” International Herald 
(November 27, 1995).
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corruption, the U.S. contractor was eventually awarded the contract and the controversy 
has subsided.
Due to the threat of Plan Colombia to Brazilian sovereignty. Brazilian leaders 
committed resources to autonomously defend its 1,650-kilometer long Amazon border in 
order to fight the narco-trafficking.36 General Alberto Cardoso, chief of the Institutional 
Security Cabinet, stated: “The Brazilian territory cannot be used as a base for standard 
US military actions, nor as a sanctuary for guerrilla elements to flee to, nor a shelter for 
drug traffickers and their laboratories.” There were rumors that Brazil was allowing the 
U.S. to construct military bases in the Amazon to fight drug trafficking, Cardoso denied 
that the Brazilian Government is going to authorize any U.S. use of its territory'.” Brazil 
prefers a multilateral approach to the drug problem in order to minimize the impact of 
U.S. hegemony.18 One example of Brasilia's preferred multilateral approach is the South
j6Defense Minister Geraldo Quintao stated that by the end of the year around 
1.150 soldiers will form advanced platoons on the border with other countries. Marco 
Antonio Martins. “The entire Brazilian border is to be occupied by the Army,” (text). Rio 
de Janeiro Jomal do Brasil (Internet Version-WWW“) in Portuguese (7 March 2001). 
Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-Americas, 8 
March 2001 (PrEx. 7.10: FBIS-LAT-2001 -0307). Available from World News 
Connection. February 16, 2002.
37Sonia Cameiro, “Brazil: Federal Police To Patrol Colombian Border,” (text).
Rio de Janeiro Jom al do Brasil in Portuguese. (31 August 2000). Translated by the 
Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-Americas. 01 September 
2000 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-LAT-2000-0831). Available from World News Connection, 
February 16,2002.
38“South American Summit Creates Group To Fight Money Laundering,” (text). 
Rio de Janeiro. Jomal do Brasil (Internet Version WWW) in Portuguese (5 September
2000). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report- 
Americas, 6 September, 2000 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-LAT-2000-0905). Available from World 
News Connection. February 19,2001.
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American Financial Action Group that will coordinate anti-money laundering laws of 
participating states to affect the profit of narco-traffickers.
Brazilian policies reflect a need to control U.S. hegemony, but do not promote a 
specific proposal to deal with the Colombian crisis. Brazil’s reticence to address the 
issue prompted historian Kenneth Maxwell to comment, “Brazil is the main ostrich, 
which paradoxically searches for a leadership role in South America, but keeps its 
distance from the most dangerous conflagration, and the most potentially divisive 
conflict: Colombia.”” However, the unwillingness of Brazil to deal with the drug trade 
on its northern frontier is partly due to its reluctance to regularly patrol this area.
Because it is a large territory covered by dense jungle the undersized Brazilian Army 
would be pressed to maintain a regular presence.
The U.S. has met with objections from other regional states in its efforts to 
combat the illegal narcotics trade, based on familiar concerns of U.S dominance. The 
U.S. had agreed to withdraw its military in Panama by the year 2000. The U.S. prepared 
to leave the Panama Canal to Panamanian authorities, as directed by the Torrijos-Carter 
Treaties signed in 1977. Even as the U.S. prepared to withdraw its military forces from 
Panama, the Panamanian Government tried to negotiate to allow U.S. forces to stav. Thew  •
talks were controversial among Panamanians, ending when President Mireva Moscoso 
said that “never again would there be a US military presence in her c o u n t r y A n y
'^Maxwell. 9.
40Jorge Medina Vieras, “Moscoso Opposes Renewed US Presence,” (text). 
Mexico City NOTIMEX in Spanish (24 January 2000). Translated by the Foreign 
Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-Americas, 27 January 2000, (PrEx 
7.10 FBIS-LAT-2000-0126). Available from World News Connection, July 8, 2001.
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continuation of a U.S. military presence was understood by the U.S. as a deal among 
equals, whereas Panamanians only viewed a continued U.S. presence as denigrating the 
ability of Panama to safeguard the canal and effectively fight drug trafficking. Prior to 
Moscoso, President Ernesto Perez tried to broker an agreement that would place an 
international center to fight drug trafficking and money laundering in the former U.S. 
installations. The center was to be a joint Latin American effort called the Multilateral 
Coordination Center to Fight Drug Trafficking. It was considered during the proceedings 
of the OAS in 1996, but withdrawn due to domestic opposition in Panama.41
Other proposed and active U.S. bases are generating similar nationalist opposition 
in Ecuador and Peru. A U.S. base was established in the Iquitos area of Peru, near the 
border with Ecuador. Its purpose is to provide support to the Peruvian National Counter­
narcotics Directorate that works to eradicate coca crops and to combat drug trafficking 
activities. The residents are strongly opposed to the presence of U.S. Drug Enforcement 
Agents and military personnel who will settle at that location.42 They have threatened 
violent action against them. In Ecuador, a similar dynamics seem to be at work. A U.S. 
base was established in Manta to monitor the flows of heroin and cocaine from the 
Putumayo and Caqueta provinces of Colombia through the basing of advanced air-
4‘“President Repeats Offer To Set Up Antidrug Center," (text). Paris. AFP in 
Spanish (2 July 1996). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS 
Daily Report-Americas. 5 July 1996 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-LAT-96-129). Available from 
World News Connection. July 8. 2001.
42 "Loreto Patriotic Front Gives Ultimatum to DEA. Southcom Members if Base 
Built in Peru." (text). Mexico City, NOTIMEX in Spanish (01 March 2001). Translated 
by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-Americas. 2 March 
2001 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-LAT-2001-0301). Available from World News Connection. July 
8, 2001.
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warning aircraft and their tankers. Although the U.S. presence is supported by a large 
part of the populace, strong doubts remain among congressmen who state that Ecuador 
has “sold-out” and is becoming the “new Panama” of Latin America/3 Antagonists of the 
American presence disliked the expansion of U.S. influence in Ecuador noting that the 
state has already adopted the U.S. dollar as its currency.
CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN REGIONAL SECURITY RELATIONS
Latin American nationalism has had a propensity to be strongly associated with 
anti-U.S. sentiment since the end of World War II. Many Latin American observers 
believed Latin American resistance to U.S. hegemony would be reduced with the end of 
the Cold War. Certainly tensions have been reduced, but opposition to U.S. hegemony 
has not completely dissipated. Certain U.S. actions during the 1990s soothed regional 
concerns, such as the end of U.S. control of the Panama Canal, and the role of the U.S. 
military in the Peru-Ecuador border conflict. Despite the assurance provided by these 
examples, regional states still exhibited mistrust represented by the 1994 Haitian security 
crisis, and continued support for the Cuban government.
Two incidents during the 1990s engendered security cooperation between Latin 
American states and the U.S. by reducing traditional antagonisms concerning state 
sovereignty. The first was the way in which the Peru-Ecuador conflict was resolved, and 
the second dealt with the U.S. peacefully relinquishing control of the Panama Canal. The 
U.S. did not take a unilateral approach when it intervened in the two hundred-year-old
43Anthony Faiola , “U.S. Base In Ecuador Stirs Debate,” Washington Post, 25 
January, 2001, p. 1.
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border dispute between Peru and Ecuador. Fifty years ago the dispute had been solved 
through the vehicle of the Rio Protocol, the agreement including Argentina. Brazil. Chile, 
and the U.S. as guarantors. Although the accord settled contentions on the large majority 
of the border between Peru and Ecuador, the Condor Mountain and Cenepa River areas 
had not been properly mapped before the treaty and therefore remained under dispute."
In 1995 Peru and Ecuador clashed over their interpretations of which state controlled the 
Condor and Cenepa areas. The two sides endured hundreds and possibly thousands of 
casualties.45
Ecuador approved the plan to let the guarantors of the Rio protocol mediate the 
conflict. The complicity of Ecuadoran Government was likely due to the cost of war.
The border war incurred an estimated $7-510 million a day. with one report calculating 
the total cost of the conflict at $250 million.4* Not only was the war blamed for a 
decrease in foreign investment, but also an increase in inflation that had the combined
b e n ja m in  Ortiz Brennan. “Strategic Importance of Condor Range Viewed,” 
(text). Quito HOY in Spanish (19 November 1995). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast 
Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-Americas, 16 January 1995. (PrEx 7.10: FBIS- 
LAT-95-025). Available from the World News Connection. March 5, 2002.
45CasuaIty estimates vary, see James Brooke, “Peru and Ecuador Halt Fighting 
Along Border, Claiming Victory,” New York Times, 15 February 1995; and David Mares. 
“Deterrence Bargaining in Ecuador and Peru's Enduring Rivalry: Designing Strategies 
Around Military Weakness,” Security Studies 6, no. 2 (Winter 1996-97): 91-123.
^ “Newspaper Reports $10 Million Spent Daily on Conflict,” (text). Quito, Voz 
de los Andes in Spanish (7 February, 1995). Translated by Foreign Broadcast 
Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-Americas, 7 February 1995 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS- 
LAT-95-026). Available from World News Connection; January 23, 2002.
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effect of increasing Ecuador’s fiscal deficit.47 Whatever the reason, the U.S. seemed 
prepared to act as an equal partner in unison with the Rio Treaty’s other guarantor states. 
Both Ecuador and Peru agreed to seek a resolution through the Rio Protocol. The 
resulting document signed by antagonists and guarantors was agreed upon in Brasilia in 
February of 1995. Subsequent procedural meetings took place in Argentina and Chile.4*
The peaceful transition of the Panama Canal also helped ease Latin American 
concerns about U.S. dominance. Panama had long been derisively considered the fifty- 
first state of the U.S. throughout the region. Therefore, many Latin American observers 
interpreted the transition of the Panama Canal to Latin American control as the 
conclusion of U.S. occupation. However, because the U.S. president did not attend the 
transition ceremony, the U.S. failed to capitalize on the event. President Clinton, 
concerned that the ceremony might project U.S. weakness as opposed to its willingness to 
compromise, declined to participate in changeover ceremonies. Panamanian Foreign 
Minister Jose Miguel Aleman stated that the absence of President Clinton and the U.S. 
Secretary of State was indicative of the ’’lack of diplomatic courtesy” by the U.S.41' 
Aleman bitterly pointed out that: “the Latin American countries and Panama are
47“Central Bank Chief Warns of Economic Fallout” (text). Paris AFP in Spanish 
(27 February 1995). FBIS Daily Report-Americas. 18 November 1995 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS- 
LAT-95-039). Available from World News Connection, January 23,2002.
■^David Scott Palmer, “Peru-Ecuador Border Conflict: Missed Opportunities. 
Misplaced Nationalism, and Multilateral Peacekeeping,” Journal o f  Interamerican 
Studies and World Affairs 39, no. 3 (Fall 1997): 126-127.
49“Govemment Voices ‘Disappointment’ Over Clinton Absence,” (text). Mexico 
City, NOTIMEX in Spanish (13 December 1999). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast 
Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-Americas, 14 December 1999 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS- 
LAT-99-1213. Available from World News Connection, February 7, 2002.
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disappointed by the fact that the people heading the current U.S. administration are going 
to miss a celebration where they might have shined.”50 Latin American leaders might 
have viewed U.S. participation in the ceremony as a demonstration of U.S. resolve to 
amicably negotiate settlements with less powerful Latin American states. Instead, the 
U.S. was perceived as begrudgingly accepting its eviction from Panama. If the power 
disparity were less between the U.S. and Latin American states the U.S. might have been 
more responsive to the degree of importance that many Latin American states placed on 
the occasion.
Latin American leaders demonstrated their continued mistrust of the U.S. by 
hesitating to approve any intervention during the Haiti crisis in 1994. Many regional 
states declined to support the humanitarian mission despite the obvious human suffering 
and absence of legitimate state authority. The U.S. first opted to consult with the OAS. 
which refused to support the U.S. led initiative. The U.S. then sought approval by the 
UN, where the strength of Latin American opposition was overcome by support for the 
U.S. position. The sequence of events underlies how the U.S. asymmetric power so 
troubles the rest of the OAS membership that they refused to come to the aid of a 
regional state in acute humanitarian need.
The question must be raised, if not Haiti during the 1994 crisis, then when will the 
OAS approve an intervention and under what circumstances? Maingot points out that 
although Latin American states pledged to support and defend democracy in the region 
by signing the Santiago Declaration, they still valued state sovereignty above this
^ i d .
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commitment.51 The explanation for this duality is that Latin American states are more 
concerned about U.S. dominance than they are about supporting democratic norms. 
Whether the U.S. offers a direct threat or not. Latin American distrusts the overwhelming 
nature of U.S. power that has the potential to ruin their economy or destabilize their 
government at the change of a single policy.
As discussed in earlier chapters the issue of Cuban sovereignty has undermined 
Latin America and U.S. relation during most of the Cold War. One might expect these 
differences to fade with the end of the Cold War, the theory being that the Soviet Union 
used Cuba as one of many issues to drive a wedge between the U.S. and Latin America. 
This has not been the case. Sanctions imposed by the U.S. are still a point of contention, 
although states demonstrated a tendency to look beyond their differences with the U.S. on 
the topic of Cuban sovereignty during the 1990s. Key regional states still defend the 
government of Cuba since they believe if the U.S. intervenes in the affairs of any regional 
state, such a precedent may allow the U.S. to do the same in any state in the region.
Most regional states support the idea of democratic change in Cuba, but also 
admire Cuba for circumventing U.S. dominance. For this reason most Latin American 
states disagree with Washington’s economic embargo and political stand against Cuba. 
Mexico’s Minister of Foreign Affairs. Jorge Castaneda, stated that the Fox 
Administration would try to improve its financial, cultural exchange and trade ties with 
Cuba and he added that U.S. policies were impediments to Cuban reform.52 President Fox
5lMaingot. 190-191.
52Ben Barber, “Mexico says it will try to improve ties to Cuba.” The Washington 
Times, 18 February 2001,6.
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stated, “We do not agree with the blockade; we believe that Cuba’s solution must make it
move toward a market-oriented economy and democracy. It is a position different from
that of Washington.”51
Similarly, Brazilian leaders announced their support of Cuban sovereignty, and
therefore disagree with U.S. policy.51 However, a willingness to push the issue of
democratic change in Cuba denotes a degree of movement towards the U.S. position.
President Cardoso broke with Brazil's traditional neutrality on the Cuban government
when he announced his support for human rights and the establishment of democracy.
  %
Cardoso's proclamation angered the Castro government and in retaliation Fidel Castro 
shunned the visit of Brazil's foreign minister in 1998. excusing himself because of 
illness. An observer in the foreign ministry carefully noted that despite Cardoso's 
comments, the President was in no way suggesting he approved of the violation of 
Cuba's sovereignty: “The president’s speech was not against the principle of not 
interfering in the internal affairs of other countries. President Cardoso did not demand 
that Castro call elections now. he only recalled Brazil’s commitment to a democratic 
Cuba.”55
5j **Fo x .  Bush Exchange Opinions on Cuban Issues,” (text). Mexico City
NOTIMEX in Spanish (16 February 2001). Translated by Foreign Broadcast Information
ServiceSBIS Daily Report-Americas, 17 February 2001 (PrEx: 7.10: FBIS-LAT-2001 - 
0217). Available from World News Connection, January 23, 2002.
54Freita.
55Monica Yanakiew, “Brazil: Castro Ignores Brazilian Foreign Minister's Trip to 
Cuba.” (text). Sao Paulo, Agenda Estado in Portuguese (30 May 1998). Translated by 
the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-Americas. I June 1998 
(FBIS-LAT-98-152). Available from World News Connection. January 23,2002.
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However. Brazil and Cuba improved relations both economically and politically 
during President Cardoso's tenure. The state-owned Brazilian oil-company, Petrobras, is 
working with Cuba to begin drilling for oil off the Cuban coast, and Brazil is working 
with Cuba to overhaul its antiquated sugar harvesting techniques. The willingness of 
Brasilia to push democracy in Cuba is still limited, as Cardoso made a point to endorse 
the end of U.S. sanctions against Cuba during a visit to Havana.
Argentina and Venezuela stand at opposite ends of the Cuban issue.
In 1997 President Menem regularly told domestic and international audiences he opposed 
the Cuban government. Menem backed his position, framing an important question 
concerning what he perceived as a double standard applied to regional efforts to 
democratize:
“Cuba is a dictatorship where for the past 36 years human rights have not been 
respected, there is political persecution, and prisons are full.... If we have been 
so tough on Stroesner or Pinochet, who at least left their respective countries in 
working condition, whv should we behave anv differentlv toward Fidel? Or are
*  56there different standards for democracy?
The speech was indicative of improving relations between Washington and Argentina. 
Although not all Latin American leaders fully agreed with the statement, the fact that a 
leader of a major Latin American state said this in a public forum demonstrates that some 
of the difficulties caused by U.S. hegemony in the previous forty years may have been 
receding.
56IsabeI San Sebastian, “Menem Views Relations With Spain,” (text). Madrid, 
ABC Language in Spanish (4 May 1997). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast 
Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-Americas, 4 May 1997 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-LAT- 
97-087). Available from World News Connection, February 19, 2001.
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President Hugo Chavez had a different approach to relations with Cuba. Chavez 
strongly supports Cuba and condemned the U.S. economic embargo against it. Chavez 
promised to provide Castro with half of Cuba’s petroleum needs, and in return Cuba 
agreed to send doctors, trainers and industrial engineers to Venezuela. Chavez claimed 
these actions were part of a broader policy to truncate U.S hegemonic aspirations.5'
CONCLUSION
The GNP totals demonstrate that extreme power asymmetry remained intact 
during the 1990s, except for defense spending indicators that reflected a reduction in U.S. 
spending during the Bush and Clinton Administrations. The end of the Cold War 
introduced a period of reduced U.S. spending, and conversely, an era of economic 
success in Latin America leading to an increase in defense spending. Although enough 
consistent data was presented to note these trends, total U.S. spending was still 
significantly higher. It initially seemed that extreme power asymmetry remained 
entrenched, but the slight deviation in military spending may have had a positive impact 
in regional relations by lessening the extreme dominance of the U.S. This chapter 
reviewed key security issues confronting the region in the post Cold-War order and 
concluded that regional security relations were improved when compared to the prior 
twenty years. It also concluded that the level of improvement could not be directly 
correlated with the small decrease in extreme power asymmetry levels, so other 
explanations for the improvement in security cooperation must be highlighted.
^Scott Wilson , “Chavez, Castro Sign Oil Accord,” Washington Post, 31 October 
31 2000, A-16.
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Table 17 summarizes four Latin American states general attitudes towards issues 
pertinent to U.S. Latin American relations during the 1990s. Argentina's viewpoints 
were most similar to those of the U.S. than other Latin American states, a trend that was 
introduced with the end of dictatorship in 1983, but gathered momentum during the 
1990s. Whereas Brazil may worry about U.S. domination. Argentina seemed to use its 
pro-U.S. policy as a fulcrum against Brazilian dominance. Argentina was supportive of 
the U.S. Gulf War and actually sent military forces to aid the coalition effort. This action 
brought a notably negative reaction from Brasilia. Brazilian leaders perceived
Table 17. Regional Issues Demonstrating Security Cooperation. 1990-2001
FTAA/NAFTA U.S. Drug 
Certification
Plan Colombia U.S. Policy 
Towards Cuba
Argentina Positive Unknown Positive Positive
Brazil Negative Negative Negative Negative
Mexico Positive Negative Neutral Negative
Venezuela Negative Negative Negative Negative
Argentina was currying favor with the U.S. at the expense of Brazilian-U.S. relations. 
President Fernando de la Rua announced his support for Plan Colombia and both de la 
Rua. and his predecessor Menem, made their dislike for Castro publicly known. 
Argentina supported the OAS sponsored multilateral drug effort and did not approve the 
highly unpopular U.S. drug certification policy. Argentina supports the expansion of 
NAFTA, or the creation of the FTAA. Buenos Aires is not as concerned as Brasilia that
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it could become a U.S. dominated institution. Argentine leadership supported both 
Mercosur and U.S. efforts to solicit support for the FTAA.
Brazilian leaders stated that they supported the FTAA. but they preferred an 
agreement negotiated on their terms. Judging by recent policies it seems that Brazil seeks 
to solidify itself as the regional leader through Mercosur, and diversify its domestic trade 
and investment away from U.S. dominance, towards the EU and Asia. Brazilian leaders 
believe these efforts will increase its bargaining position against the U.S.. and allow it to 
enter an FTAA on more favorable terms.58
If Brazil's trade policies were the only signs of disagreement with the U.S. then 
securing Brazilian cooperation on security issues would not be problematic. However. 
Brazilian leaders voiced some disagreement over U.S. policy towards Cuba and stronger 
disagreement with Plan Colombia, both touchstone issues showing a general inclination 
against U.S. hegem ony.A lthough Brazil's stand on both issues was not nearly as clear 
as Chavez's. Brazilian leaders expressed concern that Plan Colombia could lead to a 
long-term U.S. military presence in the Amazon, and therefore they do not want to 
support the U.S. interference with Cuban sovereignty, although it is not supportive of 
Cuba's government.
58 For more on this view. See Susan Kaufman Purcell, "The New U.S.-Brazil 
Relationship,” in Brazil Under Cardoso, eds. Susan Kaufman Purcell and Riorden Roett 
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1997). 92-101.
59Castro asked Cardoso to become his advocate to the U.S. showing a certain 
level of amity. See, Renata Giraldi and Sonia Cameiro, ““Fidel Castro Wants Cardoso to 
Mediate End of US Embargo,” (text). Rio de Janeiro, Jomal do Brasil (Internet Version- 
WWW) in Portuguese (02 November 2000). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast 
Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-Americas, 17 November, 2000 (PrEx 7.10: 
FBIS-LAT-2000-1102). Available from World News Connection, January 23.2002.
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Mexico and the U.S. continued to become closer on economic, political and social 
issues, but more friendly relations did not inhibit Mexican leaders from adopting 
positions opposite of Washington on some other areas. Recently, the Fox Administration 
made it clear Mexico will remain friendly with Cuba. Mexico has chosen the role of 
intermediary between Latin America and the U.S.. denouncing the unilateral drug 
certification policy of the U.S. but constructively countering with the negotiation of a 
bilateral accord.60 In its new role Mexico has warned Washington about how states 
bordering Colombia are concerned about the secondary effects of Plan Colombia.61 
Instead of maintaining the role of interpreter of U.S. actions to Latin America, it has 
become the interpreter of Latin America to the U.S. There are promising signs that the 
Bush and Fox Administrations are forging ahead on key issues that they were formerly 
unable to compromise on. The interdependence reinforced by NAFTA infused a new 
sense of urgency to Mexican-U.S. relations.
Venezuela was opposed to the U.S. in all key regional issues during the 1990s. 
Venezuela had stated their opposition to a regional trade agreement with the U.S. 
Venezuela, like most of the region, severely criticized the U.S. policy of unilateral drug 
certification. Despite FARC incursions on the Venezuelan border and the influx of 
Colombian migrants, Venezuelan leaders believe that the Colombian conflict is an
60F o x  stated that Mexico would make compromises such as agreeing to 
extradition in drug-related crimes. "Mexico, US Prepare Bilateral Fight Against Drugs,” 
(text). Mexico City. Reforma.com WWW-Text in Spanish (18 February 2001). 
Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-Americas. 
20 February 2001 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-LAT-2001-0219). Available from World News 
Connection, February 19, 2001.
61 Jane Perlez, "Mexico Warns Of Colombia Drug War Spillover,” New York 
Times, 31 January 2001, 7.
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internal matter and does not support Plan Colombia. Since the election of Chavez. 
Venezuela is Cuba's strongest proponent, offering Cuba petroleum on favorable terms 
and frequently voicing support of the Cuban government.
The broader trends show that anti-American rhetoric has been substantially 
moderated during the 1990s in Latin America. This trend is in part reflected by the 
regional posture of Latin American leaders toward Cuba that has migrated from strong 
anti-U.S. opinion to one of general disinterest. Since the spread of democracy and the 
reduction of U.S. interventionist activity, democratic and pro-market administrations in 
Latin America find it difficult to support the Cuban form of government. Mexico is the 
most vivid example of the Latin American move away from Cuba. In the past. Mexico 
was Cuba's most ardent supporter: but the Fox Administration has distanced itself from 
that role."'
Latin American states no longer consider democracy and human rights as first 
world issues being imposed on them, and the region has shunned *the third wav'-type 
economic policies aimed at curbing U.S. hegemony. The regional discourse is no longer 
focused on the dogmatic debates of the fiee-market versus import-substitution 
government-led development, but only how far the free-market model is applied to 
developing economies. U.S. leadership in the creation of the FTAA is widely accepted, 
although the timetable for its implementation is still being debated between Brazil and 
the U.S.
During the 1990s. U.S. military power declined by comparison to Latin American
6“Venezuela during the presidency o f Hugo Chavez is the lone exception to this
trend.
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states. The reduction in the overwhelming nature of U.S. hegemony had a positive 
impact in regional security relations, although differences still remain between the region 
and the U.S. One mitigating factor in U.S. hegemony seems to be the creation and 
continued maintenance of the NAFTA accord. Its general effect is to circumvent the 
hegemonic relationship and place U.S .-Mexican relations on a different level than U.S. 
relations with the rest of the region. Recent U.S .-Mexican cooperation under the Bush 
and Fox Administrations is unprecedented, and seems likely to continue as both states are 
forced to confront interdependence in a constructive manner.
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CHAPTER VH
FINAL ANALYSIS: COOPERATION UNDER POWER ASYMMETRY
The central purpose of this dissertation was to explore the obstacles to achieving 
greater security cooperation between Latin America and the U.S. Hegemonic stability 
theory was used as a tool to understand the historical interaction between regional states. 
The use of hegemonic stability theory necessitated analysis at the structural level, 
avoiding the more common state-level approaches normally applied to Latin American- 
U.S. relations. Hegemonic stability aptly described the relative peace between regional 
states, but did not account for the undercurrent of non-cooperation exemplified by 
varying degrees of Latin American distrust of U.S. hegemony. This weakness in 
hegemonic stability theory prompted the question: Could varying levels of power 
asymmetry in the hegemonic system explain some of the problems in security relations? 
More to the point: Do higher levels of U.S. power asymmetry negatively impact U.S.- 
Latin American security relations? The research question, how does power asymmetry 
impact security cooperation between the U.S. and Latin America?, provided a framework 
to test the contention that higher levels of power asymmetry may negatively impact the 
security cooperation generated by a hegemonic system.
The case study chapters demonstrate that the U.S .-Latin American security 
relationship is aptly described by hegemonic stability theory. The historical analysis 
suggests that the regional relationship is not a pure power relationship, nor it is likely that 
Latin American states would have banded together to balance against the U.S., and form 
a security-based alliance to deter U.S. unilateral actions. Instead, all functioning security
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alliances in the region include the U.S. as the senior partner. Hegemonic stability explains 
why states have not formed a cohesive front against the U.S., because the hegemon 
provides public goods to the weaker states in the form of stability. However, as the brief 
review below will show, the strength of U.S. hegemony also created problems for 
regional security cooperation.
The deleterious impact of extreme power asymmetry began to show several 
decades after the U.S. Civil War. The U.S. status as the regional hegemon began to 
emerge with the end of the Civil War. Latin American states were for the most part 
receptive to the role of the U.S. because the U.S. showed a willingness to intervene when 
Latin American states were threatened by European incursions. Regional incursions by 
Spain and France during the Civil War were both turned back by the threat of U.S. force, 
and a British threat against Venezuela several years later. Latin American states lauded 
the exercise of U.S. power, as the U.S. seemed to become the regional broker of state 
sovereignty.
However. Latin America soon grew to recognize their inability to influence U.S. 
security policies, leading them to realize that the unilateral security guarantee by the U.S. 
could be a double-edged sword. The Baltimore incident was a lesson to Chileans that the 
U.S. was able to enforce its policies without what they deemed as proper attention to their 
state sovereignty. The purpose of the first Pan-American Conference was to rectify the 
tendency of the U.S. to set security policy for the hemisphere, a goal both sides of the Rio 
Grande concurred with for different reasons. The U.S. wanted to reduce their regional 
obligations as laid out in the Monroe Doctrine, Latin American states sought to curb U.S. 
power. Although the first Pan American Conference and three follow-on events forged
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the Pan-American Union, little progress was made beyond the founding of the 
organization because of lingering Latin American suspicions of U.S. dominance. As 
regional historian Lloyd Meecham points out. “Yankeephobe intellectuals in Larin 
America were becoming popular at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of 
the twentieth century."1 Larin American leaders began to realize the limitations of 
security arrangements under a hegemon that was comparatively too powerful. Security 
agreements among disproportionate powers are difficult to maintain. What may be 
cooperation can be interpreted as coercion, and the ability of the system to produce 
visible public goods becomes increasingly complicated.
The Wilson Administration's interventionist policies against the Caribbean, 
Central America and Mexico were negatively viewed in much of Latin America, and as a 
result, hemispheric security relations languished. Wilson had a policy that justified 
intervention against all non-democratic governments, a prescription viewed as moralistic 
by the U.S.. but imperialistic by Latin Americans. With Argentina and Mexico at the 
forefront of anti-U.S. sentiment, many Latin American leaders equated security 
cooperation under Pan-Americanism as approval of U.S. expansionism. Latin American 
states began to commit to a strategy to displace U.S. regional influence by positively 
affecting trade flows with Europe, and thus reducing the hegemonic influence of the U.S. 
Many Latin American leaders throughout the Cold War mimicked this strategy.
Interventionist U.S. policy subsided with the onset of the Great Depression. 
Because the U.S. had neither the will nor the capacity to intervene, it seemed logical that 
President Roosevelt's ‘Good-Neighbor Policy' was a natural outcome. Whether the
lMecham, The United States and Inter-American Security, 34.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
229
origins of the policy were altruistic, or executed in self-interest, it resuscitated Latin 
American-U.S. friendship. Improving relations cleared the way for security cooperation 
in the form of an anti-intervention treaty signed at the seventh hemispheric summit in 
1933. The depression reduced power asymmetry in the system, with the ultimate impact 
of increasing trust among the U.S. and Latin American states. The positive atmosphere 
fostered by a reduction of power asymmetry to more acceptable levels by weaker states in 
the system greatly benefited U.S. efforts to successfully lobby regional states to support 
the Allied cause during World War II.
After World War II the military and economic power of the U.S. reached an apex 
unparalleled in world history. Post-World War II security cooperation began on a 
positive note with the creation of institutions that had remained elusive under the prior 
fifty years of Pan American meetings. The creation of these institutions belied the 
strength of the post World War II hegemonic system. Several important treaties were 
signed, including; the IADB in 1942. the Rio Treaty in 1947, and the OAS Charter and 
Pact of Bogota in 1948. The Rio Treaty, in particular symbolized the growth of trust in 
the hemisphere compared to regional relations twenty years earlier. It focused on 
codifying security cooperation among regional states, a goal that the Pan American 
Union could never achieve. During this period and into the early 1950s, Latin American 
states regularly supported U.S. proposed security measures in the UN and OAS.
With the growth of U.S. power relative to other regional states, security 
cooperation steadily deteriorated. The U.S. directed a series of overt and covert 
operations aimed at overthrowing Latin American regimes in Cuba and Guatemala, 
culminating in the widely condemned intervention of the Dominican Republic in 1965.
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The U.S. miscalculated the degree of Ladn American support in the Cuban-U.S. dispute. 
Latin American states began to identify with Cuba, although most regional states did not 
approve of Cuba's form of government. This duality can be explained by the ability of 
Cuba to attain independence from U.S. influence. Cuba became a symbolic focal point 
for U.S .-Latin American security relations. The more Latin American states thought the 
U.S. was imposing its will, the stronger they seemed to support Cuban efforts to 
circumvent U.S. hegemony. At an OAS meeting in the early 1960s, the U.S. was unable 
to gamer support for its measure that condemned Cuban human rights abuses. Instead, 
the U.S. settled for a measure vaguely aimed at Cuba denouncing communist principles.
Latin American leaders were becoming increasingly frustrated with the public 
goods the U.S. provided to hemispheric states. Latin American states expected a great 
deal of economic support from the U.S. in the post World War II era. They were 
expecting something akin to the Marshall Plan rewarding regional states for their support 
of the Allied cause during the war. They were disappointed by the lack of corporate 
investment and monetary infusion, noticing the U.S. did far more to help its former 
enemies. Japan and Germany, than hemispheric allies. As U.S. power grew Latin 
American states expected to accrue some benefit. The U.S. raised regional expectations 
when the Kennedy Administration initiated the Alliance for Progress, but the program did 
not meet the level of economic support that Latin American states thought was necessary 
to alleviate regional poverty.
A division over the kind of public goods offered by the U.S. began to become 
pronounced during the 1960s. Both sides thought that the U.S. should provide stability, 
but how that stability would be achieved was the central question. Latin American states
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thought the public goods required to achieve stability should be in the form of economic 
and social support to relieve their intractable problems with poverty and education. The 
U.S. thought it provided stability in terms of protection from Soviet intervention.
Regional arrangements began to emerge that excluded the U.S.. such as the Andean 
Common Market, the Latin American Free Trade Area, and the Latin American 
Economic System, as the U.S. was increasingly perceived as the security threat rather 
than a security partner. The public goods equation was influenced by the more visible 
role the U.S. played in regional security as power asymmetry remained a key feature of 
the post World War II era. As the U.S. became more visible in the region because of its 
strong hegemonic position, expectations on what the U.S. should, and should not. provide 
increased.
Although the regional dominance of the U.S. did not subside during the 1970s. the 
oil crisis, combined with Latin American economic growth early in the decade, gave the 
short-term impression U.S. power was declining. Due to the defeat and social unrest 
attributed to the Vietnam War. the U.S. public was inclined towards the support of an 
isolationist foreign policy. Double-digit inflation and high unemployment rates brought 
on by an oil crisis added to national pessimism and forced the Carter Administration to 
become less interventionist in Latin America. The Carter Administration viewed U.S. 
economic problems as the signs of a permanent decrease in U.S. power and believed the 
U.S. must learn to act multilaterally to exist in such an environment.
In the same time frame Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico began the decade with 
growing economies, bolstered by strong export earnings and domestic consumption. 
However, hyperinflation from over-borrowing, and the impact of the global economic
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crisis, sent Latin American states into debt. These states began the decade with the 
perception they were gaining vis-a-vis Washington, supported by statistics showing their 
imports and export dependence on the U.S. to be shrinking, only to be frustrated by a 
dramatic downturn leaving the national outlook cynical and embittered. Just as the U.S. 
self-perception of declining fortunes made it more compliant on security issues towards 
Latin America. Latin American self-perceptions of success, dashed by crushing 
hyperinflation, made it less amenable to U.S. overtures. Despite the Carter 
Administration's attempts to improve relations by trying to negotiate with Nicaraguan 
revolutionaries, to increase contacts with Cuba, and to negotiate the end of the U.S. 
occupation of the Panama Canal, inter-American security cooperation was barely 
functioning.
Perhaps if Latin American economies had not experienced severe downturns that 
crushed growing Latin American confidence. Carter's attempts to use multilateral forums 
rather than unilateral action might have been viewed as constructive engagement by 
regional states. However, the economic turmoil of the 1970s forced Latin American 
states to look inward, too absorbed by domestic concerns to notice overtures from the 
U.S. Washington's motivations stemmed from its own self-perception of declining 
international status. Eras of economic or security crises seemed to have a different 
impact on hegemonic powers and weaker states: whereas crises seemed to force Latin 
American states to look inward, they made the U.S. search outward for regional allies to 
shore up an eroding hegemonic position. The radicalizadon of Latin American policies 
towards the U.S. was highlighted by the proliferation o f dependency theory that cast U.S.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
233
hegemony in a negative tight and regional flirtation with the Soviet Union as a means to 
balance against the U.S.
During the 1980s the inability of Latin American states to balance U.S. military or 
economic power led to greater insecurities. Whereas South American states usually 
considered themselves ethnically and geographically separate from the Caribbean and 
Central America, they now took stronger interests when the U.S intervened in any part of 
Latin America. Despite the hemispheric growth of democracy, regional states 
demonstrated outward sympathy to non-democratic regimes in Argentina, Cuba,
Grenada. Nicaragua, and Panama. Latin American states viewed U.S. interventions 
against any regional state as a potential threat against themselves, and the U.S. 
democratic justification as a cynical pretext.
Argentina and Brazil both embarked on aggressive campaigns to build indigenous 
arms-manufacturing industries, aimed in part at their interstate rivalry, but also to gain 
autonomy from the U.S. dominance. These expensive efforts continued despite economic 
hardships, underlying the degree of concern these states viewed on U.S. dominance. 
Complaints from the U.S. concentrated on Argentine and Brazilian attempts to sell 
ballistic missile technology to Middle Eastern countries, and was vehemently rebuffed as 
yet another attempt by the U.S. to interfere with state autonomy.
The 1990s marked an important event: the end of the Cold War, the decrease of 
the perceived threat by the U.S., and its subsequent reduction in defense expenditure. 
Since the defense expenditure of the U.S. dropped, so did the level of power asymmetry 
in the region, and security cooperation increased. The decade after the Cold War resulted 
in many regional states conforming to the hegemon by moving towards liberal economic
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and democratic reforms. Government representatives in Buenos Aires and Mexico City 
tended to side more frequently with the U.S. on regional security issues. Economic 
integration attributable to NAFTA generated good will between the Mexico and the U.S. 
Issues such as cooperation against the illegal narcotics trade, illegal migration, and 
commercial trade, were being positively addressed between national officials. The U.S. 
and Argentina vastly improved relations, although Argentina's ongoing economic crisis 
has placed a question mark on this trend continuing. The U.S. and Brazil still maintain 
differences over the drug war but reached a compromise in the OAS on cooperation in 
this arena, and recently the U.S. has pledged to fund a Brazilian sponsored plan to curb 
drug use in the region. Because of Chavez's strong stands against several U.S. regional 
policies, and Washington's unwillingness to engage Chavez. Venezuela and the U.S. 
have not maintained productive relations.
This research shows that the lack of security cooperation between Latin America 
and the U.S. described in the case study chapters reviewed above can be attributed to 
extreme power asymmetry. Power asymmetry explains why security cooperation was 
more difficult during certain periods, such as the early 1900s, and from roughly 1965 to 
1994. Conversely, security cooperation increased during the post Civil War and post- 
Depression periods, when the U.S. had not yet obtained regional dominance (Civil War), 
and when the U.S. significantly reduced its regional presence (Depression). During 
periods of reduced U.S. power asymmetry the U.S. intervened in regional states to a 
lesser degree, and was more inclined to pursue multilateral as opposed to unilateral 
policies.
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During times of extreme hegemony the U.S underutilized regional institutions 
since it was tempted by its capability to unilaterally enforce its policies. For this reason 
the OAS was disregarded as a vital instrument of regional security during most of Cold 
War. The IADB, Rio Treaty, and OAS are the focus of regional multinational security 
efforts. All were created before extreme power asymmetry negatively impacted the 
hegemonic system.
Distrust related to extreme power asymmetry also explains the Latin American 
tendency to search for alternatives to the U.S. during the I960-1980s period. During 
times of extreme power asymmetry Latin American states tended to look to Europe. 
Japan and the Soviet Union as a means to circumvent what they perceived as dominance. 
The EU, Japan, and the Soviet Union all took their turns in courting individual Latin 
American states from the 1960s to the 1980s. Many Latin American states turned to 
regional alternatives also. Organizations such as the Andean Group and Mercosur were 
in part created to reduce Latin American dependency on the U.S. Despite the negative 
impact of power asymmetry, the research also shows that the majority of states 
acknowledged the benefits of the hegemonic system at any given time. Because Latin 
American states were not determined enough to undermine U.S. hegemony through 
balancing against it. some level of advantage must have been perceived.
In the 1990s the Latin American preoccupation with sovereignty cooled although 
power asymmetry remained relatively unchanged. Latin American defense of Cuba has 
subsided except for the unique case of the Chavez regime in Venezuela. Regional 
sensitivities still exist over the conduct of the drug war but the U.S. has established bases 
in Ecuador and Curasao, and received cooperation from Peru. Bolivia and Colombia.
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The Brazilian approach had been to ignore the problem and oppose U.S. initiatives, but 
even Brazilian sensitivity over the Amazon region in the North is giving way to 
cooperation sponsored in the OAS and forced to some degree by the heightened conflict 
in Colombia.
The increasing trust between the U.S. and Latin America during the 1990s is more 
difficult to explain since U.S. economic power grew substantially during the period. 
Several potential explanations exist for recent improvement in security relations. One is 
that despite continued power asymmetry, growing globalization has forced the U.S. to 
acknowledge Latin American interests. Competition from the EU encouraged the U.S. to 
implement NAFTA. Because U.S. interests are more tightly aligned with Mexican 
interests through NAFTA, the U.S. is consistently aware of Mexican domestic problems, 
and maintains an open dialog with the Mexican government to maintain bilateral 
stability. The growing U.S. energy dependency also makes regional stability more 
important than in the past. The petroleum production of Mexico and Venezuela has 
grown in importance, particularly due to the growing instabilities in the Persian Gulf 
region. Finally, the growing strength of the EU as a competitor to U.S. global leadership 
encourages the U.S. to increase its multilateral ties to Latin America and push for an 
FTAA.
Locating the precise moments when extreme power asymmetry impacted security 
cooperation is difficult because of the complex relationship between power asymmetry 
and security cooperation as well as a lag-time between power changes and system 
reaction. In this case study chapter 3 contains two examples of hegemony under 
acceptable power asymmetry: after the U.S. Civil War until the end of the century and
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from the beginning of the depression until the end of World War II. Chapter 3 also has 
one example of extreme power asymmetry, from the turn of the century until the 
depression. Even with these obvious cases exact dates are difficult to identify because of 
a lag-time between eras. For example, the true security benefits of beneficial levels of 
power asymmetry produced after the depression did not appear until the early 1940s. 
although the actions to create that cooperative behavior occurred fifteen to twenty years 
earlier. Also, there was a notable change in Latin American opinion towards the U.S. 
near the end of the nineteenth century, however the true lack of security cooperation was 
demonstrated by the lack of security cooperation produced by the Pan American Union 
and Latin American sensitivity towards U.S. interventionism during that era.
The connection between hegemony and security cooperation is complex, making 
the task of isolating specific moments when extreme power asymmetry negatively 
affected security relations difficult to identify in case study chapters 4 through 7. There 
are points when extreme power asymmetry seems to be clearly defined. After World 
War II Latin American states approved of U.S. interventions until 1965. when there was a 
backlash against the U.S. action in the Dominican Republic. During this period the 
negative impact of power asymmetry seemed to reach its height during the 1970s. In the 
late 1970s U.S. power and unilateral policies declined: a similar pattern to U.S. policy 
change due to the depression during the 1930s. However, strong Latin American distrust 
remained, and generally rebuffed U.S. attempts to peacefully mediate the Nicaraguan 
conflict.
Through the collection of empirical evidence the study identified several stress 
points in regional security relations that were used to identify when weaker states became
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uncomfortable with power asymmetry. These stress points included an increase of Latin 
American sensitivity towards sovereignty issues, an increase in Latin American efforts to 
find alternatives to U.S. dependency, and an increase in U.S. unilateral action. When 
U.S. power rose to unacceptable levels there was a notable increase in Latin American 
sensitivity to any sovereignty issue. Latin American states were extraordinarily defensive 
of U.S. policies against Cuba, not so much because they supported Cuban policies, but 
because they sensed if they were complacent on the issue it was tantamount to approving 
similar U.S. policies against other states in the region. As U.S. power rose to 
unacceptable levels Latin American leaders began to increase their efforts to ameliorate 
their security dependencies on the U.S. through internal or external economic and 
security arrangements. Power asymmetry also resulted in an increase in U.S. unilateral 
behavior. When U.S. power grew the temptation to act in its own interests without 
regional consultation would grow. When power asymmetry was extreme Latin American 
leaders demonstrated their mistrust of U.S. leadership by disapproving of any U.S. 
intervention for humanitarian reasons or security concerns. Latin American opposition 
increased the likelihood of U.S. unilateral action that resulted in the erosion of 
multilateral institutions.
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS SCHOLARSHIP
This study opens debate into a dimension of hegemonic stability theory not yet 
explored and to this moment assumed. It suggests that hegemony can no longer be 
thought of in one dimension: the level of power asymmetry in a given system must be 
taken into consideration. The consequence of power asymmetry is to work against the
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stability created by the presence of the hegemonic system by creating mistrust among the 
weaker states in the system against the hegemon. As the power of the hegemon grows, it 
tends to rely increasingly on material incentives to spread its power since it is already 
generating a surplus of this commodity. There were two important time periods in which 
extreme power asymmetry happened. The first occurred during the last years of the 
nineteenth century and the early years of the twentieth century, the second proceeding 
World War II. After the increase in U.S. military and economic power, relative to Latin 
America, interventions increased as well, one expression of the U.S.'s use of material 
incentives. The question of the legitimacy of interventions is not the primary issue, but 
the fact that they resulted in Latin American sensitivity to any expression of U.S. power 
helped create distrust among regional states directed against the U.S. This distrust eroded 
the positive impact of hegemony. This occurred by weakening the role of the hegemon in 
supporting regional institutions, security or economic initiatives. Opposition to the U.S. 
was symbolized by initial support for the Cuban revolution, sustained over the years 
despite the spread of democratic norms that Cuban leadership had rejected. Further.
Latin American distrust led to the active search for an alternative to the hegemon, as 
Latin American states turned toward Europe. Japan, and finally regional agreements 
excluding the U.S.
The opposite is also verified by the study. When extreme power asymmetry is 
alleviated, relations between the hegemon and weaker states generally improved. This 
occurred because the exercise of material incentives of the hegemon was curtailed, 
eventually reducing the level of distrust between the U.S. and Latin American states over 
the course of several years. After years of active intervention, the Depression led to
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Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy. The U.S. lacked the resources and therefore the will 
to intervene in Central America and the Caribbean as it had during the previous twenty 
years. As noted in chapter three, the Good Neighbor Policy was hailed in Latin America, 
improving regional relations and setting the stage for a high level of cooperation during 
World War II. The power of the U.S. was curtailed once again during the 1970s due to 
economic crises, over-extension in Vietnam, and other domestic concerns. Regional 
relations and security cooperation significantly dipped during this era, even as President 
Jimmy Carter actively worked to improve ties by curbing arms exports, support 
democracy, and reawaken a multilateral forum to solve regional security issues. This 
result can be explained by decreasing Latin American power during the 1970s. occurring 
in tandem with the decline of the U.S.
This study demonstrates that when hegemonic stability theory is applied, 
hegemonic power should not be considered static. The power level of the hegemon is 
likely to fluctuate over time, and this fluctuation affects the system. When a hegemon 
accrues excessive power relative to the weaker states in the system, dynamics occur that 
impede security cooperation despite the presence of public goods. The primary good of 
the hegemonic system, in that it promotes stability and fosters the best possible 
environment for the expansion of wealth that benefits all states in the system, can be 
eroded by extreme power asymmetry.
This study also provides a systemic base from which to examine U.S.-Latin 
American security relations, a perspective largely neglected in the literature dealing with 
hemispheric relations. Literature concerning regional relations typically focuses on 
state-level analysis, such as the enabling of democratic institutions or the spread of free-
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market principles to enable domestic growth. Another popular approach is to compare 
the cultural differences of each side to determine which one requires renovation to 
improve regional relations. The systemic view tells us that the spread of political, 
economic and cultural structures is a result of the diffusion of the norms of the hegemon 
through a socialization process, or as Ikenberry and Kupchan label it. alteration of 
substantive beliefs. Since they are a result of the system, it may be more helpful to focus 
on these phenomena from the structural view as opposed to state or unit levels.
Although this study utilizes the systemic level and maintains that such an analysis 
has the potential to explain the majority of state behavior, it also recognizes that other 
theories at the state level are useful in identifying contributing causal variables. The 
systemic level is appropriate for examining international relations dynamics over large 
periods of time, however state-level theories allow a researcher to examine particular 
events in more depth than systems-Ievel analysis allows.
Individual studies of Latin American or U.S. culture may shed light on problems 
in the inter-American dialog. Prominent works regarding state-level theory were 
reviewed in Chapter 2. Huntington explains how the prominence of U.S. culture in Latin 
America can create domestic resentment in Latin American states, and therefore harm 
regional relations. Schoultz focuses on the superiority that U.S. citizens feel towards 
Latin Americans, and how that attitude negatively impacts U.S. foreign policy. Wiarda 
and Fukuyama focus on different views of Latin American and U.S. social structure to 
explain the relative success of the U.S. compared to the challenges faced by most Latin 
American states. Wiarda argues that U.S. policy makers should consider these 
differences.
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Other state-level factors such as changes in domestic political and economic 
institutions are frequently used to explain the improvement or decline in domestic 
circumstances. Dominguez focuses on the regional transformation towards republican 
democracy as a foundation for improving relations. Other authors focus on the efforts of 
Latin American states changes their economic structure as a means to promote greater 
stability and improve regional relations.
These state-level theories are capable of describing certain aspects of U.S .-Latin 
American relations in depth, but do not provide an analysis broad enough to explain the 
reoccurring patterns in U.S .-Latin American relations across time. The power asymmetry 
argument explains why security cooperation between the U.S. and Latin America has 
occurred despite cultural differences, changes in types of government and economic 
structure.
Detailed case studies of the time periods involving the sudden growth of U.S. 
power, and sudden reduction would be helpful in determining how the hegemonic system 
conformed to those circumstances. By studying these periods in isolation details may 
emerge to further explain why security cooperation decreases and ways to ameliorate this 
phenomena.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The U.S. must work to reduce the negative impact of power asymmetry, which 
may improve the perception of Latin American leaders towards the U.S. One method to 
accomplish this is by working harder to support a multilateral forum for Latin American 
states to provide input into regional issues. Unilateral U.S. action must be avoided as
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much as possible, although leadership stipulates it must occur on occasions. Institutions 
exist to enable U.S. consultation; these multilateral organizations should be given greater 
importance in Washington's overall foreign policy. The pattern of reoccurring power 
asymmetry among regional states is not likely to dissipate in the foreseeable future. The 
U.S. can increase regional security cooperation and facilitate its ability to lead on key 
security issues by at a minimum consulting with Latin American states, and when 
possible including Latin American states in the solution as in the case of the Peru- 
Ecuador border conflict.
In order to reduce the negative impact of hegemonic leadership the U.S. must also 
show tolerance for the Latin American states that disagree with Washington's policies. 
The U.S. maintained a more moderate response to Venezuela and Cuba during the last ten 
years. Despite the efforts of the U.S.. deep Latin American suspicions remain. For 
example, although there is little evidence to charges against the U.S. that it planned to 
overthrow Chavez with domestic opposition in 2002. many policy makers in Latin 
America believe this has been the case. The U.S. will always find its credibility in 
sovereignty issues to be very low. mostly due to power asymmetry. However, the U.S. 
must demonstrate a willingness to engage its critics rather than give the appearance of 
condescension, as it has done in some past cases.
If Latin American states truly want to influence the kind of public goods the U.S. 
is willing to offer, it must seek to engage the U.S. in a NAFTA type arrangement. The 
prognosis of the region-wide implementation of an FTAA is not promising. Argentina 
was in line to negotiate its entry into a trade agreement with the U.S. behind Chile, 
however Argentina became mired in financial crises during the last part of 2001 that
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endangered the Mercosur agreement, and will likely curtail its partnership in any other 
similar agreement. The economic crisis of Argentina may affect the Brazilian position on 
the FTAA. encouraging Brazil to push for a region-wide integration plan during the next 
five to ten years. If the U.S. were to support a free-trade agenda, it is conceivable that 
this action might create enough momentum to bring a recovered Argentina, and even 
Brazil into an arrangement, with the rest of Latin America following suit. The continued 
growth of the Mexican economy also will act as encouragement to other Latin American 
states.
Cooperation seemed to marginally improve during the 1990s, but power 
asymmetry may increase in light of the growing U.S. defense expenditures. The power 
asymmetry argument dictates that a new undercurrent of distrust is likely to challenge 
whatever progress has been made during the 1990s. This means it is likely another era of 
strong hegemony may create security cooperation problems between the U.S. and Latin 
America. The Colombian issue is one potential issue that will test regional relations. 
Latin American hostility to extreme U.S. hegemony will continue to express itself around 
sovereignty issues and lead to periodic quests to find alternatives to U.S. power in the 
region. The best method for Latin American states to ameliorate the impact of extreme 
power asymmetry is to successfully bind the U.S. to an FTAA scheme that creates a 
mechanism that increases the likelihood the U.S. will pay attention to their agenda.
There are two positive indicators that show security cooperation, and therefore 
regional stability, improved over periods when power asymmetry was more extreme. 
First, U.S. leadership seems increasingly dedicated to engaging Latin American states on 
a regular basis. This is motivated primarily by trade concerns, but also because there is
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an increasing recognition that unilateral policies tend to be counterproductive in the long­
term. Second, the U.S. as the hegemon has been successful at socializing the system 
since its norms are now widely accepted in Latin America. Democracy and free market 
economies proliferated and continue to endure in Latin America as in no other time in 
history. With democratic reforms and liberalization creating some degree of stability in 
most Latin American states, the political discourse has moderated. The combination of 
growing interdependence, and wide acceptance of common political and economic values 
may be enough to block the negative impact of extreme power asymmetry.
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